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POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE INDIAN REPUBLIC; AN EVALUATION 
OF CHANGING PATTERNS SINCE INDEPENDENCE
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"India forms an integra] part of Mackinder's 'World Island,'
that is the Eur-African-Asiatic land mass, the most important single
1geographical unit of the world." During the long period of British 
colonial rule the Indian subcontinent was politically fragmented, 
economically unviable, and culturally diverse to a degree tlmt both 
distressed and challenged the new national leaders. After independence 
in 1947, India was confronted with several acute problems which changed 
many geographical patterns existing prior to that time. India was par­
titioned on a religious basis, and this partition caused an unprecedented 
movement of population from one political unit to another, creating major 
problems in finding food, housing, and employment for refugees.
Prior to independence India was divided into 562 small princely 
states and nine British provinces. To consolidate these small fragmented 
areas into larger geographical units was a great problem for Indian 
leaders. The consolidation created new economic, political, cultural,
G. E. Pearcy, World Political Geography (New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell Company, 1957), pp. 517-518.
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and other geographical patterns, and there followed a major reorganization 
and magnification of many existing problems. Among the outstanding prob­
lems were the uneven distribution of natural resources, which magnified 
the task of economic development, especially in establishing new industries 
in all states on an equal basis. Further, fragmentation of the existing 
political structure resulted in such a power vacuum that the Congress Party 
for many years had no effective opposition.
The central government, dominated by the Congress Party, had to 
face the formidable task of incorporating foreign enclaves, developing 
offshore islands, and creating friendly relations with neighboring inde­
pendent units. At the time of independence there were several French and 
Portuguese enclaves, offshore islands, and small independent kingdoms 
within, or adjacent to, the Indian subcontinent. It was essential for 
India either to absorb these areas or to maintain friendly relations with 
them. In subsequent developments both approaches were employed in hand­
ling this problem.
In addition to the task of establishing friendly relations with 
the small neighboring countries India has had to seek a way to deal 
effectively with China. The Chinese ideology of Communism is profoundly 
dissimilar to Indian democracy. The political and ideological differ­
ences between India and China created a threat not only to India but to 
the whole of Asia.
Indian political relations have been equally unsatisfactory with 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Pakistani nationhood, which likewise 
dates from the 194-7 partition, is based upon religious concepts which are 
contrary to the principles of the Indian secular state. The hostility
3
between India and Pakistan has been intensified because of the Kashmir 
question.
The problems of nationhood are numerous and complex, not only 
because of India's size, population, and the great number of languages 
and dialects spoken within its borders, but also because the nation has 
chosen to solve its problems within the framework of parliamentary demo­
cracy. Finding solutions to the various problems becomes more cumbersome 
because India is like a museum of races and cultures, cults and customs, 
and faiths and tongues, with a vast gap between the rich and the poor 
and between the educated and the illiterate. Nevertheless, despite this 
diversity there is a considerable degree of unity in India, a unity 
characterized by love of country, devotion to democratic principles, some 
common historical bonds, at least some elements of cultural similarity, 
and certain common interests which cement the Indian nation and popula­
tion together.
In this dissertation the writer will evaluate the changing 
geographical patterns since independence as they relate to internal and 
external problems, to the viability of the Indian state, and to inter­
national relations. In order to accomplish these ends it will be 
necessary to review the existing relevant literature', to assess the 
geographical environment, to recount certain spatial details of the 
internal political situation, to analyze external political influences, 
and to evaluate international relations and problems.
Research in the literature was undertaken at the libraries of 
the University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State University, at the Library 
of Congress, and at the Embassy of India Library, Washington, D. C. A
4
variety of published and unpublished material was borrowed from the 
Office of the Geographer, Department of State, Washington, D. C. Primary 
sources consulted include government reports, newspapers, maps, and 
unpublished dissertations on various aspects of the problem. Secondary 
source materials were in the form of books, articles in various profes­
sional journals or periodicals, yearbooks, and atlases. Although there 
is a vast amount of literature available bearing on the geography, his­
tory, economics, and politics of India, much of which was reviewed, a 
significant part was not fully utilized in this study, since it had no 
direct relationship to the main theme. Significant portions of the 
published material utilized have been written by political scientists 
and economists. A smaller fraction has been written by geographers. 
Several new maps and tables were prepared in order to interpret the 
changing geographical patterns and to analyze the effects of such altered 
patterns on the viability and stability of the nation.
Following the introduction, the study presents a general picture 
of the physical setting in chapter two. In chapter three the writer has 
examined the distribution of agricultural, mineral, and forest resources 
and evaluated the impact of these geographical considerations on the 
political and economic viability of the country. A description and 
interpretation of the changing political map of India, along with new 
emerging patterns of political party strength, follows in chapters four 
and five. Boundary problems and external relations with neighbors as 
well as with power blocs are discussed in chapters six and seven as an 
approach in evaluating the prospects for stability and peace in the 
region. In the concluding chapter the effects of changing patterns are
5
reviewed, and the writer anticipates future developments in the light of 
the changed conditions since independence.
In evaluating the political-geographic patterns, the author has 
attempted to balance generalizations with pertinent details and examples. 
There is a fertile ground for geographers to conduct additional research, 
particularly in the changing territorial arrangement of political parties, 
the regional disparities in the distribution of economic, cultural, and 
social elements, and the evolving political patterns relating to economic 
development.
The contributions of this study to the existing literature are 
varied. This is the first balanced political geography of the Indian 
nation taking into account the whole sequence of changing patterns since 
independence. Other studies on this subject either emphasize non- 
geographical aspects of the question or are related to the details of 
one particular aspect of political geography. Currently, while the rest 
of Southeast Asia is under the threat of Communist expansion, this study 
provides insight into the causes and explanations for the survival of 
India as a democratic state. It also paves the way for geographical 
studies of lesser scope on different aspects of political geography. 
Political and economic factors which need further study include the 
effects of the geographical environment on voting behavior, geographical 
arrangements of the tribal areas of Assam and the North East Frontier 
Agency, effects of changing political party affiliation on foreign policy, 
causes and effects of regional antagonisms on national unity, river water 
disputes among the various states, and regional disparities in the eco­
nomic sphere. This dissertation has sketched the broad aspects of Indian
6
political geography5 a detailed study of the component problems is outside 
the ken of this study.
CHAPTER II 
PHYSICAL SETTING
India, the seventh most extensive and second most populous 
country, is the largest democracy in the world. Lying in the northern 
hemisphere, it extends between latitudes 8°4''1S" and 37°17'53" N. and 
longitudes 68°7'33" and 97°24'47" E. It measures about 3,219 kilometers 
from north to south, 2,977 kilometers from east to west, and covers an 
area of 3,267,053 square kilometers. It has a land frontier 15,168 
kilometers long and coastline of 5,689 kilometers (Fig. 1).
Physiographically, India can be divided into four well-defined 
divisions, each of which has a direct or indirect impact on the political 
setting of the country. These divisions are: (1) the Himalayas, (2)
the Great Plain of Northern India, (3) the Southern Peninsula, and (4) 
the Coastal Plains (Fig. 2).
The Himalayas
Strategically, the most important division is the Himalayan 
mountain chain. This range is the world’s highest mountain system, and 
one of the longest, extending almost uninterriçtedly for a distance of 
2,500 kilometers. Three more or less parallel ranges are evident, the 
Greater of Zanskar Range, often known as the Inner Himalayas; the 
Lesser or Pangi Range, sometimes called the Middle Himalayas; and the
INDIA AND THE WORLD
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Siwalik or Pirpanjal Range which has been designated the Outer Himalayas. 
In each range the southern slope is steep, whereas the northern slope is 
much gentler.. "The northern slopes are generally forest clad below the 
snow line, but the southern slopes are too precipitous either to accumu­
late snow or to support more than a sparse tree growth, except in valley 
1basins." The Greater Himalayan Range begins at the peak of Nanga Parbat 
near the bend of the Indus, and extends southeastward and eastward to 
the Brahmaputra gorge. Its average elevation is 7,000 meters, and its 
average width is 25 kilometers.
The Lesser Himalayan Range, which rarely rises to more than 
5,000 meters, has a width of 80 to 100 kilometers. The Outer Himalayan 
Range spreads over a zone some 15 to 50 kilometers in width, with an 
average elevation of 900 to 1,300 meters. The Himalayas are succeeded 
on the north by lesser ranges which further tend to separate India from 
her Chinese neighbor.
On the east the mountain wall between India and Burma is called 
by different names in different places. For example, in the north it is 
called the Pafkai Hills, but farther south these become the Naga Hills. 
Still farther southward are the Lus'hai Hills, and finally the Arakan 
Yoma which reach the sea at Cape Negrais and continue in the Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands. These hills are, for the most part, clothed with dense 
humid forests. The ffimalayan and eastern boundary mountains directly 
influence the political geography of India.
1
Raye R. Platt, ed., India ; A Compendium (New York: American
Geographical Society, 1962), p. 11.
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Isolation from the Continent of Asia 
India is clearly set apart from the rest of Asia by a broad 
no-man's land of mountains, jungle covered on the India-Burma frontier, 
ice bound on the India-Tibet border, and desert (Thar) in the west. The 
almost impassable Himalayas isolate India from Tibet on the north, and 
the two flanking highlands, the Hindukush in the west and the Lushai 
Hills in the east, are continuous with them, thus isolating the sub­
continent from Asia. K. M. Pannikar asserted that, "Politically India
was isolated from the rest of the continent and became introspective in 
2its attitude." Isolation inhibited India's development of international 
relations. The only doctrine followed in the ancient and medieval periods 
by powerful rulers like Ashoka and Akbar was to bring all of India under 
one control. At no time in its history has India had a policy of 
external aggression.
Strategic Location 
India's northern border is a linguistic and cultural divide as 
well as a natural barrier. Unfortunately, the natural barrier role is 
less obvious in the space and missile age. The 1962 invasion demon­
strated the fallacy of natural_.barriers in national defense.
Little cultural intercourse, however, has occurred across the 
Himalayas. The lack of penetration from the north during most of the 
nation's history developed in Indians a false sense of security, a
2K. M. Pannikar, Geographical Factors in Indian History 
(Bombay: Bhartiya Vidhya Bhawan, 1955), p. 50.
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3kind of 'Maginot Line' mentality. This mentality was self-evident in 
1962 when China invaded India, and the Indians were not prepared for such 
an invasion. In earlier times, the Chinese were unable to organize a 
strong military presence in Tibet and, as a result, India was left to 
bask in the sun of complacency. The recent invasion destroyed the moun­
tain barrier myth, and India, with her psychological protection destroyed, 
stood naked and afraid in the world.
Pass Routes
The Himalayas, of course, are not quite impenetrable, but overland 
travel is very difficult and dangerous. A few passes are used for the 
treuisporting of goods on the back of man or beast. Tibet is reached from 
Srinagar across the Zoji-La to Leh and thence across the Karakoram Pass, 
perhaps the best known and most important pass in the whole mountain 
system. The Aksai Chin road in Ladakh is the first trans-Himalayan motor 
road to be kept open throughout the year. Between the Punjab and Tibet, 
the K-Lang, the Shipki, and the Niti passes are of some importance, but 
for hundreds of miles farther east there is no route across the Himalayas 
until Darjeeling is reached.
The Jelep La and Nathu La are the important passes between 
Sikkim and Bhutan on the main Indo-Tibetan trade route through the Chumbi 
Valley, northeast of Darjeeling (Fig, 3)* From India to Burma there are 
half a dozen routes, none of them much used. In northern Burma there is 
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route is through Manipur. This latter route was followed by the allied 
troops who drove the Japanese out of Burma in 1945* The An and Taugup 
passes merely link central Burma with the Arakan Range. Prom the Indian 
side, movement by sea to the Irrawaddy delta channels was far easier, 
and of great importance in Burma's history.^ Cultural mixing in the 
subcontinent came largely from the northwest rather than from the north 
or northeast.
Climatic Influence 
The Himalayan mountainous zone isolates the deep interior of 
Asia from the influence of warm air from the south, and it protects India 
from the cold blizzards generated by the continental winter high pressure 
system of northeastern and central Asia. The upland barrier creates a 
difference of 20° to 30° P. in both winter and summer temperatures 
between the lowland below and the northern face of the mountains. It
serves as a screen within which the Indian monsoon operates. The mois­
ture laden winds blowing off the Indian Ocean are blocked by the
Himalayas, and hence the interior of Asia receives very little rainfall.
Catchment Area for Rivers 
Physically, the Himalayas have acted as a great catchment area 
for the runoff from the annual monsoon rains. Their slopes yield the 
water which irrigates and fertilizes the great plains of northern India. 
Important hydroelectric development has been possible in the foothills 
of the Himalayas. The availability of water and the regularity of flow
Gordon East and 0. K. H. Spate, The Changing of Asia:
A Political Geography (London.; Methuen and Co. Ltd. , 1958), p. 132.
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for both irrigation and power, support an aura of relative well being 
and social stability reflected in the politics of the north at least 
until 1967. In contrast, the lack of reliable moisture due to the un­
certainty of river flow and the general capriciousness of the southern 
streams is perhaps reflected in the political turmoil of peninsular 
India.
The Great Plain of Northern India 
Between peninsular India and the Himalayan mountains lies the 
alluvial plain of the Sutlej, the Ganges-Jumna, and the Brahmaputra rivers, 
commonly referred to in its entirety as the Great Plain of Northern India. 
This plain is approximately 2,400 kilometers long, with a width varying 
from 150 to 500 kilometers and a total area of 770,000 square kilometers.
It is one of the largest alluvial plains in the world. The gradient of 
the plain is so gentle that over most of the surface it is imperceptible 
to the eye. A notable feature of the plain is the immense thickness and 
uniform character of the alluvium which forms the subsoil of the plain.
The plain has had a number of direct and indirect influences on the 
political geography of the country.
Concentration of Population
The level Great Plain of India with its deep, fertile, stoneless,
alluvial soils, and its many rivers, is the most favorable and most desir-
5able part of the subcontinent. The four rich states of the plain, the 
Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal, in which about 40 per cent
^Harry Robinson, Monsoon Asia; A Geographical Survey (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 114*
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of the country's population live, support one of the densest populations 
in the world. This plains region has a population considerably greater 
than that of the whole United States, packed into an area about one- 
tenth as large.^ The plain supports, primarily in an out-dated agricul­
tural way of life, an average density comparable to that of industrialized 
Britain. Several important cities, however, are located in the plain. 
Overall, the high concentration of population presents a host of food 
supply, health, employment, and other types of problems.
Center of Political Power
The northern plain has remained throughout history the center of 
Indian political power, and the capital of the country has always been 
situated in the plain. Delhi and Patna have at various times served as 
the political capital. Currently, the headquarters of many important 
political parties, such as the Congress Party, the Jan Sangh Party, and 
the Jan Kranti Dal Party, are located on this plain.
The northern plain has been coveted by several invaders, helping 
to make this region the great melting pot of cultures. It is on the 
northern plain that the whole modern drama of race conflict versus race 
assimilation was played out, a drama which finally shaped the political 
and cultural destiny of both India and its neighbor Pakistan. The 
traditional role of the northern plain as the focus of political power 
may change with the advent of industrial concentrations in the peninsula. 
It is possible, however, that this industrialization may change only the
Ê. H. G. Dobbyj Monsoon Asia (Chicago; Quadrangle Books, Inc.,
1961), p. 230.
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distributional pattern of economic activities and not the locus of 
political power.
The Unity of the Nation 
The people of the northern plain have always favored the political 
unification of the country. During its history the northern plain has been 
more easily brought under one empire, whereas elsewhere Indian geography 
has tended to divide instead of unify. Because of its flat nature it was 
easy to develop transportation routes across the plain, to organize armies 
among its dense population, to exercise control from the capital (which 
was always situated in the heart of the plain), and to attain steady crop 
production to support the population.
The north-south division of the nation is very prominent even at 
the present time in Indian politics. Since independence, most of the 
strong politicians and freedom fighters of India have been trained here 
on the plain. All important political parties sprang up here, and the 
central cabinet is dominated by the politicians of the plain. Due to its 
high density of population, the northern plain has more representatives 
than any other physical region and thus dominates the nation's politics.
The important government portfolios, such as the Prime Minister, Home 
Minister, and Defense Minister, have all so far been held by politicians 
from this region.
Southern Peninsula 
The southern peninsula is geographically a VL^y in̂  or tant part 
of the Indian subcontinent. It is separated from the northern plain by 
the Satpura, the Mahadeo, the Maikal, and the Sarguja Hills, sometimes
18
known together as the Satpura line. It extends into Rajasthan on the 
west and has a kind of outlier in the Assam plateau on the east (Fig. 2). 
The southern plateau affects the political situation in a number of ways, 
among others is that it contains almost all the mineralized areas of the 
country. In the northeast portion of the plateau, in Bihar, Orissa, and 
Madhya Pradesh, India's most important iron, mica, and manganese mines 
are located. In the south, in Maharastra, Andhra Pradesh, and Mysore, 
iron, manganese, diamonds, thorium, and gold are mined. In the northwest, 
in Rajasthan, and in the center, in Madhya Pradesh, lead, zinc, uranium, 
and mica are produced. Most of India's coal supply occurs in Bihar and 
West Bengal, both in the plateau area, although coal bearing beds are 
also found in the Mahanadi Valley of Madhya Pradesh, in Orissa, and in 
Andhra Pradesh.
These mineralized areas are now the sites of extensive mining, 
and they have industrialized urban centers which are centers for capital 
accumulation. The often heard cry for establishing comparable industries 
in other regions is economically unsound. The mining industrial labor 
force has created political chaos and eventually unstable government in 
the region.
Another important political implication of the peninsula is in 
the importance of this region as an agriculturally rich area, especially 
for commercial crops. The fertile black lava region extends from the 
Aravalli Hills in the north to the Belgaum District (now in Mysore State) 
in the south, and covers a large part of Kutch, Kathiawar, Bombay, Madhya 
Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and Rajasthan. The region is particularly im­
portant for commercial crops like cotton, oil seeds, tobacco, coffee.
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rubber, and peanuts. The low lying plains area of the peninsula are 
important for growing rice. The fertile black soil (lava) region cor­
responds roughly with the Marathi speaking region. Belgaum became a 
bone of contention in a border dispute between Maharastra and Mysore, 
because the Belgaum District is the only black cotton soil area in 
Mysore and, at the same time, is linguistically akin to Maharastra.
The Indian peninsula has had a certain isolating effect, with 
the Satpura line acting as a barrier against the spread of Aryans from 
the north and Dravidians from the south. The central part of the range 
is sufficiently accessible to permit the passage of armies but difficult 
enough to hamper their reinforcement.?
Most of the semi-feudal, princely states which existed before 
their absorption into India, shortly after independence were located in 
the central part of the plateau. In the northeastern forested hills 
dwell many of India's 30,000,000 aboriginal people. These tribal people 
are still very faithful to the old princes. They elected coalition 
governments in Madhya Pradesh and in Orissa consisting of Swatantra as 
a majority party (most of the princes joined the Swatantra Party) to 
show their faithfulness to the princes. These coalitions resulted in 
the ouster of the Congress Party from power.
Coastal Plains
The western coastal plain is composed of fertile alluvial soil 
which supports a flourishing agriculture. In the northern part, the
7Percival %)ear, "India: The Political History," in Asia : A
Handbook, ed., by Guy Wint (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966). p. 
57.
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Gujarat coast contains the important industrial and textile centers of 
Ahmedabad and Bombay, and the newly developed oil producing areas of 
Ankleshwar, Gujarat. The Kanara-Konkan coast (Bombay to Mangalore) con­
tains rich agricultural land and the important iron ore producing area 
of Goa.
The Malabar coast is the most densely settled area in the whole 
of India. It is a rich cashew, coffee, coir, spices, tea, and rubber 
growing region. The State of Kerala, with a Communist government, demanded 
that the foreign exchange earned by cashew and coir exports be invested 
for the development of the state. A similar demand was also voiced by the 
coalition government in Bihar where much foreign exchange has been earned 
through exploitation of various minerals. These demands were raised due 
to the formation of opposition coalition governments. Such demands have 
created internal stresses within the country.
The Drainage
Broadly speaking, Indian rivers can be divided into two separate 
types, the north Indian, or Himalayan origin rivers, and the peninsular 
rivers. The Himalayan rivers are large, their gradient is low, and they 
bear a vast quantity of fine silt, some of which is spread out on the 
level plain. The Himalayan rivers are not dependent on monsoon'rain­
fall alone for their water supply, but also have a source in the melting 
of the Himalayan snow. Their seasonal regime is more valuable as it 
brings a maximum of water at the height of the hot weather— February to
g
April— when the peninsular rivers are at their lowest. In contrast,
80. K. H. Spate, India and Pakistan; A General and Regional 
Geography (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 195?), p. 15 =
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the peninsular rivers depend entirely on monsoon rainfall, which is 
concentrated in only four to six months of the year. Streams which may 
be half a mile wide or more during the high flood monsoon season shrink 
to a trickle only a yard or so across during hot weather.
Some of the important political implications of Indian rivers 
may now be suggested. For one thing, political boundaries are not drawn 
around drainpige basins or along existing streams (Fig. 4)« The political 
boundaries of states in India have been drawn mainly on a linguistic 
basis and do not coincide with the river basins. Therefore, the exclu­
sive control of the water of any river by one state may create tension 
among the neighboring states. Such conflicts are arising between îfysore 
and Maharastra over the Tungabhadra River, and between Madhya Pradesh 
and Maharastra over the Narmada River. The absence of rivers flowing 
from the north to the south or vice versa, owing to the geological struc­
ture of the country, is partly responsible for the disunity of the north and 
south. Political differences arise when the distribution of water is 
uneven in a situation where availability of irrigation water is of 
crucial importance to the economy.
Failure to appreciate the importance of differences of topography, 
the vagaries of rainfall, and the seasonality of river flow was responsible 
for a great waste of money in abortive irrigation schemes in Madras. The 
political troubles over river water are mostly confined to the peninsular 
plateau. Unfortunately, it is often not economically feasible to con­
struct large irrigation or hydroelectric projects in the south. This 
economic imbalance between regions creates tensions in national politics.
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and the opposition party often takes advantage of the situation in 
accusing the governing party of being unfair.
Strategic Role of the Seas
Since India is closed in on three sides by mountain ranges, trade 
routes have normally been easier by sea. It is a significant fact that al­
though large portions of north India were conquered many times by for­
eigners, India was never ruled by a monarch who did not have his capital
9in India except when it came to the naval power of the. British. During 
the second World War a short period of Japanese supremacy in the Indian 
Ocean followed the capture of Singapore, and the occupation of the 
Andaman Islands demonstrated that the threat to that ocean from the side 
of Pacific can be a real one.
During the British colonial period, India followed a territorial 
water limit of three miles, along with Britain and most of her colonies.
A proclamation was issued by the President of India on March 22, 1956, 
however, to extend the territorial waters out to six nautical miles. A 
subsequent proclamation issued on September 30, 1967, extended the ter­
ritorial waters to 12 nautical miles. This proclamation superseded all 
previous ones. The Republic of India has the obligation to ensure its 
effective control over as wide an area of the sea adjacent to its coast 
as is compatible with international law. The nation has chosen a 12- 
mile zone in order to safeguard its territorial integrity as a developing 
country to facilitate exploiting and utilizing the natural resources of 
the sea in the most effective manner. Besides, strategic and economic
9K. M. Pannikar, op. cit., p. 71.
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necessities, the overseas Indian settlements along the entire arch from 
the Cape of Good Hope to Malaya, in Kenya, Tanzania, the Republic of 
South Africa, Mauritius, Ceylon, and Burma are of great concern to the 
Indian state.
The Indian government was disturbed when the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America jointly announced a plan to use the Indian 
Ocean islands of Aldabra and Diego Garcia for strategic bases and 
missile tracking stations. It was afraid of creating tension in the 
area, knowing that China would be quite unhappy with such a move. 
Strategically, seas adjacent to India are as important to India as the 
northern boundary, and it is felt that they should be effectively 
protected.
The Climatic Conditions
Several political problems have arisen over regional shortage 
of food, over floods and droughts, conflicts concerning the distribution 
of waters, dam sites, and the preservation of forests, all directly 
related to the climatic conditions of India. Nowhere else are so many 
people so intimately dependent upon rainfall rhythms; the whole pros-
10perity of India is tied up with the eccentricities of its seasonal winds. 
India’s climate is characterized as monsoonal. The country receives 
nearly 90 per cent of its rain during the southwest monsoon season which 
is concentrated in a period of only four to six months. The winter mon­
soon creates a water shortage during the rest of the year. Moreover,
10George B. Cressey, Asia’s Land and Peoples; A Geography of 
One-third of the Earth and Two^hirds of its Peoples. 3rd ed., (New 
York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 396.
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Indian rainfall is frequontly torrential in character. The rain falls 
too quickly to be absorbed by the soil, and consequently there is 
excessive runoff.
The amount of rainfall strongly influences the cropping pattern 
and, hence, the economic viability of a state. In India there is, for 
instance, the West. Bengal rice and jute economy, the middle Ganges rice 
and sugar cane economy, the western Uttar Pradesh and Punjab wheat 
economy, and in Rajasthan an economy based on millet, acacia trees, and 
scrub. Kerala, Bihar, and West Bengal are food deficit states due to 
climatic uncertainties. The political instability of some of these areas 
especially Kerala and West Bengal, is partly caused by food deficits.
In Madras, the Dra vida Munnetra Kazhagam (Referred as DMK) government won 
a majority in the 1967 elections due to a regional rice failure combined 
with language propaganda. The reality of a food shortage quickly reaches 
the illiterate masses, and the opposition parties can exploit this situ­
ation to achieve their goals.
It is the unreliable rainfall, then, rather than temperature 
fluctuations which determines the outcome of India's harvest. Too much 
rain means floods and destruction; too little, famine and death. The 
wide variations in rainfall seriously affect the life of the people. 
Similarly, the temporal variation in the arrival of rains is of major impor­
tance. The monsoon rains may be considerably delayed or appreciably 
early over the entire country or over certain parts of it. The normal 
onset of the monsoon is. in late May on the southern tip of the Indian 
peninsula, it reaches Bombay by June 10, and by July 1 the monsoon has 
reached almost all over India. Rains persist: until about September 1,
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when the southwest winds cease to blow and the dry season begins. In 
the years when the summer monsoon starts late, it frequently retreats 
early, thus deleteriously affecting both summer and winter crops, since 
winter crops rely largely upon the moisture left in the soil by the summer 
rains. The frequent droughts cause food shortages, for which blame is 
placed on the government machinery.
There can be one or more breaks or interruptions in the rains 
during July and August. A long break in the monsoon rains or a sudden 
early cessation of the rains can be very harmful to crops and may lead 
to famine conditions. The breaks in the rains are longer and more numer­
ous with increasing distance from the coast. The areas on the flanks of 
the main zone of monsoon rains are particularly liable to such risks 
(Fig. 5). Gujarat, the southern margins of the %per Gangetic Valley, 
and the interior districts in northwest India tend to be especially 
hard hit. Here the government has paid special attention to the develop­
ment of irrigation. As a result, the area is usually politically stable. 
Altercations do arise, however, over the local distribution^df water.
Rainfall periodicity and unequal distribution of rainfall are 
very important factors in the assessment of the political problems of 
India, since they affect the natural vegetation, agriculture, irrigation, 
and settlement patterns. Areas with 80 inches or more of rainfall pro­
duce food crops like rice and commercial crops such as tea, jute, coffee, 
rubber, and spices (Fig. 6). These rainy areas,.’however, are always in 
danger of floods. The heavy rainfall encourages commercial crop culti­
vation, and hence these are areas of a chronic deficit. West Bengal and 











V A R I A B I L I T Y  O F  R A I N F A L L
3 0 °
A f t e r  I R.R.  P l a t t
BELOW  1 5 »  
1 5 - 2 0 »  
2 0 - 2 5 »  
2 5 - 3 0 »  
















India's principal famine zones, however, lie in regions with 
less than 4-0 inches of annual rainfall (Pig. 6). As Stanç) has pointed 
out, the famine areas are not the driest parts of the country but those
1 ihaving an intermediate rainfall. The most frequent drought stricken 
areas suffer markedly during drier than normal years. Famines create 
political unrest and place a great strain on the relief capabilities of 
the state. The Times of India, on October 6, 1963, depicted this dis­
parity of rainfall. On the same day as the Kosi River floods submerged 
300 villages in Bihar and northern West Bengal, severe drought conditions 
prevailed in Rajasthan. A drought and a flood condition in the same 
state may follow in quick succession. A flood hit Rajasthan in the early 
monsoon period of 1968 and a drought later in the same season. Such con­
ditions put pressure on the government, and extra spending for relief 
becomes a necessity. Strong opposition recently appeared in the Rajast­
han State Assembly to the Congress government which for a time could not 
form its government due to the lack of majority, and presidential rule 
had to be imposed.
Soils
Soils only affect the political situation in reference to the 
productivity of crops and the suitability of different crops. The most 
important and productive soil of India is the alluvial soil of the 
Sutlej-Ganges plain and the delta regions of the southern rivers. These 
fertile soils yield high crop production and relative prosperity to the
11L. Dudley Stamp, Asia; A Regional and Economic Geography,
11th ed., (London: Methuen and Company Ltd., 1962), p. 198.
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areas concerned, thus helping to create political stability. The 
Vidharbha area of rich regur (a rich black loam) soil opposed union with 
Maharastra, since it is economically a food surplus region, whereas 
Maharastra is an area of poverty in part generated by less than fertile 
agricultural soil. The fertility of the soil of India in general has 
been depleted due to continuous use and failure to fertilize. Even 
establishing a fertilizer plant in a certain section of the country brings 
conflict and political problems, since every state wants to establish a 
fertilizer plant within its own state boundaries, a situation which is 
simply not economically feasible. Such plants can only be established 
where raw material is easily available.
Vegetation
The vegetation pattern also directly affects the political 
stability of the subcontinent. Dense jungles give shelter to guerrillas, 
to forces of disunity and to government opposition. While acting as 
barriers to movement, they are at the same time sources of rich timber 
and various other useful forest products. Hence, depending on which 
area one refers to, the natural vegetation can be either salutary or 
deleterious to the effective functioning of government.
The important timber producing trees in the deciduous forests 
of India are sal (Shorea robusta), teak (Tectona grandis), sandalwood 
(Santalum album)« shisham (Palbergia sirosoo), and mahua (Bassia lati- 
folia). These are also called monsoon forests. In Orissa and eastern 
Madhya Pradesh these forests shelter tribal people who support the 
opposition party. The resultant coalition government, especially in
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Madhya Pradesh, is unstable. At the time of writing, however, the 
coalition government of Orissa is working satisfactorily, since the
coalition includes both of the rightist parties.
Jhuming (shifting cultivation) is practiced in hilly areas of 
Assam, in Chota Nagpur, and among the Bhils (scheduled caste) and in 
Deccan. The government is facing opposition for imposing legislation to 
stop the jburning practices. The importance of forests for grazing, fuel, 
and manure cannot be overemphasized. Any move to change these prac­
tices will be strongly criticized. The forests are politically very 
important.
In the hilly forested areas of Assam some tribes find shelter in
the forest and undertake sabotage activities. The tribal people of Bihar
are also demanding a separate tribal state (Jhar Khand). The Garo,
Khasi, and Jaintia Hill people have recently been granted a separate 
autonomous state (Meghalaya). The dense forests and deep ravines give 
shelter to the dacoits and robbers in the Chambal Valley area of Madhya 
Pradesh, in Uttar Pradesh and in Rajasthan, and these state governments 
have to spend a large amount of money to. maintain law and order. More­
over, the historical separation of the people of the northern plain from 
those of the southern peninsula was due in part to the dense forest 
conditions; the people in the south differ markedly from those in the 
north in terms of race, language, customs, living habits, and sense of 
nationality.
Physiography, topography, climate, vegetation, soil, and other 
biotic factors play, directly or indirectly, an important part in 
creating the political geography of India. These elements influence the
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strategic situation, the internal unity or disunity, relations with 




The economic picture of India at the time of independence was 
grim. Barely five per cent of the population earned more than enough 
for a subsistence living, and millions were unemployed. Problems such 
as;.rehabilitating displaced persons from East and West Pakistan; increas­
ing the producton of raw jute, .cotton, and food grains to make tç for 
the loss of territory to Pakistan; establishing communal harmony, and 
increasing even slightly the economic level of the people loomed as 
formidable.
Since 1947, however, some progress has been made. Real national 
income has increased by 70 per cent, industrial output has increased from 
a base of 100 in 1956 to 199*3 in 1967, and agricultural production has 
risen from a base of 100 in 1950 to 132.4 in 1966-67. Such statistical 
gains are partially.offset by the rise in the wholesale price for all 
commodities from an index level of 100 in 1952-53 to 204.5 in 1963. The 
increase in prices has been attributed, at least in part, to the cost of 
the wars with Communist China in 1962 and with Pakistan in 1965. The 
defense budget rose from Rs. 2,800,000,000 ($1.00 = Rs. 7.50) in 1961 to 
nearly Rs. 10,000,000,000 in 1967. Moreover, in 1966 and 1967 the nation 
was stricken by its worst famine since 1943. ' Surprisingly, millions of
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people probably had their first really nutritious meal during the famine, 
since many low caste Hindus who had normally lived under the specter of 
starvation benefited from governmental food distribution programs under­
taken during the emergency. Some 250,000,000 of India's population today,
1however, are either undernourished or malnourished or both.
Agricultural Resources
India, although an agricultural country with 70 per cent of its 
population dependent on farming and 82 per cent of its people living in 
rural villages, is still short of food grains. This shortage is due to 
several agricultural problems, all of which have become matters of 
international concern in the last few years. The immediate concern is 
the acute shortage of food caused by two years of disastrous crop weather 
and the continuing rapid increase in population. The amount of food 
grains available per capita in 1966 was 14*2 ounces per day as compared 
to 16.8 ounces in 1965. The drought brought a decline in India's 
national income, recession to its industry, violence to its streets, 
and famine to its countryside. In addition to the vagaries of the mon­
soon and much inherently poor land, there are several human factors 
responsible for creating the Indian food shortages. Among them are 
backward farming techniques, shortages of fertilizer, the lack of 
irrigation facilities, limited and high-cost rural credit, and an 
unsatisfactory land tenure system.
Poor methods of cultivation bring perhaps the lowest production 
per hectare in the world. For example, India's average yield of rice is
-|
C. B. Mamoria, Agricultural Problems of India, 5th ed., (Alla­
habad; Kitab Mahal Private Ltd., 1966), p. 130.
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1,1 tons per hectare in contrast to U tons per hectare in Japan. The
Indian farmer is, nevertheless, reported to be highly responsive to
improved practices introduced by agricultural education, and not the
2timeless conservative he was long thought to be. Some individual 
farmers with small plots and the close cooperation of the government are 
making progress. More and more mechanical devices are being used on 
farms. Tractors and pumps are becoming the favorite rural status sym­
bols rather than money spent for social and religious functions, orna­
ments, or simply more land. Thousands of farmers are adopting new 
farming practices, such as using high yielding varieties of seeds, 
chemical fertilizers, pesticides, or improved irrigation techniques.
Some optimists believe that these new practices may increase the food 
production to four or five times the current level. Mechanization, in 
any case, will have the effect of replacing a large number of manual 
laborers by machines. Hence, the incentive to raise a large family in 
order to have an adequate labor supply will weaken, and this in turn, 
will help overall population control.
The production and distribution of crops has a direct impact 
upon the internal and external politics of India. The total production 
in 1967-68 was 95,600,000 tons, the highest India has ever produced in 
her entire history. The previous record crop was in 1964-65, when the 
country harvested 89,000,000 tons. All states produced well in 1967-68 
except Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, which unfortunately are the principal
2Suman Dubey, "Agriculture : Twenty Years of Vacillation," 
Weekend Review, I, No. 36 (August 12, 1967), 11.
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3rice growing states and which are usually surplus food producers. The
production of agricultural commodities in the Punjab, Gujarat, Madras,
Mysore, and Himachal Pradesh was above average, whereas in Kerala, West
Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and Assam it was below average (Table 1).
India has about 20 per cent of its cultivated land under cash
crops, and the government has no intention of reducing the area so 
4planted. The only way to increase production significantly, then, is 
to increase yields. Prices received for food grains are comparatively 
lower than those received for so-called cash crops. Therefore, acreages 
sown to cash crops have grown at a rate more than twice that of those 
sown to food grains. Indian agricultural policy calls for concentrating 
on the production of high quality cotton, jute, and sugar cane at home. 
This concentration on cash crops has diminished the production of cereals 
and thereby made the food famine more acute. Kerala, West Bengal, and 
Assam particularly concentrate on cash crops, and, therefore, these 
are notable food deficit states. The present resources and future 
development possibilities of the various regions, are greatly differ­
ent (Table 2). Development obviously needs to be planned according to 
the available and potential resources of the region concerned.
The chronic food shortages in India have several political 
i2g)lications. In the first place, the need to expend scarce foreign 
exchange for importing food grains places a severe strain on the'balance
^Dilip Mukerjee, "The Unquient City; India, A fecial Report," 
The Times (London), Friday, January 26, 1969, p. XV.
^erek Davies, "India: Politics," 1968 Yearbook of the Far 




INDIA: STATEWISE GROWTH RATES (COMPOUND) OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION,
AREA, AND PRODUCTIVITY, 1951-1952 to 1964-1965
State Production Area ProductivityPercentage
Above Average
Punjab 4.56 1.90 2.61
Gujarat 4.55 0.45 4.09
Madras 4.17 1.10 3.04
Mysore 3.54 0.81 2.71
ffimachal Pradesh 3.39 0.71 2.67
Fair
Bihar 2.97 0.71 2.25
Maharastra 2.93 0.44 2.45
Rajasthan 2.74 2.85 0,11
Andhra Pradesh 2.71 0.26 2.45
Madhya Pradesh 2.49 1.28 1.21
Orissa 2.48 0.81 1.66
Low
Kerala 2.27 1.30 0.96
West Bengal 1.94 0.59 1.34
Uttar Pradesh 1.66 0.72 0.94
Assam 1.17 1.25 0.08
Total 3.01 1.21 1,77
Source : Accelerating India's Food Grain Production 1967-78 to 1970-
710 Washington, D. C.: U. S.Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service, Foreign Agriculture Economic Report No. 40> March, 1968, p. 25.
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TABLE 2
PRESENT REGIONAL PRODUCTION AND FUTURE. POTENTIALITIES 
OF LAND RESOURCES IN INDIA
Region Potentialities for Actual Production
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of payments and hence on the overall economy. During 1967 the total 
quantity of food grains imported into India amounted to 8,670,000 tons 
(valued at approximately Rs. 5,321,700,000), as against 10,360,000 tons 
in 1966 and 7,4-60,000 tons in 1965°  ̂ The United States alone supplied 
4,435,100 tons of wheat in 1967. The importation of American wheat has 
been an important factor in relieving acute consumer distress in some 
years, but over a period of years these imports are likely to have a 
depressing effect on incentives for domestic wheat production. Who knows 
how long the United States can or will supply food grains to India? The 
Soviet Union and China in some recent years have also entered the world 
food grain market as deficit countries. Partly because of India's 
strategic position in world affairs, both the United States and the Soviet 
Union have been willing to export food grains to India. However, India 
has consistently refused to align, itself with either of the power blocs 
in the cold war.
In the second place, the lack of national food policy has 
resulted in regional disparities in distribution. In 1966, for example, 
the regional disparities in food supply increased; while people in Bihar 
were starving, officials in Madras went ahead with a program to cut the 
price of rice. In 1964 and 1966, public agitation, rioting, and loot­
ing of grain stores broke out in many parts of the country. Predictably, 
the food shortage was attributed to hoarding by landlords and grain 
dealers, and even to hoarding by the government and its Congress Party
5Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Develoimnent and 
Cooperation. Annual Report, 1967-68 (New Delhi: Department of Food, 
Government of India, 1968), p. 11.
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supporters.^ In 1967, at the time of the general elections, the voters 
rejected almost all the ministers in charge of economic portfolios, 
including the Central Food Minister, Mr. Subramanium. Efforts on the 
part of central government authorities to move food from surplus to 
deficit areas were resisted by states with surpluses. The reluctance 
of the surplus states to share their bounty, and the unwillingness of 
deficit state governments to take the responsibility for feeding their 
people, only showed the weakness of the elected ministers and the all- 
too-frequent lust for power rather than service. An attençt to nation­
alize the wholesale trade in food grains was frustrated largely because
7the speculators themselves exerted considerable political power.
At the new Chief Ministers conference held in April, 1967, the 
ministers voted to retain the single state food zones which already 
existed. Although the new chief ministers were representing not only 
the Congress Party but opposition parties as well, they could not evolve 
any uniform procurement and distribution policy for food grains. The 
chief ministers were not ready to follow a policy of monopoly trade and 
conçjulsory procurement of food grains by the government at New Delhi; 
since such a policy might create bitterness among the producers and 
eventually arouse opposition to the chief ministers. Significantly, 
no chief minister in any state assumed the agricultural portfolio in 
Ms  own state government.
^The Economic Weekly (July, 1964), 1187.
7Gunnar %rdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of
Nations, Vol. I (New York; Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., 1968), p.
283.
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A major factor limiting crop production over most of the Indian 
Union is water supply. The seasonal climatic regime with its summer 
monsoon rains and winter drought means that crop growing is very largely 
confined to the wet season. Two crops per year can be raised in most 
areas of the country if water can be made available during the dry season. 
Thus, irrigation is clearly of the utmost importance.
The total water potential of India through its mean annual river
8
flow is estimated at 1,675,000,000,000 cubic meters. In 1967 it was 
estimated that only 33 per cent of the potential resources was being 
utilized. Since independence in 1947, 500 new irrigation and power 
development facilities have been built, but 21 years after independence 
only 3 6,855 ,000 hectares out of 157,950,000 cultivated hectares were 
being irrigated. Increased soil fertility, improved seed and implements, 
and better breeds of livestock and poultry cannot bring about much change 
in agricultural productivity unless there is a concomitant supply of 
water. Irrigation could create the potential for double or triple 
cropping in many new areas.
The creation and extension of irrigation schemes have many 
political implications. New areas developed for irrigation are fre­
quently faced with the political problem of water distribution, and 
serious conflicts often arise between farmers and between different 
villages. Land titles are frequently questioned by neighbors. Land 
prices have greatly increased. Politicians contest elections on local
g
Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
Yearbook, India 1967 (New Delhi: Government of India, Publication
Division, 1967), p . 250.
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water distribution, irrigation, and land tenure issues which appeal to
the local voters. The Ganganagar District of Rajasthan is one of a
number of sensitive areas where irrigation improvements have created
local political issues.
Disagreements over the site of dams and the legality of river
water use have arisen between states. Conflicts on the Narmada River
between Madhya Pradesh and Maharastra, and on the Tungabhadra River
between Maharastra and Mysore are examples of such issues.
In spite of considerable remaining irrigation potential in
India, the land frontier has been more or less exhausted. Unfortunately,
the average productivity per hectare has gone down by 10 per cent due to
such factors as reckless deforestation, poor drainage, cultivation of
submarginal land, growing salinity, and the lack of artificial fer- 
gtilizers during the last decade. A major scheme for reclaiming ravine
land in the Chambal River basin adjoining Rajasthan (2,800,000 hectares),
Madhya Pradesh (2,430,000 hectares), and Uttar Pradesh (1,230,000 hec-
10tares) has recently been undertaken. In addition to projects for 
reclaiming ravines, the government has undertaken reclamation projects 
in Kans-infested (grassy weed), saline and alkaline, water-logged, 
torrent-ruined, and desert lands. Through these reclamation projects 
India expects to increase its total cultivated area from 157,950,000 to 
182,250,000 hectares. The reclaimed ravine areas will not only increase
9"Harnessing the Land Resources," Eastern Economist, XLVIII,
No. 17 (April 28, 1967), 857.
10study of Survey and Reclamation of Ravines in India (New 
Delhi: Planning Commission, Committee on Natural Resources, Government
of India, 1965), p. 43»
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the crop production but will increase the safety of life for the local 
people, since these areas tend to be dominated by dacoits who instill 
terror in the population. The increased safety of life will build 
confidence among the people in their government and thereby help to 
bring stability and peace to the countryside.
The limited extent to which the available cultivated land in 
India can be expanded magnifies the basic organizational problems of 
land ownership and land tenure. A great deal of land reform has been 
undertaken by the central government. A major achievement of indepen­
dence was the abolition of all intermediary tenures— that is, tenures 
held by societies or individuals (such as Zamindari, Mahalwari,
Ryotwari, Jagirdaris, and Inam) who in turn rented the land to landless 
laborers. By this reform 20,000,000 peasants were brought into direct 
contact with the state and became owners of their holdings. A land 
ceiling of 12 unirrigated hectares (in most of the states) has also 
been enforced to equalize land distribution. It would be no exaggera­
tion to say that never before in the history of land tenure reform has
so much legislative action, with such wide social and economic ramifi-
11cations, been undertaken as in India since independence. Acharya 
Vinoba Bhave, an elderly leader of Gandhian times and persuasion, has 
launched a nationwide movement for the donation of tracts of land and 
the gift of entire villages by large land owners for distribution among 
landless laborers. By these peaceful and democratic methods, the entire 
agrarian society has been transformed to ensure greater freedom and
^̂ "Who Benefits from Zonal Control," Swar.jya. XII, No. 22 
(November 25, 1967), 30.
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security to the tiller of the soil. A useful concomitant has been the 
removing of functionless intermediaries between the state and the 
cultivators.
The Government of India has adopted a new program for encouraging 
cooperative farming, but the Indian peasants, with their profound tradi­
tional love of their own little plot of land, are not actively participa­
ting in this program. To oppose the cooperative farming scheme the new 
Swatantra Party was formed, and it is currently the largest opposition 
party in the parliament. A drastic change in the land tenure system in 
northern West Bengal, imposed by the coalition ministry of that state, 
has brought on a number of riots. The difficulty of controlling the 
riots created frictions among the coalition members. Finally, the coali­
tion ministry was dissolved and presidential rule was imposed. The 
coalition ministries in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar where the Congress 
ministries were overthrown were formed on the basis of land tenure and 
land reform issues.
Mineral Resources
Mineral resources are almost equally important with land 
resources for the development of a country and the stability of its 
political situation. India is well endowed with several important 
minerals. Although she is not as fortunate as her neighbor, China, she 
is nevertheless better placed than Pakistan. India has vast reserves 
of high grade iron ore, manganese, mica, thorium, titanium, and bauxite, 
along with ample quantities of dolomite, magnesite, and coking coal to 
support both ferrous and non-ferrous metal industries. It is equally
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rich in other minerals including those needed for cement, ceramics, and 
refractory industries.
Before independence India was not an important mineral producing 
country, but the great industrialization program of recent years has 
greatly increased production. Minerals vary in importance from region 
to region over the country. While the Chota Nagpur plateau, Bihar, 
Orissa, and West Bengal states are very important, Jammu and Kashmir, 
the Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh are relatively 
unimportant in mineral production.
India possesses nearly one-fourth of the total world reserves 
of iron ore. The estimated reserves of iron-ore in the country exceed
1 P20,000,000,000 tons; this is about 22 per cent of the world's reserves. 
This ore is mostly high grade. Many internal and international political 
problems can be related directly to the iron ore. First, almost all 
proven and probable reserves are located in the Bihar-Orissa sector, 
Madliqra Pradesh, and Ifysore states. This concentration creates a great 
problem as to where to locate iron and steel industries. Economically, 
it is not feasible to transport ore to other regions, although all the 
states desire industry and, of course, consume steel. Some of the mines 
cross the political boundaries of states, and legal rights to them are 
sometimes challenged by interested parties. For example, the dispute 
over the Purnia District between West Bengal and Bihar before the state 
reorganization was an important case.
S. Gananathan, Economic Geography of India (New Delhi: 
National Book Trust, India, 1967), p. 13»
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Second, India has to face competition in international trade as 
an ore exporter. The principal importers of Indian ore are Japan and 
some countries in eastern Europe. The main competitors in the Japanese 
markets are Australia, Malaysia, and certain countries of South Africa 
especially the Republic of South Africa. In the eastern European mar­
kets, India's main competitors are the West African countries. To 
compete successfully with these countries, India must export ore at a 
cheaper price or lower costs by integrating the various processes 
involved in production, processing, and marketing.
Besides iron ore, manganese is another important mineral resource 
for India's development. ]hdia is the third largest producer of mangan­
ese in the world, with estimated reserves of high grade ore of about
20,000,000 to 25,000,000,000 tons and of low grade ore of about 50,000,000 
to 60,000,000 tons. The manganese mines are concentrated in the Chota 
Nagpur plateau and Madhya Pradesh. In the international field the Soviet 
Union supplies manganese $2.00 to $3.00 cheaper per ton, which makes 
that country a serious competitor for export markets in Japan. Other 
importing countries are the United States, Great Britain, and West 
Germany.
Mica is another very important mineral product from the point 
of view of foreign exchange. India is the world's largest producer and 
exporter of mica. It produces nearly three-fourths of the world's 
siçply and through foreign sales earns Rs. 150,000,000 in foreign 
exchange. The United States alone inports 40 per cent of India's mica. 
Three important producing states are Bihar, Rajasthan, and Andhra Pra­
desh.
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India is only a minor producer of gold, accounting for only one 
per cent of the world's production. Even so, this gold has considerable 
political significance. The production is confined to the Kolar gold 
mines of Ifysore. India's gold prices have been well above world prices. 
The rising price level of commodities and the low official interest rate 
encourage the personal hoarding of gold, not only for traditional orna­
ments or jewelry but also as an excellent hedge against inflation. 
Attempts by Indian government officials to reduce the drain on foreign 
exchange by placing tighter controls on gold smuggling and by encourag­
ing the people to invest their hoarded gold in the industrial establish­
ments have been largely unsuccessful for political reasons. Most of the 
hoarded gold is controlled by rich industrialists or business communities 
who influence the legislatures. Attempts to devalue the currency or 
increase the $35.00 per ounce price of gold have created strong opposi­
tion. Other mineral resources have had political impact on India since 
they are partially responsible for unequal distribution of heavy indus­
tries, industrial labor problems, and the development of cordial 
relations with foreign countries.
Several consequences of the unequal distribution of minerals are 
significant in Indian politics. First, approximately 63 per cent of the 
mineral production is concentrated in the three states of Bihar, Orissa, 
and West Bengal (Table 3) • This concentration of minerals was respon­
sible for the early establishment of iron and steel industries here.
Other states then opposed creating more industrial establishments in 
this region. Officials of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, and Madras (the name 
of the state now changed to Tamilnadu), for instance, have agitated for
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more manufacttiring establishments in their respective states. On the 
national level, opposition party members always accuse the ruling 
party of neglecting certain regions in the planning of industrial 
development.
Second, mine union members are always agitating for better 
housing, higher pay, more medical facilities, and a higher share of 
profits. The decisions about these matters are made by the central 
government with the help of state planning departments. Agitation has 
been particularly strong in West Bengal, Orissa, and, to a lesser 
extent, in Bihar. These areas have large industrial establishments, 
and the labor is largely concentrated here.
Third, India has had to develop good relations with other 
mineral rich countries like the United States, the Soviet Union, West 
Germany, and Great Britain to supplement her deficiencies and to export 
iron, manganese, mica, and ilmenite. Walking this neutralist tight rope 
requires a most astute political balancing act.
The little west coast territory of Goa, which for centuries was 
under Portuguese political control, presents an interesting political 
problem in reldcion to its mineral resources. With the conquest of Goa 
on December "8 , 1961, the Indian Union acquired a large reserve of iron 
and manganese ores. Goa in 1967 earned Rs. 103,000,000 from exports of 
minerals to West Germany, Italy, and Japan. Because of this mineral 
trade, the economy of Goa is conqjaratively better than that of its 
neighbor Maharastra. An election in Goa resulted in the decision to 
remain as a Union Territory instead of merging with Maharastra. Goa 
would be an economic loser by joining Maharastra.
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Power Resources 
India is fairly rich in coal and water power resources but 
deficient in petroleum and natural gas. The uneven distribution of coal 
has major political implications. For example, the coal deficiency is 
acute in the heavily populated areas of southern India. Goal transpor­
tation from the north is difficult and costly. Also, the lack of coal 
in Maharastra and Gujarat is a serious hindrance to industrial expansion 
in those states, which are pressing hard for equal consideration in 
locating new industrial establishments.
Most of the hydropower resources of the nation are situated in 
the Ganges and Brahmaputra basins. A majority of the best potential 
sites are far away from load centers and hence are economically unfeas­
ible to develop. The cost of water power development, including the 
essential transmission lines, is so high that the need for power in most 
parts of the country must be met by thermal generators. In the near 
future, however, coal is expected to become the preponderant source of 
commercial energy in India.
Mines crossing the political boundaries of the states create 
tension between adjoining states. For example, when the States Reor­
ganization Commission decided to transfer 1,250 square kilometers of 
the Pumia Subdivision of Bihar to West Bengal, the Bihar government 
protested against the transfer. Apparently, the central government 
chose to support Bihar in the dispute on the grounds that the coal 
reserves and water works belonging to the Tata Iron and Steel Factory in 
Jamshedpur should not, for reasons of political-economic convenience, 
extend beyond the state boundaries (Appendix I).
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Currently, there is the good possibility of an export market 
for Indian coal. Japan, Australia, Pakistan, Ceylon, and other countries 
of southern Asia are deficient in coal resources and depend upon imports. 
India's chief rival for these markets is currently the Republic of South 
Africa, but China is a possible future competitor. Conservationists feel 
that India should retain its high grade coal instead of aspiring to export 
it. At present, they admit, India has sufficient coal resources for her 
home demand, but, they argue, there is an imperative need for conserving 
them, since reserves of coking-quality and other high grade coal are 
limited. If India should increase its per capita consumption of energy 
by 2000 A.D. to, say, three tons of coal (Europe consumes 2.72 tons per 
capita at present) its known resources would be exhausted in less than 
15 years.
Petroleum resources are very limited in India. They are largely 
confined to the Assam belt, along the west side of the Naga and Manipur 
Hills, to the Surma Valley on both sides of the India-Pakistan border, 
and to Gujarat coastal tracts. These areas together produce 95 per 
cent of India's oil production. Since petroleum is available in supplies 
insufficient to India's needs, oil imports will continue to impose a 
burden on the nation's balance of payments. Imports of crude and 
refined products during 1966 amounted to 9,600,000 tons. The Energy 
Survey Committee Report estimated inçorts of 17,000,000 tons of crude 
by 1970-71, 30,000,000 tons by 1975-76, and perhaps 50,000,000 tons by 
1980-81.^4
13H. N. Setha, "Indian Nuclear Energy Program," India and 
Foreign Review. V, No... 2 (November 1, 1967), 16.
p .  Aiyer, 1900-1967; The Pattern of Growth of Power in
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India is striving to improve its posture vis-a-vis oil dependence 
on other states. In 1948-49 there was only one small refinery in the 
whole country, but currently there are eight large refineries in oper­
ation. The new refineries have been opened with foreign assistance.
These refineries are at Nunmati, Assam (Rumania), Barauni, Bihar (Soviet 
Union), Trombay, Maharastra (Esso of New York and Burma Shell of London), 
Koyali, Gujarat (Soviet Union), Vishakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh (Caltex), 
Cochin, Kerala (Phillips), Haldia, West Bengal (Prance and Rumania), and 
Madras, Madras (National Iranian Oil Company and Amoco, a subsidiary of 
Pan American International Oil Company).
The regional distribution of refineries creates international 
political problems because India imports oil from various countries. The 
national interest would best be served by inserting from the Middle East 
states, since these countries can exchange oil for India’s manufactured 
goods. Since January 1967, petroleum products delivered in India have 
greatly increased in price because of the closing of the Suez Canal.
Good relations with the Middle East countries, then, can relieve the 
strain on foreign exchange, since in that area India can barter machin­
ery and other finished products for oil. India's deficit in oil is 
matched by its weak position in natural gas.
India is potentially the richest country in the world in 
thorium production, and she is also fairly well endowed with uranium.
The nation at present has three atomic power stations. A plant at 
Tarapur (Maharastra) has two reactors of 190 MW capacity each, one of
India. Monthly Commentary on Indian Economic Conditions. Annual Number. 
1967 (New Delhi; Government of India, 1967), p. 109.
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which became operational on April 1, 1969* An atomic power project at 
Rana Pratap Sagar near Kota (Rajasthan) with two units of 200 MW capac­
ity each and another project at Kalpakkam of 4.00 MW capacity in 
Tamilnadu (formerly Madras) will be completed later. Canada has been 
of significant assistance in aiding India to develop its nuclear power 
facilities. All of the atomic power stations are being developed to 
supplement existing conventional fuel supplies.
In international politics, India follows a policy of Ranch Sheel 
(peaceful coexistence) and, as a result, does not produce atomic weapons, 
although she is probably capable of doing so. India has not signed the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty, however, because none of the "have 
nations" are willing to assure her defense from a possible attack by 
China. The two big powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are 
unhappy with India's refusal to sign the treaty.
In the long run, India's shortage of power can easily be met 
through further development of hydroelectricity. The Iqrdroelectric 
potential in the country has been estimated at 4-1,000,000 KW at 60 per 
cent load factor (equivalent to a firm annual energy potential of
216,000,000,000 KWh), contributed by 24-6 major schemes. At present, 
less than 10 per cent of the total economic water power potential is 
utilized. %dro-power resources, which constitute the cheapest source 
of power from the point of view of capital outlay and operating costs, 
offer vast opportunities for future development. Potential lydroelectric 
resources, like all other kinds of resources, are unevenly distributed.
Of a total potential of 41,000,000 Kw, 25,000,000 Kw are in the Ganges 
and Brahmaputra basins, where most of the locations being considered are
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far from load and consumption centers. Existing hydroelectric power 
facilities are centered principally in Kerala, Itysore, Madras, Orissa, 
the Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir. The Punjab and Madras are the 
leading states in installed capacity. The Punjab is the predominant 
hydroelectric power consuming state. Assam, with the highest potential, 
has only a slight development of its hydroelectric resources.
The establishment of power stations for rural people has direct 
political significance. Indian cities were partly electrified before 
the first Five Year Plan, but the rural areas lacked electricity. In 
1951, only 3,687 towns and villages were electrified, but the number had 
risen to 55 >200 by March, 1967. Every village with a population of more 
than 5,000 today has the benefit of electricity. This inçrovement makes 
life easier and more prosperous, and thereby helps to bring unity and 
stability to the nation. The rates charged for electricity for agri­
cultural uses are much lower than those for industrial uses. Electri­
fication has influenced rural people to remain faithful to the Congress 
Party. The future development of power resources, and a more equal 
regional distribution of the electricity, can help bring political unity 
to the country.
It is important to note that the development of power on a 
regional basis has been developed according to the available resources. 
In the Ganges-Brahmaputra basins, hydroelectric power facilities have 
been developed. In the Chota Nagpur Plateau the emphasis is on thermal 
power from coal, and in Rajasthan atomic energy has been developed. The
15V. S. Gananathan, op. cit., p. 6 4.
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central water and power commission is developing an all-India grid. The 
steps towards this goal are first a regional grid, then an interregional 
grid, and finally a national grid. The all-India grid system will 
eventually aid in the national integration and unification of the 
country (Fig. 7). All people will get the electricity at the same rate, 
and the supply will be steady and efficient. A sense of unity, the gov­
ernment hopes, will develop among the people, and finally the unity of 
the nation will be achieved.
Industrial Development and Distribution 
British policy discouraged expansion of Indian manufacturing 
through general restrictive measures and a variety of specific economic 
and political controls.At the time of independence it was realized 
by the new leaders that industries should be developed to stabilize the 
economy of the country. A number of Indian industries have shown marked 
growth since 1947. The nation is now the second largest producer of 
steel in the east and eighth in the list of world's industrial nations. 
Its cotton textile industry is outranked only by that of the United 
States, In jute, the country is the world's leading producer. It makes 
fighter planes and transport planes, and has begun to produce tractors 
and tanks. In essence, India has made tremendous progress in various
W. Miller, A Geography of Manufacturing (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hhll Inc., 1962), p. 247.
^^ercival Sipear, India, Pakistan and the World, 4th ed.,
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fields of industry. Valule-added-iimodern industry is planned to show a 
15-fold expansion from 1950-51 îo 1975-76.̂ ^̂
Progress made since independence has not markedly changed the 
regional distribution of industry. There is a marked imbalance in the 
level of industrialization in the various regions. The major areas of 
industrial concentration are: (1) the western region, where 4-7 per cent
of the total industrial labor force is engaged in large scale indus­
trial establishments; (2) the eastern region, where 4.2 per cent is so
engaged; and (3) the southern region where even yët oqly 10 .5 per cent
18is engaged in large scale industrial establishments (Table 4)« The 
northwest and northeastern regions are the poorest in industrial 
■ establishments.
Industries are developed primarily because of the potential 
resources available in an area and not on political considerations.
Some political influence, however, is being exerted in decisions con­
cerning the location of new plants. It is not unheard of for senior 
Congress leaders to exert influence to establish industries in their 
home constituencies.
Most of the large industrial complexes are situated near such 
big urban centers as Calcutta, Bangalore, Atimedabad, Madras, Cochin, 
Delhi, Hyderabad, Kanpur, Bombay and Visakhapatnam (Fig. 8). These
17Wilfred Malembaum, "Industrial Progress in India under 
Planning," Current ffistory. LIV, No. 320 (April, 1968), 207.
18p. p. Karan has selected industrial districts where 1500 or 
more wage earners were employed in manufacturing. These districts were 
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Percentages are calculated from the Large Scale Industrial 
Establishments in India. Percentages refer to the total number of 
workers employed in major industrial establishments all over India.
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areas have geographical advantages for establishing industries in their 
superior transportation, marketing, and other relevant facilities.
The iron and steel industry of India is making tremendous 
progress, and the export of semi-finished and finished products is 
increasing. The market for Indian machine tools includes not only the 
developing countries of South Vietnam, Iran, Nigeria, and Thailand but 
also technologically advanced countries like the United States, Britain, 
Canada, and West Germany, The major iron and steel plants established 
since independence in the public sector of the economy will increase the 
quality and export of steel goods. Four major iron and steel plants 
have been established with foreign collaboration during this period.
TABLE 5









Durgapur West Bengal England 3.4
Bhilai Madhya Pradesh Soviet Union 3.2
Rourkela Orissa West Germany 3.5
Bokaro Bihar Soviet Union 5,5
Each of these four large steel plants was established in its 
present location in one of four different states on the basis of resource 
availability. There was agitation in Andhra Pradesh to establish a
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steel plant at Visakhapatnam, but for economic reasons the request was 
denied. Having a new steel plant became a status symbol, and agitation 
has been carried on to establish new steel plants in other parts of the 
nation. Russian economic assistance in building two of the four major 
steel plants has created fear in the minds of the general public that 
the Soviet Union might sometime dominate the internal politics of India. 
kn attempt was made to get American financial assistance for the Bokaro 
plant, but terms laid down by the United States were not acceptable to 
the Indian government. The concentration of income, entrepreneurs, euid 
technical skills in the more highly developed regions has generated a 
great imbalance in the spatial economic structure of the country as a 
whole.
New investors frequently avoid the Calcutta region, the Ruhr 
of India, because of political troubles. Labor difficulties are rife in 
the Calcutta region, and approximately 900 'Gherao incidents' (workers 
shutting management personnel into their offices) have occurred since 
the coalition government came to power. The leftists, in a kind of 
election strategy, charged that the dominant position in West Bengal 
business and industry had passed into non-Bengali hands, and thus con­
vinced the voters of their right to either gain control of industry or 
at least have a fair share of the profits. In the western and southern 
states of Gujarat, Maharastra, Mysore, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, and 
Orissa, investment conditions are more stable. In Tamilnadu, Kerala, 
and Orissa, there are non-Congress administrations, but there are fewer 
economic troubles than in West Bengal and Bihar. Therefore, foreign 
investment is increasing.
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The Indian government has considered the grievances of all the 
states and has made an effort to plan a program of industrial develop­
ment that is regionally balanced» New industries are being developed 
near large urban centers all over the country, for instance, ship­
building in Visakhapatnam; machine tool, aircraft, and telephone 
industries in Bangalore; heavy electronics in Bhopal; machine building 
in Banchi; and fertilizers, leather goods, and oil refining in Kanpur» 
Other industrial concentrations are being developed in Cochin, ^̂ sore, 
Hyderabad, Kota, and Amritsar» These scattered industrial developments 
are attracting workers from nearby areas, thereby transforming the 
economic base and hence improving the political stability of the var­
ious regions of the country. The regional migration to work and the 
consequent better economic conditions should eventually bind the people 
together and enhance the loyalty of the workers »
Finally, another very important step has been taken by the
planning commission, that of decentralizing the pattern of development
of the ubiquitous industries to fit the ideal of a socialistic society.
The commission recommended that a large number of small towns, widely
distributed over different parts of the country, should be developed
into industrial townships with planned provision for small scale and 
19light industries. India's small scale industries are essentially 
artisan enterprises. These industries use agricultural and other 
indigenous products and are oriented towards the village economy.
Hence, they are more acceptable to rural people and at least partially
19D. R. Dau, Small Scale Industries and Handicrafts (New Delhi: 
Sarvodaya Publishers, 1967), p. 8 .
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fill the gap created by the inevitably unequal distribution of heavier 
industrial concentrations. These craft industries employ more people 
and produce a larger quantity of goods than large scale industries. The 
value of production from the ubiquitous industrial sector is about 30 
per cent of the gross output of all the factories in the country. In 
1967, the number of factories in this sector was over 107,000 with about
2 0,000,000 people employed.
The ubiquitous industries provide work to seasonally unemployed 
persons and thus help to create political stability. Moreover, the work 
is provided in the villages where women can also share in the craft 
industries. Therefore, the wide dispersal of the ubiquitous industries 
will lower the dependency ratio and increase the overall productivity.
Transportation and Communication
Transportation and communication are two of the many ingredients
necessary to accelerate the pace of economic progress and political
stability. In many instances they play a key role, and in all cases
20they set the limits of progress. India is deficient in transportation 
and communication facilities. Although the nation accounts for 16 per 
cent of the world’s population, it has only four per cent of the world's 
roads, two per cent of its rail freight, and one per cent of its trucks 
and buses. Regional famines, which still occur, illustrate strikingly 
the need for better transportation and communication facilities.
20Wilfred Owen, Distance and Development; Transport and 
Communication in India (Washington, D. G. : The Brooking Institution,
1968), p.1.
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The railway system is the biggest state -undertaking and the
world's second largest network under a single management, second only
21to that of the Soviet Union. Since independence tremendous progress 
has been made in rail transportation. When India became independent in 
194-7? it inherited a railway system shattered by economic depression, 
worn out by abnormally heavy use in the war, and dismembered by parti­
tion. India's railways comprised not a single system but a large number 
of systems with different gauges. These systems are now organized into 
nine zonal systems, and some of the narrow gauge tracks have been con­
verted into meter gauge tracks and meter gauge ones into broad gauge 
ones. Railway equipment is now reasonably sufficient for the needs of 
the country, and some is exported to Hungary, East Africa, Burma, and 
Thailand. A new revolution to convert steam engines to diesel and 
electric locomotives is taking place. The number of passengers and 
amount of freight tonnage have increased tremendously.
There are direct political implications in railway travel and 
the distribution of railway, lines. For example, as a means of attract­
ing the attention of the government to a particular regional-political 
problem, it has become the practice of groups of individuals to disrupt 
railway movement. Damage to railway property has been increasing year 
by year, and if the Minister of Railways is not popular with the 
troublesome groups, an appeal for his removal from office can be signed 
by sabotage of the railway system. As a means of agitating against
21 "Two Decades of Freedom: Facts at a Glance," Socialist
Congressman, VII, No. 8-9 (August 15, 1967), 51»
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a language policy in recent years, students in some of the southern 
states burned railway coaches and set fire to railway stations.
The sparseness of the railway network in Assam, Orissa, 
Rajasthan, and the southern states has caused difficulty in distributing 
food in times of shortage, and also has hampered efforts to control 
rebellious groups (Fig. 9)* The unity of the country can be enhanced by 
the further development and integration of railway lines throughout the 
country.
Since 1951 y India has increased its surface road mileage by 
82 per cent. In the past 10 years, an average of 10,000 kilometers of 
newly surfaced roads has been constructed annually. The total length of 
the road network is over a million kilometers. The number of motor 
vehicles increased by 166 per cent during 1951-6 6, commercial vehicles 
increased 149 per cent, and road mileage 140 per cent. In the same 
period, the amount of travel nearly quadrupled, and by 1966 roads 
accounted for nearly as much intercity travel as railroads. Still more 
road development is needed in rural areas. Approximately 82 per cent 
of India's people live in 570,000 rural villages. One out of three of 
these villages is more than five miles from an improved road, and only 
one out of nine villages is served by an all weather road. In Uttar 
Pradesh where one-third of India's wheat is grown, food deficits can 
occur despite rich soil and the availability of substantial ground water 
resources because farmers are miles away from markets and have no roads. 
Nearly 36 per cent of the villages in the state are without a road, and 
in hilly areas 50 per cent of them hsve no road connection. The inade­

























Rajasthan, and parts of some of the southern states is an important 
factor in the shortage of tubewells (pumps), fertilizers, and other 
agricultural needs.
The inadequacy of transportation has a direct bearing on the 
mobility of the people; on agricultural and rural development, on the 
siç)ply of fertilizer, seed, and food grains; on the exploitation of 
mineral resources; and on industrial deliveries and retail trade. The 
lack of adequate transportation facilities results in social fragmenta­
tion and a lack of political and economic cohesiveness in the country.
Near the northern border of the country, political factors 
have led to road construction designed for defense. By 1966, 3,76$ 
kilometers of new roads with a width of 6 .1 meters had been constructed; 
3,090 kilometers of roads had been widened and surfaced between Sonamarg 
and Leh in Ladakh. The immediate program undertaken as a result of the 
defense emergency included the construction of 5 ,3 6 0 kilometers of new 
roads near the border and the widening of 4,360 kilometers. This road 
building activity related to national defense was precipitated by the 
1962 war with China.
Besides rail and road travel, air travel is an increasing 
phenomenon in India. Air travel, however, is not a major feature of the 
Indian transportation pattern. It may not become a regular feature even 
for the next generation, because it is eight times more expensive than 
railway travel. The immediate concern of all political parties and the 
public in relation to air transportation is the defense of the country 
by air. There is a popular demand for India to build its own fighter 
planes and to defend its own borders from hostile neighbors. Here again.
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transportation becomes a key to political stability and national 
security.
The telecommunications network is an almost equally inçortant 
part of the political geography of the country. The post offices, the 
telegraph and telephone systems, and the radio and television stations 
are the media through which political propaganda is dispersed and the 
government's influence over its citizens is exercised. In India the 
postal and telegraph service is the second largest state undertaking, 
employing 500,000 people. There are currently more than 100,000 post 
offices, and the number of telephones is increasing rapidly.
Radio is probably the principal medium through which Indian 
political leaders communicate with the public. India's radio stations 
are able to reach 62 per cent of the: nation ' s area where 77 per cent of 
the population live. All-India Radio has installed community listening 
sets in about 150,000 villages. The broadcasts have, in a relatively 
short period of time, created an interest among rural folks in national 
and international issues along with their strictly local interests,
India has also introduced a television network in the Delhi 
area, especially for educational purposes. In 1967, the only television 
transmission in India was from the five-kilowatt Delhi station of All- 
India Radio, serving a radius of 30 kilometers. At the time there were 
reported to be nearly 5,000 receivers. All of the communication facili­
ties have helped to inçrove the internal cohesion of the country and to 
broaden knowledge of and interest in international relations with the 
outside world.
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Modern communications can play a tremendous role in educating 
the farmers, improving farm techniques, lowering the rural and urban 
birth rate, and uniting the nation. Major changes in the attitudes of 
the people can be brought about by use of the official communications 
network, changes which will inqsrove the general standard of living and 
create a better image of the country among the various nations of the 
world.
Foreign Trade
The nature and extent of the foreign trade of a country has a 
direct relationship to general economic conditions, to internal and 
external political problems, and even • to governmental stability. 
India, with more than 21 years of independence, must seek affiliations 
and trade relations with ideologically suitable partners if it is to 
survive as a democratic nation. India's trade with the United States 
and the United Kingdom is increasing at a rapid rate. In 1966-67 the 
United States supplied more than 36.8 per cent of India's imports, with 
wheat being the leading inport commodity. There has been and is strong 
political opposition from the leftists against importing such large 
amounts of wheat from the United States. The leftists charge that 
India's planning is not based on economic practicalities. The virtual 
dependence on the United States for wheat, they say, has lowered the 
nation ' s prestige by portraying India ' s image as that of a hungry and 
even starving stepchild of American capitalism. Moreover, the United 
States has threatened to cut off wheat shipments during at least one 
time of crisis. Such a threat was posed by President Lyndon B. Johnson
71
at the time of the disturbance with Pakistan in 1965- This type of 
threat and the uncertainty of the food supply is dangerous in a time of 
national crisis.
In recent years wheat has constituted more than 20 per cent of 
India's imports by value, and machinery and iron and steel production 
have amounted to another 25 per cent. Cotton and raw jute are other 
major imports. In spite of difficult relations with Pakistan in recent 
years, India should strive hard to develop good relations with that 
country because it can supply raw jute and long staple cotton at cheaper 
prices than any other area. For the best economic development of the 
Indian subcontinent and general peace in the area, it is essential that 
both these neighbors should have good trade relations with each other.
As is the case with the United States and the United Kingdom, 
India's trade with the East European countries is also increasing. These 
East European countries, which are likewise capable of meeting many of
India's demands for machinery and raw materials, offer a considerable
22market for her primary, semi-processed, and manufactured goods.
India's trade with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Ger­
many, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria is largely carried out 
on a bilateral basis. Although there is an ideological difference 
between India and these countries, there is little, if any, interfer­
ence by these countries in the internal politics of India. The Indian 
people think that the barter-type trade agreements are only another form
K. Sarangan, United Nations, Conference on Trade and 
Development, Liner Shipping in India's Overseas Trade (Conference on 
Trade and Development, 1967), p. 40.
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of trade relations and have nothing to do with politics. There is some 
political maneuvering, however, especially by the Soviet Union, but the 
Soviet political influence is more on external policies than on internal 
state politics.
Exports to four major trading partners, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Japan accounted for 56.1 per cent 
of the total exports of India in 1966-67, as against 54*8 per cent in 
1965-66. India's main exports in 1966-67 were textile yarn and fabrics 
(31.7 per cent), jute (21.5 per cent), and tea (14 per cent). The 
export of jute and tea is increasing steadily, although jute production 
has been rather low for the last two or three years. The United States 
alone accounts for about 45 per cent of the total export of jute goods. 
Pakistan, which supplies cheaper jute goods than India, is a strong 
competitor in this commodity. Besides textiles, jute, and tea, other 
traditional items of export are spices, tobacco, mineral ores, scrap 
metals, leather, hides and skins, vegetable oil and oil cakes, cashew 
nuts, coffee, and coir. Finished goods are increasing in India's 
exports, and there is a sharp decline in raw material exports, espec­
ially cotton, mineral ores, and raw leather. The finished machine goods 
are exported to countries in North and South America, bestem Europe, 
Australia, and New Zealand, in addition to the less developed countries 
of Africa, southeast Asia, and the Middle East. In exchange for these 
machinery purchases, the Middle East countries supply petroleum and 
petro-chemicals, cotton (long staple Egyptian cotton), and other raw 
materials for India's growing manufacturing industries.
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India always has a deficit balance of trade, nnfortnnately, and 
this imbalance is increasing (Fig. 10). While it increased only nine 
per cent from 1964-65 to 1965-6 6, the increase was 49 per cent from 
1965-66 to 1966-67 (Fig. 10). This adverse balance is not only a con­
stant worry to government economists and political leaders, but also a 
severe burden to the masses. The price of consumer goods has been 
increasing at an alarming rate. The price of food grains, for instance, 
increased from a base index of 100 in 1952-53 to 262 in 1967. The 
generalized wholesale price of all commodities in the same period rose 
to 222. The price rises have an adverse effect on political stability.
To an important degree they are due to the sudden explosion of popula­
tion in recent years.
Demographic Analysis
The population explosion of India is a subject of constant 
worry to educated Indians and many of the democratic nations. Among the 
nations of the world,with 16 per cent of the total world population,
India ranks second in population only to the People's Republic of China. 
Although India has approximately one-third the area of the United States, 
it shelters about two and a half times the population of the United 
States. Such a vast population creates numerous economic and political 
problems for the country.
India's population is increasing at a very rapid rate. In the 
decade of the last decennial census (1951-6 1) the absolute increase was
78,100,000. India's population today approximates that of the 55 states 













present is 2 .5 per cent, i.e., 13»000 ,000 new souls are added per year.
India's population is estimated at 555,000,000 in 1971, 625,000,000 in
1976, and 719,000,000 in 1981. India's modern rate of growth, however,
is not exceptional in relation to the rate of growth in Japan or, for
that matter in western countries such as Great Britain, Germany, the
Soviet Union or the United States, all of which at times have exceeded
23India's percentage increase. The rapid increase in India was especially 
notable during 1951-6 1, but because of very high death rates the net 
increase was very moderate in earlier periods. Four important factors 
about India's population are important to note: the huge absolute
increase, the continuing high level of natural fertility, the rapidly 
decreasing death rate, and the persistent poverty of the people.
The direct effect of this high increase in the past decade is 
reflected in the increased dependency ratio and the high unemployment 
which together nullify much of the progress achieved through planning.
Any gradual growth in per capita income is essentially neutralized by 
the growth of population, so that what emerges is a growth of the total 
economy rather than an increase in income per person. The nearly 80 per 
cent of the people who live below the poverty line do not get enough 
caloric intake for healthy living. The tragedy is that the strenuous 
efforts which the Government of India has made in increasing irriga­
tion, land reclamation, and food output have been largely cancelled by 
the growth of population. Singly to provide for the additional annual 
population increase, the country needs to develop resources adequate
^^Norton Ginsburg, The Pattern of Asia (Englewood Cliffe, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1958), p. 6̂5.
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to provide for 126,500 more schools, 372,500 more school teachers, 
2,509,000 more houses, 188,774,000 more meters of cloth, 12,545,300 
more quintals of food, 4,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 more jobs, etc.^^
Another feature of the sudden increase in population is the 
associated change in the dependency ratio. According to the 1961 cen­
sus, 4 0 .2 per cent of the total population was in the 0 -1 4 age group, 
47.9 per cent in the 15-49 group, and 11.9 per cent in the 50 and over 
group (Fig. 11). Since the working population is considered to be 
those in the 18-58 age bracket, the dependency ratio in 1966 was 884 
per thousand, and it is expected to be 896 in 1971. ĥe increased 
dependency ratio lowers the per capita income and places a great strain 
on the working population.
The increase in population has also aggravated the enployment 
situation. In 1961, there were 8,000,000 people unemployed; by 1966 
this figure had reached approximately 12,000,000; and by 1971, there 
will probably be 15,000,000 unemployed. The number of unemployed is 
increasing in spite of the fact that the Government of India created
13,000,000 new jobs during the Third Five Year Plan (1961-66) and is 
expected to create 20,000,000 more jobs between 1966 and 1971. In 
India unemployed people often stage demonstration and demand jobs when 
jobs are not available. Significantly, the Communist Party and other 
leftist parties have instigated these unemployed workers to stage riots 
and demonstrations and to loot commercial establishments.
^̂ Pr. S. Chandrashekhar, "A National Population Policy Wanted,” 
The Hindu Weekly Review. February 11, 1968, p. 12.
^^Dependency ratio = ̂  0-17 58/1000 or 18-58.
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The uneven distribution of population has a particular bearing 
on certain economic and political differences over the country. Half 
of the population of India lives on less than one-quarter of the avail­
able land, and one-third is concentrated on less than six per cent of 
the land. The average density according to the latest census was 138 
per square kilometer. This represents a density approximately 15 times
greater than that of Africa, Latin America, North America, and the
26Soviet Union. Densities are greatest in the well-watered alluvial 
plains of the Ganges and on the coastal lowlands, especially in the 
rice lands of Kerala and West Bengal. By contrast, parts of the dry 
interior are relatively sparsely populated (Fig. 12). The Ganges 
Valley, still predominantly agricultural, now has a density of popu­
lation comparable to that of many western industrialized areas. 
Interestingly enough, governments of all of the densely settled states 
(Kerala, West Bengal, Tamilnadu, and the Punjab, and the Delhi Munici­
pal Council) are not under the control of the Congress Party. Uttar 
Pradesh recently voted for the Congress Party. Kerala and Tamilnadu 
have Communist and DMK governments respectively, and in the Delhi 
Municipal Council power is held by the Jan Sangh. West Bengal and 
the Punjab are under the Communist Party and the Akali Dal Party 
respectively.
The rather marked urban growth and the village to city migration 
patterns of the Indian population have a variety of political effects. 
Though India continues to be a predominantly agricultural and rural
26Thomas E. Dow, Jr., "The Population of India," Current History. 
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country, the urban proportion of the total population has been slowly
27increasing, from 11 per cent in 1901 to 18 per cent in 1961. More­
over, during 1951-61, the rate of urban growth (26.4 per cent) was 
higher than that of rural growth (20.6 per cent). Tamilnadu, Maharas- 
tra, and Gujarat are the most urbanized states in the country. These 
three states draw more than their share of industries and attract 
greater investment of private capital, and are thus achieving notable 
improvement in their standard of living. The elections in Tamilnadu 
are generally won by the urban, industrial, and commercial entrepreneurs 
rather than by the more numerous rural agriculturalists. Most of the 
political decisions are taken in the large cities where the capitals of 
the states are located.
Internal migration is not a prominent aspect of Indian 
population. The comparative immobility of the Indian people has long 
been obvious from the official census reports. In every Indian census,
nearly 90 per cent of the people have been enumerated in the districts
28in which they were born. Five per cent of the people move to the 
adjoining districts due to job opportunities in more industrialized 
areas. This traditional social restriction to their birthplace has 
created a local and regional feeling among the people that is reflected 
in politics. Except during times of national emergency, the tendency 
towards separatism is evident in many of the regions and states of 
India. A greater sense of national unity and integration throughout all
27Dr. S. Chandrashekhar, India's Population; Facts. Problem, 
and Policy (New Delhi; Meenakshi Prakashan, 1967), p. 11.
28Gunnar Myrdal, o£. cit., p. 387.
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of India is one of the objectives of the present government. Most of 
the migration that is taking place is near such, large urban areas as 
Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta, Bangalore, Madras, Hyderabad, and Kanpur.
This migration has created a severe unemployment problem and increased 
rioting and crimes in the big cities. Another type of migration is 
that which takes place when a severe regional drought condition arises, 
but this is not a seasonal or permanent migration. Such migrations 
create acute food shortages in the cities to which the hungry migrants 
turn for emergency relief, and they thus disrupt the peace and stability 
of municipal administration. More internal migration, especially mobil­
ity from one area to another, will tend to unify the nation and strengthen 
the idea of nationhood. As one means to this end, the Government of 
India has made it compulsory for all Indian Civil Service personnel 
(Indian Administrative Service, Indian Police Service, and Indian Admin­
istrative and Accounts Service) to be assigned to posts in states other 
than their home state.
The vast population of India is a serious concern not only of 
the Indian educated elite but also of governments, groups, and individ­
uals in other friendly nations of the world. With the help of the 
United Nations, the United States, and a number of other countries,
India has begun an official and already effective family planning pro­
gram. Under this program, about 5,700,000 sterilizations have been
performed in the country so far and about 2,700,000 intra-uterine loops
29have been inserted. About 200,000,000 condoms are being distributed 
29"India Equals World Performance in Sterilizations, lUCD 
Insertions," India News, VIII, No. 5 (April 25, 1969), 2.
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per year, and this figure may go up to 600,000,000 or 700,000,000 per 
year within a period of three to four years. There are 56,000,000 
ooiçles in the country with three or more children and, according to 
Dr. S. Chandrashekhar, Health and Family Planning Minister, these 
couples should undergo voluntary sterilization. Studies have shown 
that the majority of Indians do not oppose family planning in principle. 
There is no religious prejudice against birth control. Today 90 per 
cent of the people in urban areas are aware of the possibility of family 
planning, 70 per cent accept it, and 35 per cent practice it, whereas in 
the villages the comparable figures are only 60 per cent, 30 per cent, 
and 15 per cent.
The family planning program has direct political inqplications 
for both public and private expenditures. Opposition to the program is 
due to the old established traditions of having more sons for social 
security and to the program's encouragement of late marriages which is 
also contrary to tradition. The young people in reproduction age brac­
kets are mostly not opposed to family planning. Apparently insufficient 
contraceptive distribution programs have brought some resentment among 
the village folk. The old village leaders who practically hold the 
political power in villages are still not actively endorsing the family 
planning program. The young people find themselves confronting these 
elderly pillars of village politics, and the result is sometimes a 
conflict between the two groiçs.
In conclusion, the bonds of political unity which have been 
brought into existence: in independent India must be strengthened by 
more social and economic integration. The political future throughout
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south and southeast Asia depends largely on which of the two great 
neighboring states, Communist China or democratic India, will be more 
successful in solving its economic problems. Failure in India could 
mean the end of democracy there and in some of the smaller nations as 
well. Thus India must succeed in its planning programs. Economically, 
India must progress at a faster rate than China and must control its 
population if it is to attain success in its democratic ideals. The 
present family planning program should be extended, and the masses should 
be better educated as to its techniques and objectives. The last four 
general elections have indicated that democracy in India can survive if 




While in the process of assuming power, the new Indian 
government had to cope with one internal crisis after another. Following 
the bloodletting, looting, and unprecedented mass migration that accom­
panied partition, law and order had to be restored, and mass machinery 
had to be organized to deal with the millions of non-Muslim refugees from 
East and West Pakistan. A major task of the new administration was to 
unite India and dethrone $62 princely rulers. Geographically, the 
princely states were scattered over every portion of the map of India 
(Fig. 1 3). The lack of geographical contiguity made it difficult to 
unite and integrate the territories of the various states into larger 
units. It was soon quite apparent, however, that the Gksvemment of India 
would find it worthwhile to depart from strict logic in order to get the 
larger states freely and willingly into a union and, at the same time, 
extend control over that union.
Integration of Indian States 
Before independence, there was a widespread fear that the vast 
number and striking diversity of the princely states, some of which were 
larger in area and population than such European nations as France, Ger­
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and stability of India. It was speculated that India would live or 
perish as a union depending on how it solved the problem of integration. 
The princely states had their own individual revenue sources, land tenure 
patterns, legal and monetary systems, transportation networks, adminis­
trative machinery, and police forces. Moreover, the Indian Independence 
Act left the Indian states completely free, and so created not two but
564. independent countries, of which two, India and Pakistan, were to be
1dominions. In theory, it left India even more fragmented than when the
British first began to assume authority. As a start toward integrating
various territories into a union, the Government of India established a
separate Department of State.
The aim of the newly formed (June 25, 194?) Department of
State, it should be reemphasized, was to establish the unity of India.
Professor R. Coupland suggested that India could live if its Muslim limbs
in the northwest and northeast were amputated, but could not live with- 
2out its hearts. The heart here signifies the interior areas of India, 
i.e., the Gange tic plain and northern part of the southern peninsula.
In revamping the territorial organization inherited from the British, the 
Government of India has tried to create a system of states which satis­
fies the maximum number of regional interests and, at the same time,
3furthers national cohesion. On July 5, 1947, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Ŝir Percival Griffith, The British Impact on India (London: 
Prank Cass and Company Ltd., 1965), p. 355.
"̂The Indian Dominion and the States," World Today, V, No. 1 
(January, 1949), 30.
^Ranjit Tirtha, "Geographical Reorganization of Indian States, 
1947-1960," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Caro­
lina, 1962), p. 2.
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(Minister of State) and the last Viceroy of India (Lord Mountbatten) 
gave long and forceful speeches to the princely rulers on the merits of 
integration. Within a week of these speeches, all the states within the 
old geographical limits of British India had accepted union with India 
except Hyderabad, Junagarh, and Jammu and Kashmir.
In the first of these three holdout states, the Nizam of 
Hyderabad, a Muslim prince ruling over an overwhelming majority of Hindu 
subjects, had shown an inclination to establish a sovereign state. It 
was widely felt, however, that an independent Hyderabad might be a danger 
to the safety of India, since a sovereign state within the heart of a 
larger country might create tensions by aligning with one or more 
enemies of the larger enclosing state. On September 13, 194S, Indian 
troops entered and subdued Hyderabad, and by this action resolved a 
problem that had been troubling the mind and body of the new Union aince 
its inception on August 15, 1947.^
The story of the Muslim ruler of Junagarh is a bit different 
from that of the Nizam of Hyderabad. The Junagarh ruler refused to 
accede to India, preferring union with Pakistan.. His subjects rose in 
revolt against him, however, and he was forced to flee to Pakistan, 
whereiÇ)on Indian armed forces restored order in his. state. The Govern­
ment of India held a referendum in February, 1948, which went almost 
unanimously in favor of union with India. It was finally agreed that
India: The Settlement with Hyderabad,” Round Table, XXXIX,
No. 153 (December, 1947), 67-68.
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Junagarh should be included within the state of Saurastra.^ The domains 
of Junagarh were scattered in different parts of Saurastra and separated 
by other territories (Fig. H)* Whether considering the problem politi­
cally, economically, or technically, it would have been very difficult 
for India or Junagarh to administer the fragmented area effectively.
Integration in India was accos^lished rapidly. Within less than 
a year after independence, the number of state units had been reduced 
from $62 to 27 (Fig. 1$). Integration was achieved by following a real­
istic policy. Some states were merged with provinces geographically 
contiguous to them; some were formed into viable unions of states, and 
some were converted into centrally administered areas.^ Integration in 
most instances was achieved swiftly and peacefully.
After independence, India gained more territory and population 
through the integration of the princely states than it lost through 
partition. The essentially bloodless revolution, which brought about a 
great geographical transformation in the inner structure of the Indian 
nation has had no parallel in world history. It took three terrifying 
wars and sixty years for Germany to unite its people into a nation state. 
Similarly, in Italy unity was achieved only after several bloody mili­
tary campaigns. In the Iftiited States of America it took four years of 
terrible civil war to consolidate a fragile federal structure.
The process of unification that India witnessed after 
independence was far more than sinple territorial integration. A common
Îfolden Furber, "The Ifeiification of India," Pacific Affairs, 
XXIV, No. 4 (December, 1951), 357.
Â. Krishna Swami, The Indian Union and the States; A Study 
in Autonomy and Integration (New York; Pergamon Press, 196$), p. 16.
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legal system and a uniform judicial administration were adopted, 
permeating all levels of social and economic life. An integrated system 
of transportation and communication was developed, cutting across the 
territories of the former princely states and British provinces. This 
functional integration has provided the country with some important 
ingredients of unity. Language differences have, on the other hand, 
tended to shatter internal unity.
Reorganization of States on A Linguistic Basis
A common language in India could be a powerful basis for 
national unity, but according to the 1951 census there were 844 lan-
7
guages and dialects in the country. The 14 major regional languages 
specified in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India are spoken 
by 91 per cent of the enumerated population. Of the remaining tongues, 
63 are 'foreign' languages, and another 720 are spoken by fewer than 
100,000 persons each. In India a linguistic group seldom includes in 
any large area a majority of more than 75-80 per cent, and it often 
has not been possible to form states with minorities smaller than 20-25 
per cent.
The vast majority of Indian languages fall into two major 
groups, one concentrated in the north and one in the south. The north­
ern languages are Indo-Aryan and are derived from the Sanskrit family, 
whereas the South Indian languages are not. The Tamil language, for
7Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "The Riots in Tamilnadu; Problems 
and Prospects of India's Language Crisis," Asian Survey. V, No. 8 
(August, 1965), 4 0 3.
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instance, has not been influenced by Sanskrit, and has no similarities 
with Hindi or its associated languages. The people of Tamilnadu feel 
that the nation is dominated by the North, and that the South has been 
both neglected and exploited. The Congress leadership, they say, has 
been drawn predominantly from northern India, and south Indians, they 
point out, were under-represented in the cabinets of Nehru and Shastri, 
especially in comparison with the states of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, and 
Maharastra. The young people in Tamilnadu demonstrated against the 
imposition of Hindi as the national language. Hindi books were burned, 
and the Hindi signs in railway stations were defaced or ripped down.
The decision to make Hindi the national language was taken with the 
reasoning that, among the 14- major languages, Hindi was spoken by the 
largest percentage, that is, by about 4-2 per cent of the population.
Unfortunately, Hindi at the time of its adoption could not 
compare in literary development with at least three of the other lan-
g
guages, Bengali, Tamil, and Marathi. Nevertheless, geography and 
politics make the Hindi speaking Ganges plain the heartland of India. 
Significantly, the fewest boundary changes at the time of independence 
were made in northern India where Hindi is the predominant language.
On the world scale, it is not clear whether linguistic groups 
make ideal political units. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have made 
efforts to organize political states on a linguistic basis, but both of 
these countries possess one predominant language. Russian is spoken by 
58.4- per cent of the people of the Soviet Union, and Serbo-Croatian by
g
Selig S. Harrison, "The Challenge to Indian Nationalism," 
Foreign Affairs, XXXIV, No. k (July, 1956), 624..
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75 per cent of those in Yugoslavia. Belgium and Switzerland, to cite 
the best West European examples of linguistic pluralism, have both had 
to contend with language problems. Currently, there is serious trouble 
about language usage in Belgium. The ever greater trouble in India is 
due to the fact that linguistic boundaries tend also to be caste boun­
daries; caste is essentially a regional or local affair. The linguistic 
demarcation of state boundaries in India, Nehru and other political 
leaders had thought, would intensify conflicts between castes. In 
Andhra, Kamas and Reddies (different castes) were lost in the welter of 
castes, and they faced each other as titans. Linguistically, Kamas and 
Reddies were one groî , but due to caste affiliations they were polit­
ically opposed to each other. Although Brahmins had dominated Bt&dras 
for generations, the DMK party, using anti-Hindi and anti-Brahmin 
slogeuis, won the state election in 1967. Now there is no Brahmin min­
ister in the state government of Tamilnadu. A strong agitation against 
Brahmins has also developed in Maharastra.
Linguistic states, however, can have some advantages of their 
own. Each such state can have its own internal cultural unity, linguistic 
tradition, and economic ties. In general, the Hindi-speaking provinces 
of the north have had the least trouble with boundary changes, and they 
have always had good relations with their neighbors. Before evaluating 
the formation of linguistic boundaries in India in specific terms, for 
a meaningful evaluation, it is important to deal with the principles of 
formation of geographical boundaries in general.
Geographers study boundaries because they are elements of the 
cultural landscape, and because they represent the limits of political
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sovereignty which have meaningful areal quality over the earth's 
landscape.^ Boundaries and frontiers are elements of landscape which 
provide either the ^  facto or ^  .jure limits of political sovereignty, 
that is, they provide one measure of areal differentiation. They are, 
therefore, objects of interest to both political and regional geographers.
All political boundaries are man-made, that is, artificial; 
obviously they are not phenomena of nature. In a sense, then, there can 
be no such thing as a natural boundary, for all boundaries create artifi­
cial barriers to the normal relations between people. The boundaries of 
India are different from those in many parts of the world. In the 
Americas, Africa, and Australia, for example, the relative emptiness of 
the land, at least at the time of the formation of boundaries, the 
absence of nationalism, and the almost complete lack of geographical 
knowledge resulted in the establishment of geometrical boundaries, which 
were satisfactory enough as long as there was an abundance of space. In 
contrast, anthropogeographic boundaries have been more important in 
Europe and in certain other densely populated parts of the world, not­
ably in India. India is perhaps the only country where the states are 
divided primarily on a linguistic basis.
Although they were not so established at the time of independence, 
all the Indian states have been reorganized on linguistic principles.
Even though such reorganization was often not favored Iqr the leaders in 
the government, they were eventually forced to divide the country on a 
linguistic basis for the following reasons:
g
J. R. V. Prescott, The Geograp^ of Frontiers and Boundaries 
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965), p. 27.
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(a) The original British-annexed territories had been formed 
without regard to any rational scientific or linguistic considerations. 
Agitation for a linguistic state first appeared in Bengal, where prior 
to 1905 the British had grouped Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and Chota Nagpur 
into one province, and later, for administrative convenience, divided the 
province into East and West Bengal. After vigorous agitation the two 
Bengals were reunited on August 25, 1911, on a linguistic basis. Similar 
agitation was launched during the period of British administration by 
Telegu-speaking people for the separation of Andhra (or Andhradesh) from 
Madras. In 1917, Andhra and Sind became separate Congress provinces. 
During the 1920 annual session' of the Congress Party, at Nagpur, the 
party decided to apply the principle of linguistic redistribution of 
states on an all-India basis. To implement this objective, the all- 
India conference appointed a committee in 1928 to draft a constitution 
for redistribution of the provinces on a more logical basis. The con­
ference committee reported that the redistribution should be partly 
geographical and partly economic and financial, but that the main con­
sideration should necessarily be the wishes of the people and the 
linguistic unity of the areas concerned. 0̂
(b) The presence of two or more lingustic blocs in the same 
state makes for inefficiency, friction, and political-economic penali­
zation of the minority group. The boundaries formed after the inte­
gration of the princely states were economically, administratively,
10John Bondurant, "Regionalism Versus Provincialism; A Study 
in Problems of Indian National Unity," Indian Press Digest Monograph 
Series No. A, December, 1955 (Berkeley: Institute of International
Studies; University of California, 1955), p. 22.
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and linguistically illogical. It was widely felt that there were too
many states even after integration. The newly created system of 27
states was -unwieldy, expensive, and inequitable, and to many it seemed
a wiser course to form linguistic states.
(c) The idea of linguistic states had mass appeal, and hence
the opposition parties, especially the Communists, adopted this idea as
a tactic to arouse opposition against the ruling Congress Party in order
to gain control of its legislative program.
In spite of these strong arguments in favor of forming linguistic
states, however, there was strong opposition to the linguistic re- 
11division of India. For example, although the Congress Party pleaded 
for the formation of linguistic states throughout the period of the 
struggle for independence, once having gained freedom,Nehru and Patel 
felt that the linguistic redivision should be postponed in favor of other 
more pressing and important matters. Soon after partition. Prime Minis­
ter Nehru remarked that first things must come first, saying that there 
was a danger that the national integration achieved by the late Sardar
Patel in the first year of independence might be nullified by a lin-
12guistic multi-partition of the country. In summary, the problem of 
forming linguistic states was complex, not only because of India's size 
and population, and the great number of languages and dialects spoken 
within its borders, but also because it had chosen to solve the problems 
within the framework of parliamen-tary democracy. The newly formed
11Report of Constituent Assembly (Legislative), November 27,
1%7 (New Delhi; Government Printing Press, 194-7), pp. 68-69.
^̂ The Times of India (Bombay), December 27, 1952, p. 1.
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Congress government had to satisfy the masses who were vehemently
supporting the idea of linguistic states.
The President of the Constituent Assembly of India appointed a
three-man commission in June, 194-8, to investigate the questions of
state formation in Andhra, Kerala, Karnataka, and Maharastra. This
commission known as the Dar Commission, said that everything which
helped the growth of nationalism in India had to go forward, and every-
13thing which threw obstacles in its way had to be rejected. It con­
cluded that lingustic groups are sub-nations, and if the intention was 
to create sub-nations in India there could not be a better way of doing 
it than to form linguistic provinces. In sum, the commission strongly 
disapproved the formation of states on a linguistic basis. It warned 
that the unity of newly independent India would be jeopardized if the 
map of India were to be redrawn along linguistic lines.
The Congress Party was not satisfied with the report of the Dar 
Commission and appointed its own three-man Linguistic Provinces Commit-
14-tee, known as the JVP committee, which submitted its report on 
vApril 1, 1949. The JVP committee, however, seconded the serious warn­
ing of the Dar Commission and expressed concern that administrative, 
financial, and economic problems might be overshadowed by the. linguistic 
issue. The report was slightly less favorable to the formation of 
linguistic states than that of the Dar Commission.
13•̂Handbook of Congressmen (New Delhi; Indian National Congress, 
1948), p. 48.
^^he committee consisting of Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar 
Vallabhbhai Patel, and Pattabhi Sitaramayya (JVP committee).
98
Strong opposition to the JVP report resulted, especially in 
the Telegu-speaking areas. On December 15, 1952, a 52-day protest fast 
claimed the life of Fotti Sriramulu, a passionate Andhra patriot. 
Violence started at several places. Some railway stations were burned, 
and several post offices were destroyed. New Delhi announced the imme­
diate formation of a linguistic based Andhra State and promised an early
15appointment of the state's Reorganization Commission. There was 
organized opposition from various political organizations, but the 
arguments for a linguistic state for the Telegu people prevailed.
The Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India 
appointed a three-man States Reorganization Commission on December 29, 
1953, to inquire further into the linguistic states question and recom­
mend a course of action. The report of the States Reorganization 
Commission, popularly known as the SRC report, is a 267-page document 
representing the conclusions of the three members^^ after traveling over 
98,420 square kilometers, interviewing some 9,000 persons, and examining 
nearly 152,000 documents.The unity of India, the report concluded, 
should be regarded as the primary consideration in any redrawing of the 
country's political units. After careful consideration, the commission 
recommended that the number of Indian states be reduced from 27 to 16,
"India: Redrawing the Map," Round Table, XLVI, No. 181
(December, 1955), 70.
16The Commission consisted of S. Fazl All, as chairman, and 
Hridya Nath Kunzru and Sardar K. M. Pannikar as members.
1 7Marshall Vindmiller, "The Politics of States Reorganization 
of India: The Case of Bombay, Far Eastern Survey. XXV, No. 9 (Septem­
ber, 1956), 129.
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with three territories.^^ The SRC commission emphatically declared that 
none of the constituent units of India would be sovereign and indepen­
dent in the sense of the American colonies or Swiss Cantons before 
federation, and asserted that it would be unnecessary to invoke the 
provisions governing constitutional amendments when the central govern­
ment wanted to make territorial adjustments.
The recommendations were partially modified in the Lok Sabha 
(lower house of the Indian parliament), and a State Reorganization Act 
was enacted in 1955. The political map after the reorganization showed 
14 states and six centrally administered territories (Fig. 16).
Although the recommendations were carefully made, the report was 
strongly criticized in all sections of the country. The New York Times 
remarked even before the publication of the report that the commission 
would suggest enlarging some states, making some smaller, wiping out a 
few altogether, and creating some new ones. .
In West Bengal, Orissa, the Punjab, and Bombay the criticism 
was particularly strong. When the SRC declined to accept the idea of a
Sikh state, agitation among the Sikhs was to be anticipated and was
19promptly forthcoming, Sardar K. M, Pannikar, one member of the SRC
®̂The States are: (1) Uttar Pradesh (Language Hindi); (2)
Bihar (Hindi); (3) West Bengal (Bengali); (4) Orissa (Oriya); (5) Assam 
(Assami); (6) Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmiri); (7) Kerala (Malayalam);
(8) Karnataka (Kannada); (9) Madras (Tamil); (10) Andhra Pradesh 
(Telegu); (11) Hyderabad (Telegu); (12) Vidharbha (Marathi); (13)
Madhya Pradesh (Hindi); (14) Rajasthan (Hindi); (15) Bombay (Gujarati 
and Marathi); (16) Punjab (Punjabi and Hindi). Delhi, Manipur, and the 
Andaman amd Nicobar islands were the three territories to be directly 
administered by the central government.
^̂ The Hindu (Madras), October 11, 1955, p. 1.
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Commission; insisted that adjustment of state boundaries on a linguistic
basis would not solve any problem unless the whole matter of unity was
considered from the point of view of Indian nationalism. There was no
such thing as Assamese, Bengali, or Kerala culture he insisted; there
was only one Indian culture which emanated from the Ramayan and the 
20Mahabharat. The Ramayan and the Mahabharat are epics which depicted 
the old Indian culture and unity. Some of the Congress leaders saw the 
idea of linguistic states as harmful and even dangerous. One of the
elder statesmen, G. Rajgopalachari, considered the whole concept a tribal
21idea. K. M. Munshi, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh, called it "fraught 
with danger."
The strong areas of conflict, such as bilingual Bombay and the 
Punjab, and Nagaland and other hilly areas of Assam, were granted separ­
ate statehood at different times (Fig. 16). The areas of bilingualism 
situated between two states were torn in both directions. These dis­
puted areas, claimed by the adjoining states, were finally partitioned
or given to the most legitimate claimant by one of the several boundary
22commissions (^pendix I).
A few of the states, such as Assam, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, 
and Jammu and Kashmir, have not been materially affected by the
^̂ The Statesman (New Delhi-Calcutta), May 13, 1955, p. 1.
^̂ The Overseas Hindustan Times (New Delhi), Ifarch 19, 1953,
P »
^^he various territorial adjustments were finalized by the 
following commissions: the States Reorganization Commission, the Pun­
jab Boundary Commission, the Maharastra and Gujarat Boundary Commission, 
the Nagaland Boundary Commission, and the Mahajan Report. Proposals of 
the Mahajan Report are still pending, and the disputed areas have not been 
transferred to either Maharastra or ttysore.
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reorganization. The people of some of the linguistic states still 
think— or thought— in their traditional associations. For example, it 
is still customary to think of Andhra State as divided into northern 
and southern regions. Economically, politically, and educationally, 
the north part, the area of the Circars, is far more advanced and tends 
to dominate the south. Only their common language, Telegu, ties the 
north and the south together.
The state of ïfysore has great geographical variation within it, 
and must be prepared for regional rivalries between the agriculturally 
poor but industrially developed south and the agriculturally rich but 
industrially poor north. The Tungabhadra Dam is in Î ysore State, but 
most of the land areas affected by this dam lie in Andhra Pradesh, where 
irrigation is more easily accomplished than in Mysore. The inclusion of 
the dam area in Itysore was strongly opposed by the Andhra people, and 
it is still a sore point between the two states. The Punjab and 
Rajasthan, as well as Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, are mutually linked 
with the irrigation waters of their common rivers. ïfysore, Andhra 
Pradesh, and Tamilnadu all have common interests in irrigation projects.
Several interstate and national problems are posed by the 
reorganization of states on a linguistic basis instead of with regard 
to their geographical conformity. Linguistic states create a certain 
danger to the national unity, since they develop a feeling of regional­
ism, hinder economic cooperation between the states, and disturb the 
peaceful environment of the nation.
The feeling of national unity has been especially weakened by 
the emphasis which the reorganization has placed on local culture.
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language J and history. A recent exang)le of such localism may be seen 
in the decision of the Madras government to change the names of trans­
port vehicles, government buildings, and residences of ministers, and 
to conduct the official state correspondence in Tamil. The Chief Min­
ister has urged the people to give their newborn babies Tamil names.
The name of the state was changed from Madras to Tamilnadu. Similar 
tendencies have been apparent among many different linguistic units in 
India since the reorganization. The developing regional rivalries will 
certainly weaken the overall national unity.
The formation of linguistic states has retarded much planned 
economic development, because local sentiment within a state often 
resents the utilization of that state's resources for the benefit of 
other states. Interstate employment possibilities, then, other than 
perhaps in the top civil services, are decreasing as states are reor­
ganized on linguistic principles. Efficient workers from one state 
cannot be employed in an adjacent one when they are deficient in the 
language requirements of that state. The creation of linguistic states 
has created strong regional feelings among the people. In addition to 
the emotional regionalism, there are disputed border areas which hinder 
the peaceful coexistence of adjacent states. The distribution of water 
and power has been made more difficult by the reorganization of states, 
and several disputes concerning production and distribution have arisen 
in the years since reorganization.
Regionalism, with its love of regional language is certainly 
not the sole cause of border issues between the Indian states. Boundary 
commissions did their best to make ing)artial judgments, but these
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judgments were inevitably influenced at times by considerations of
economic efficency and administrative convenience, and were unpopular
with certain groups. While the decision to divide India on a linguistic
basis is considered by the writer to have been an unfortunate one, the
decision now seems irrevocable, and the Indian nation will have to live
with it. A better division of the country might have been tiiat devised
by the All-India Manufacturers' Organization on the basis of geo-economics.
That organization suggested that the country should be redivided into
nine states, each with an area of approximately 259,000 square kilometers
and a population of 55,000,000. Under this plan the states could have
been formed either from natural regions or by putting together contiguous
parts of different regions, taking into account economic, strategic, and
23geographic factors. Political and linguistic factors would have been 
given secondary consideration in such a scheme. After the integration 
of Indian states into the Indian Union and the subsequent reorganization 
of the states, a major remaining sore point was Kashmir, a problem area 
which has attracted world attention since August 15, 1947. In a general 
study of the political geography of India, Kashmir must be given a 
separate and special treatment.
The Kashmir Problem
24.Jammu and Kashmir, prior to independence, was the largest of 
all the Indian states. In size, it very nearly approached the aggregate
23The Times of India (Bombay), December 25, 1966, p. 7.
^^Jammu and Kashmir will be referred to as Kashmir in the rest 
of the text.
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25area of England, Wales and Scotland. Its strategic location was 
similar to that of Switzerland in relation to Italian, French, and 
German interests. Geographical location has always been a crucial
26factor in its strategic and political importance. Its proximity to 
the Soviet Union and China makes the question of Kashmir's security a 
critical one.
The state faced basic economic problems at the time of accession 
to India, such as low income, poverty, disease, and misery. Agriculture 
had always been the mainstay of the overwhelming majority of the popula­
tion. The mineral resources are not important from the point of view of 
commercial exploitation, although coal, iron ore, gypsum, and limestone
are available. It should be noted that Kashmir has traditionally been
27an enormous economic liability to India.
From a cultural point of view, there is no other state at 
present in India which has so much racial heterogeneity as Kashmir. It 
is a multi-racial, multi-lingual, and multi-religious state. Among the 
5,000,000 people of the state, approximately three-fourths are Muslims, 
and less than one-quarter are Hindus. Kashmiri Muslims are principally 
Sunni, while there is a Shia majority in Pakistan.
^̂ Walter Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir (London: Oxford
University Press, 1895), p. 285.
26Sisir Gtçta, Kashmir; A Study in India-Pakistan Relations 
(New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1966), p. 27,
27Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 319.
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The Gulab Singh's (first Dogra Ruler) dominion produced a 
strange union of Hindus, Pathans, Sikhs, Tibetans, Buddhists, and Muslims 
In a state which had no unifying basis In cultural tradition or political 
history. The older Kashmiris suffered terribly at the hands of the 
Invaders, particularly those from the west and southwest, and they 
developed eui attitude of distrust towards all outsiders. Such distrust 
has been demonstrated In the modern struggle for the rights of the 
Kashmiris as a nationality.
The modern political problem of Kashmir starts with the lapse
of the paramount power of the British In India. On June 3, 1946, a
Cabinet Mission Memorandum was produced which read as follows:
His Majesty's Government will cease to exercise powers of 
paramountcy. This means that the rights of the States which 
flow from their relationship to the Crown will no longer exist 
and that all rights surrendered by the states to the paramount 
power will return to the states.
It was also provided that every princely state had the option 
of acceding either to India or Pakistan. The final decision about the 
accession was left to the determination of the ruler of each state. It 
Is significant to note that there was no provision In the memorandum 
for consulting the people of the princely state as to their preference. 
Nor was the accession conditional. The question of religion did not 
come into play at all.
Unlike most of the princely rulers, who had either acceded to 
India or Pakistan before August 15, 1947, the Ruler of Kashmir did not 
make up his mind. Neither India nor Pakistan was happy with his
1946.
28Cabinet Mission Memorandum, Command Paper 6855, May 12,
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indecision. In this context Lord Mountbatten had carried the Indian 
leaders' assurance to the Maharaja that even accession to Pakistan would 
be more welcome than a declaration of independence. The Maharaja thought 
that any decision to accede to one dominion or the other might at this 
stage start off a chain of events which would disturb the peace of the 
state. Ife wanted to avoid the bloodshed which was taking place both in 
India and Pakistan after partition. Nevertheless, the Maharaja concluded 
a standstill agreement with Pakistan by the exchange of telegrams on 
August 12 and 16, 1947.^^ Before a standstill agreement with India 
could be concluded, however, Pakistan cut off communications and stopped 
the supply of essential commodities (grains, cloth, kerosene, salt, and 
sugar) in order to coerce Kashmir. On October 22, 1947, fully armed 
tribesmen from northwest Pakistan and other Pakistani nationals entered 
Kashmir in a full-scale invasion to. march towards the capital of the
state, occupy it, and decide the fate of Kashmir with the sword.The
31tribesmen resorted to indiscriminate slaughter of Muslims and Hindus.
The arson, loot, pillage, plunder, and violence committed by invading 
tribesmen in various towns and villages, including Mirpur, Poonch, 
Bhimbhar, Kotly, J hanger, Naushera, Baramula, Badnipore, Hardware, 
Gulmarg, and Badgaum. was beyond description. Several noted journalists 
of the world (News Chronicle, London; Observer. London; New Statesman,
^ Ân agreement in regard to communication and s^ply arrange­
ments which had always been interlinked with British India.
^®Lord Birdwood, India and Pakistan; A Continent Decides 
(New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1954)» P* 77.
Sisir Gipta, op. cĵ ., p. 110.
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London; and The New York Times, New York) have observed that there was 
not only strong support for the invasion of Kashmir by Pakistan, but 
recruitment was also going on inside Pakistan itself. Unable to pre­
vent the raiders from committing large scale killing, looting, and
arson, the ruler requested that the State of Jammu and Kashmir should
32he allowed to accede to the Indian Union. The instrument of acces­
sion of Kashmir was signed by the Maharaja Hari Singh on October 26, 
194-7, and the accession was accepted by the Governor General of India on 
October 27, 194-7. Accession thus became legally and constitutionally 
complete. The Maharaja wrote to Lord Mountbatten,
. . . with the conditions obtaining at present in my State and 
the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no 
option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally 
they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State 
acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided 
to do so, and I attach the instrument of accession for acceptance 
by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State 
and the people to freebooters. On this basis no civilised govern­
ment can exist or be maintained. This alternative I will never 
allow to happen so long as I am the ruler of the State and I have 
life to defend my country.
The Maharaja also informed Lord Mountbatten of his decision to 
appoint Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim government of Kashmir.
Sheikh Abdullah was then a popular leader of the people and the leader 
of the largest party, the "Jammu and Kashmir National Conference."
With the acceptance of accession, Mountbatten wrote on October 27,
19A7,
0. Chagla, Kashmir. 194.7-65 (New Delhi: Ministry of In­
formation and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1965), p. 18.
33Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir (London: Robert Hale
Ltd., 1956), p. 214-.
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In the case of any State where the issue of accession has been 
the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be 
decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the 
State, it is my government's wish that as soon as law and order 
have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the 
invader, the question of the State's accession should be 
settled by a reference to the people.
The letter also stated that Indian troops were being sent to
Kashmir to help the state forces repel the invasion. It is significant
that the Maharaja's request for accession was confirmed by the major
political organization of the people of Kashmir whose head was Sheikh
Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah said in the Security Council, "... under
those circumstances, both the Maharaja and the people of Kashmir
35requested the Government of India to accept our accession." Contrary 
to India's offer of help, the 'Government of Pakistan had exerted pres­
sure on the Kashmir ruler in two ways, by coercing the state economically 
through holding back certain essential supplies, and by instigating and 
encouraging communal riots in the states. The sole purpose was to 
demoralize the administration and terrorize the Maharaja into acceding 
to Pakistan.
There are several important aspects about Kashmir with which 
the writer wishes to deal individually. Such matters as the validity of 
accession, reactions of the Security Council to the issue, the offer of 
a plebiscite, new aggression, and the future of the state are vital to 
an understanding of the total Kashmir question.
24white Paper on Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Publication 
Division, Government of India, 1948), pp. 47-48.
35United Nations, Security Council 24,1 Meeting, 1948. Sheikh 
Abdullah* Speech on Kashmir. S.C.O.R. 24,1 Meeting, 1948.
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Since the offer of accession was madèdri a constitutionally valid 
manner, and was accepted in a constitutionally valid manner, the acces­
sion was complete and valid. Dr. M. C. Mahajan states that the Governor
General had the power to accept or reject the offer, but he had no
36power to ignore the question or to attach conditions to it.^ The
relevant constitutional provisions did not authorize a conditional
acceptance at all. Pakistan described the Maharaja's accession to India
as based t^on "fraud, deceit, and violence," and maintained that it was
totally against the wishes of his long (oppressed Muslim subjects. In
fact, if Pakistan had not encouraged or instigated the invasion of
Kashmir by the raiders, perhaps the Maharaja would have continued to
consider the idea of an independent state. In any case, in February,
1954, a Kashmiri Constituent Assembly, which was the only body elected
by the people, duly ratified on behalf of all the people of Kashmir the
act of accession with India that had been entered into by the Maharaja
37nearly seven years before. The people of Kashmir had freely expressed 
themselves on the issue of accession. After the government of India 
sent an army to defend Kashmir, a complaint was lodged against Pakistan's 
aggression in the Security Council on January 1, 1948.
The Indian leaders were obviously alarmed by the way in which 
their case had been received in the Security Council. The state which 
had brought the original complaint to the IMited Nations, convinced
36M. C. Mahajan, Accession of Kashmir to India; "The Inside 
Story (Sholapur: Institute of Public Administration, 1950),p. 2.
37Lawrence Scheinman and David Wilkinson, International Law 
and Political Crisis : Aa Analytical Casebook (Boston: Little, Brown
and Gonqpany, 1968), p. 67.
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of the righteousness of its own position, was placed on the defensive.
The Council had denied the Indian claim that it alone had a legitimate
complaint. It persisted in treating India and Pakistan both as
aggrieved par+ies, when one of them denied that it was a party at all.
The issue of Pakistan's aggression, which was foremost in the Indian
charge, was ignored. The issue of accession, which Pakistan brought up
incidentally, and which the Security Council was not competent to con-
38sider was treated as basic. The active support which the Anglo-
American powers gave to proposals such as the plebiscite, the withdrawal
of Indian forces, and the substitution of the lawful government of
Kashmir by a neutral administration was later cited by Zafrulla Khan,
the first Foreign Minister of Pakistan, and was to be quoted in suc-
39seeding years by his successors in various debates.
While India had at first agreed to a plebiscite, it later 
refused to hold one. Why? Under the United Nations Councils for India 
and Pakistan (UNCIP) of January 5, 194-9, Pakistan was required to with­
draw its troops, regular or irregular, from Kashmir. Pakistan's failure 
to withdraw was directly responsible for making the plebiscite impos­
sible. Merely by withdrawing troops from the state, Pakistan could have 
had a prompt and legal plebiscite. The possibility of a plebiscite 
seems to have been envisaged at first> because up to that time no 
elections had been held in Kashmir. The whole picture changed after 
Kashmir had four general elections (two of them under the Election
38B. L. Sharma, The Kashmir Story (New Delhi; Asia Publishing 
House, 1967), p. 47.
^̂ Ibid.
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Commissioner of India) with adult franchise. In each of these four 
elections, the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, a party which is 
now called the Pradesh Congress Party of Jammu and Kashmir, was returned 
to power. This party strongly supported Kashmir's integration with 
India.
The greatest single objection to a plebiscite was that it would 
almost certainly have revived communal bitterness, stirred open rivalry 
and conflict between India and Pakistan, and negated the very objective 
of India-Pakistan amity, the principle of peaceful coexistence. India, 
fearful of unleashing a tide of irrational religious fanaticism and 
bigotry, determined to avoid this danger. More than 60,000,000 minor­
ity people in India and Pakistan depended to a large extent on the 
elimination of religious slogans and divisive concepts from politics.
As Mohammed Carrim Chagla explained in the Security Council, the people 
who would really suffer were not the politicians in Pakistan who were 
preaching a holy war but, rather, millions of innocent people. The 
major blame, then, was in Pakistan, where the press and radio were being 
allowed to spread religious hatred thinly disguised as patriotic propa­
ganda.^̂  India had no intention of reviving the old memory of partition 
and its consequences.
Technologically, it probably was not possible to organize and 
implement a plebiscite in Kashmir. Korbel̂  ̂noted that the mere
^^Edmond Taylor, "Tortured Kashmir I; The Smoke and the Fire," 
The Reporter. XXXIII, No. 8 (November 4, 1965), 27.
^̂ Dr. Josef Korbel served as a member of the United Nations 
Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP).
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technicalities of carrying out the plebiscite seemed beyond the scope of
reality. The Economist (London) also wrote that there was talk of a
popular referendum in Kashmir to decide the issue but, in view of the
vast and mountainous territory, it was felt that a referendum would have
required hundreds of external observers if it were to have any validity.
Such observations, obviously, would be hard to arrange.Could even a
United Nations plebiscite administrator prevent communal massacres and
fresh fighting after a plebiscite? Pakistan's policies and actions— its
hate India campaign— confirmed the Indian fear that any plebiscite in
Kashmir would have been fought only on the basis of the religious
affinity between Kashmir Muslims and Pakistani Muslims. Most certainly
it would not have been fought on the more basic social and political
A3issues which faced the Kashmiris.
In recent years, the situation concerning plebiscite has 
materially changed, due to the agreement between Pakistan and Communist 
China on the boundary of Kashmir with Sinkiang. In 1963, China and 
Pakistan agreed to a boundary along the main Indus-Tarim watershed in 
the Karakoram, which corre^onded very closely to the line proposed by 
the British in 1899.^ This is perhaps unfortunate, since the main 
Chinese interests in the region, the road from Sinkiang to Tibet across 
the Aksai Chin Plateau, lies outside the 1899 line. Pakistan.has ceded 
more than 5,310 square kilometers of territory, over which she had no
JO
The Economist (London), November 1, 194?, p« 1*
JO
Sisir Giçta, op. cit., p. 473.
^Alastair Lamb, Asian Frontiers; Studies in a Continuing 
Problem (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 107.
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claim legally and internationally, in order to appease expansionist 
China. The legal area of Pakistan has no common border with China.
Kashmir, except for the part occupied by Pakistan, has been 
completely integrated with India. All of the important features of the 
Constitution of India are equally applicable in respect to Kashmir. The 
features of integration include the application of fundamental rights 
to Kashmiris, the extension of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and 
the Election Commissioner of India (January 26, I960), the transfer of 
services to the Union List, the extension of audit authority to the 
Auditor General of India, the approval by the planning commission of 
state development programs, financial allocations from the central 
authorities, the abolition of customs barriers, the integration of 
services, and the association of the state with the Northern Zonal 
Council. The status of the Prime Minister of Kashmir has been changed 
to that of Chief Minister and Safar-i-Riyasat (previously head of the 
state) as Governor, as is the practice in other states of India. The 
President of India now can proclaim presidential rule in the state if 
the constitutional machinery fails, under Article 356 of the Consti­
tution of India. Article 357 providing for delegating powers by the 
President of India to the State Legislature to make laws appropriate 
for the state, has also been extended to the State of Kashmir. All 
these constitutional changes were sanctioned by the Government of Kash­
mir by a majority of vote in the assembly and were subsequently approved 
by the parliament of the Indian Union.
On October 17, 1950, the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act 2007, 
was enacted, and under it more than 9.2 hectares was transferred from
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large landlords to the actual tillers of the soil. It has been 
calculated by one economic analyst that in the year 1959-60 alone a 
total of Rs. 121,100,100 was transferred to Kashmir state funds from 
the central authorities. The biggest source of revenue for Kashmir is 
grants-in-aid from the Government of India. The per capita aid, about 
Rs. 52.00 per year compares favorably with the average of nearly Rs. 9.00 
per year for other states. The percentage of grants-in-aid from central 
authorities is also highest for Kashmir (Table 6).
TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF THE SOURCES, OF REVENUE^
Revenue Items All States Kashmir
Tax Revenue from the Center 16 14
State's Own Resources 44 9
Grants-in-aid from the Center 18 44
Non-Tax Revenue 21 35
Miscellaneous 1 2
Total 100 100
®"Kashmir; Merry Living on Grants," Economic and Political 
Weekly. Ill, No. 22 (June 1, 1968), 832.
Military aid to Pakistan by the United States under a 1954 agreement 
also changed the situation of a possible plebiscite. The United States 
military aid served to exacerbate the long strained relations between
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India and Pakistan, and in the 1960's India vas to see American arms 
turned against her. Pakistan used Patton tanks, and F-86 and F-104 jet 
fighters against India in 1965 without provoking either indignation or 
condemnation from the United States government.
It is naive for any country to suggest that after the passage 
of more than 20 years and after several significant events have radically 
altered the situation, India should still agree to hold a plebiscite. A 
plebiscite in Kashmir might lead to demands for plebiscites in other 
areas, such as Nagaland, Tamilnadu, and Kerala— areas where India is 
totally unwilling to consider a plebiscite.
A plebiscite can be operative in: international relations only 
when one is dealing with a nation as a whole. The principle of self- 
determination cannot and must not be applied so as to lead to the frag­
mentation of a country or its people.There are several examples of 
new African and Asian nations where plebiscites have not been permitted 
to break up the state, i.e., in the Katanga revolt against the Leopold­
ville government, in the struggle of the Ashanti tribes against Accra, 
of the Kurds against the Iraqis, of the Pakhtoons against the Pakistanis, 
of the Tamils against the Sinhalese, of the Karens against the Burmese, 
of the Sumatrans against the Javanese, and of the Mongols against the 
Hans. Permitting accession to sovereignty of any sub-national groiqp in 
in the name of the right of self-determination would inflict a fatal
^^IMted Nations, Security Council" 1088 Meeting, 1964.
MnhammmA Garrim Ghagla's Speech on Kashmir. Security Council Official 
Report, February 5; 1964.
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blow to the state concerned and frustrate the development of an Integrated
46and unified nation.
The possibility of a plebiscite in Kashmir was made even more 
unlikely with the new aggression launched by Pakistan in April, 1965, in 
the Kutch area, and in August, 1965, in Kashmir. The immediate object! 
ive of the attacks according to documents captured from prisoners and 
soldiers of Pakistan and supported by statements by them, was to destroy 
bridges, police stations, petrol pumps, and other important installations, 
and also to cut roads. The strength of the Pakistani troops who infil­
trated across the cease-fire line in civilian disguise was estimated to 
be about 5,000. Pakistan evidently contemplated that the state of 
Kashmir would rise against the oppression of Muslims by India, but on 
September 4, 1965, the United Nations Secretary General's report stated.
General Nimmo has indicated to: me that the series of violations 
that began on August 5, were to a considerable extent . . .  in 
the form of aimed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the 
CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on 
the Indian side.*'
Pakistani soldiers infiltrated at several points along the 765 kilometer 
long cease-fire line. In the same manner, Pakistan denied the earlier 
report of infiltration when the regular Pakistani army invaded the state 
on May 8, 1948, but later, the infiltration was admitted the Pakistani 
authorities themselves to the United Nations Council for India and 
Pakistan (UNGIP) team.
^Sisir Gvçta, op. cit., p. 4-58.
4,7Kashmir; Text of %eech by Shri G. S. Jha. in the Security 
Council on September 6. 1%5 (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 
Government of India, 1965), p. 5»
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Due to the 1965 war, the attitude of the Security Council 
members toward a plebiscite in Kashmir has considerably changed. The 
monopoly of support which Pakistan had enjoyed for so long in the Secur­
ity Council was suddenly broken. For the first time in the history of 
the Security Council deliberations, the Council voted unanimously for a 
cease-fire to be adopted by both parties in October, 1965, on the Kashmir 
issue. Furthermore, Mr. Stewart, the British Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, who had so strongly supported Pakis­
tan's case, now realized the actual situation and made it clear that if 
Pakistan again raised the Kashmir issue in the United Nations, Britain's 
position would be that she and other members of the Security Council
could do no more than urge the two parties concerned to reach agreement
/a
between themselves.^
Contrary to its first inclination to refuse to hold a plebiscite, 
Pakistan now strongly supports a plebiscite. Jinnah did not like the 
plebiscite idea at all, because he was convinced that its results would 
be determined by Sheikh Abdullah who pleaded for Hindu-Muslim unity and 
discarded the two nations theory. Pakistan's plea throughout the dis­
cussion was that Muslims are in majority in Kashmir, and that they 
should be permitted to join their kith and kin.
Pakistan's arguments for the inclusion of Kashmir in Pakistan 
are; (1) The control of Kashmir would provide security for Pakistan.
As Liaquat Ali Khan once expressed it, "Kashmir is . . . like a cap on 
the head of Pakistan. If I allow India to have this cap on our head,
^"Mr. Stewart, Kashmir and Rhodesia," India and Foreign Review, 
VI, No. 5 (December 15» 1968), 6-7.
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then I am always at the mercy of India. Then the sacrifices of millions 
will have been in vain."̂ *̂  (2) Kashmir's easy transportation links
with Pakistan provide a natural connection between the two areas. Jammu 
has long been connected with Sialkot in West Pakistan by rail, and Kash­
mir is linked by an all-weather road to Rawalpindi. Prior to 1947. there 
was no easy land connection between New Delhi and Srinagar. Since inde­
pendence, however, India's transportation system has been linked with 
Kashmir, and they are now well connected by rail and road. (3) The 
Indus, Jhelum;, and Chenab rivers all flow through Kashmir on their way 
to Pakistan. (4) In the absence of an adequate coal supply, West 
Pakistan needs to develop hydroelectric power from these rivers. (5)
The agricultural prosperity of West Pakistan is entirely dependent upon 
the river and canal system which serves an area of about 19,000,000 
a c r e s . A s  noted in Chapter Seven, however, this problem was largely 
solved through the Indus Water Treaty signed in I960 with the active 
assistance of the World Bank. (6) Muslims are in a majority in Kash­
mir, and Pakistan has pressed hard to get agreement on a plebiscite.
For a brief period after partition, India was willing to hold a plebis­
cite, but has long since rejected this approach to resolution of the 
Kashmir problem. The Indian government must consider not only the 
5,000,000 Muslims of Kashmir,’ but also the 55,000,000 other Muslims in 
India. The acceptance of this minority by the majority of the Indian
^^David E. Lilienthal, "Another Korea in the Making?" Collier's, 
CXXVIII, No. 5 (August 4, 1951), 57.
^^Latif Ahmed Sherwani, India, China and Pakistan (Karachi; 
Council for Pakistani Studies, 196?), p. 26.
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population is tied up with the solution of Kashmir. The Muslims of India 
are aware of their equality in civil rights, the great majority of them 
do not want to jeopardize these rights. The state administration of 
Indian Kashmir has largely been in the hands of Muslims since the par­
tition. At present the Chief Minister and most of the ministers are 
Muslims. In the 1965 conflict with Pakistan, the Kashmiri Muslims whole­
heartedly svçported India.
A durable peace on the Indian subcontinent depends î >on a 
reasonable solution of the Kashmir dispute. Such a solution does not 
seem nearer if the whole of Kashmir continues to be demanded by both 
India and Pakistan. Unless the attitude of both countries changes 
markedly, Kashmir seems likely to remain a divided area. As G. W. Ghoud- 
hury puts it, "The Muslims in Pakistan have shown themselves determined 
never to accept a state of affairs in which Kashmir, with Muslims com­
posing 80 per cent of its population, would be governed by Hindus from 
Delhi."̂  ̂ He goes on to assert that, "no government in Pakistan, however
powerful it may be, can survive if it neglects or tries to evade the 
52issue of Kashmir." The same rigidity of attitude persists in India, 
so a peaceful, permanent solution does not seem to be in sight. Both 
nations will have to give up some of their strong feeling and modify 
their positions if there is to be a solution which both nations can 
consider! honorable. After a lapse of 20 years, most of the Pakistani 
grievances have no validity. In the writer's opinion, the problem had
W. Ghoudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India. 19A7-66 
(New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 91.
^̂ Ibid.
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been solved to the reasonable satisfaction of Kashmiris, Indians, and 
Pakistanis.
Presumptive evidence suggests the following course of events 
for the future. India has made considerable progress in Kashmir in 
respect to agrarian reform and constitutional advancement. Improved com­
munications, better irrigation facilities, increased availability of 
power, and a program of industrialization have brought new hopes to the 
Kashmiri people. Political equality has been established, and the 
feudal system has been abolished. The progress is continuous and 
irreversible. Such a program of progress has not been undertaken by 
Pakistan in its occiq>ied territory.
In addition, the cease-fire line is a kind of linguistic and 
cultural watershed. None of the languages spoken to the north of the 
cease-fire line is spoken in Ladakh, the Kashmir Valley, and Jammu.
At least two religions. Buddhism and Hinduism, do not exist in Pakistan 
occupied Kashmir.
Pakistan's recent collusion with China must also be considered. 
On September 16, 1965, China's ultimatum to India, at a time when India 
was defending its borders from Pakistani invasion, proves this active 
collusion. Moreover, Marshal Chen Yi in February, 1964, remarked that 
Pakistan and China would continue to be friends "even after you get
C'aKashmir and we get Taiwan." In the opinion of the writer, no part of 
India is negotiable, and no government in India can negotiate any part 
of Kashmir. Kashmir is legally and constitutionally an integral part of
^̂ Pakistan Times (Lahore), May 5, 1964.
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the Indian Union. The Muslims of India, along with the rest of their 
countrymen, wholeheartedly approve and stçport this stand and would, if 
the occasion arose, be foremost in defending India's sovereignty and 
honor.
In one sense, the Kashmir problem is simply the result of other 
conflicts between India and Pakistan. Even if the Kashmir problem were 
solved, many of those basic conflicts would continue. There is obviously 
an ideological difference between the two nations. The secular nature 
of India permits every one equal rights, irrespective of race, color, 
religion, culture, creed, language, and economic status. On the other 
hand, Pakistan as a theocratic state includes in its constitution the 
provision that only a Muslim can be the head of the state; the state 
itself is known as the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan." All minority 
grovçs in such a theocratic state are second class citizens. In addi­
tion, the political-ideological difference between two nations is 
another point to be considered.
In the present circumstances keeping Kashmir within India, more 
than ever before, appears to be the only way of demonstrating India's 
ability to guard its frontiers. The continuance of India as a stable, 
strong and unified state is of prime inçjortance in meeting the political, 
economic, and military pressure from the north. After more than 20 
years of separation, the two parts of Kashmir have developed peaceful 
and workable political, economic, and cultural links with India and 
Pakistan respectively.
^̂ shmir and Indian Muslims (Lucknow: Rajkamal Prakashan
Private Ltd., 1958).
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Concern for Kashmir is vital to India, not only if it is to
recover the territory which China has nnlawfully occupied, but also if
it is to resist possible future aggression by China. India might well
forget its claim to that portion of Kashmir which is currently held by
Pakistan, and Pakistan should forget its old case that Kashmir ought
to accede to Pakistan. A final acceptance of the status quo would
enable both countries to revise their military budgets downward. The
reopening of Kashmir's normal trade restions with Pakistan would not
seriously affect India's economy, and it would certainly profit Pakistan
55as well as Kashmir.
Sheikh Abdullah has been freed, and he is now traveling in the 
Valley. His attitude has changed, and he seems only to wish for healthy
relations between India and Pakistan. He can no longer stir the Valley
to political action, as the people are more interested in development 
and peace. They understand that this peace and development can only be 
achieved through cooperation.
Northeast and Assam Area
Besides Kashmir, another troubled region in the Indian Union is 
the Northeast and Assam. Before independence these areas were little 
known provinces. At best, they were associated with oil and tea which 
the British exploited for their own interest; at worst, they were 
synonymous with inaccessible jungles, wild beasts, head-hunting tribes, 
floods, earthquakes, insects, and disease.
^^Robert C. Mayfield, "A Geographical Study of the Kashmir
Issue," The Geographical Review. XLV. No. 2 (April, 1955), 195.
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To modern India, however, the region is very important for a 
number of reasons. This northeastern portion of the country, including 
Assam with its hill districts, as well as Nagaland, Manipur, and Tri­
pura, borders China, Pakistan, Bhutan, and Burma. With its long frontier, 
extending over 4,827 kilometers, the entire region occupies an extremely 
strategic position. Unfortunately, along with its strategic importance, 
elements of dissatisfaction harmful to the integrity of the union are 
omnipresent. The legacy of discontent can largely be attributed to 
British machinations looking towards the possible establishment of a 
Crown Colony.
Isolation compounded by linguistic and political gulfs existing 
between the Assamese-Bengali groups of the Brahmaputra Valley and the 
tribes in the adjoining hills contributes to a separatist feeling. The 
region is basically a tribal or depressed class state.The caste 
ffindus have traditionally dominated the politics of Assam State, and 
tribal people have deemed it proper to dissociate from Assam in their 
desire to gain power.
During the last 70 or 80 years many foreign Christian 
missionaries have been working in Northeast India. In recent years some 
pseudo-missionaries, in reality secret agents for foreign countries, have 
begun to operate in these areas. In addition to educating the Nagas and 
the other tribal people, these agents have also been encouraging rebel­
lion against the Indian government. Some of the rebels (Nagas, Mizos, 
and others) are being trained in China and East Pakistan. The challenge
"Assam Triple Crisis," Economic and Political Weekly, II,
No. 46 (November 25, 1967), 2049.
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of China and Pakistan is not merely, or perhaps even primarily, 
territorial} it is essentially ideological, social, and political. It 
can be said in fairness that the tribesmen have enjoyed a democratic 
system throughout their history. The tribal system is more democratic 
than the elaborate socio-administrative machinery which has been intro­
duced in the more settled areas of the country.Tribal land belongs 
to the entire community. Justice is harsh and prompt. A sense of fair 
play and a complex of traditions and conventions hold the society 
together. The tribes pay no taxes and resist external domination.
Economically, the northeast region is not well-developed by 
modern standards, and the inherent wealth of the region is still largely 
unexploited. It is rich in mineral ores, oil, unexploited farm land, 
immense forests, valuable wild animals, and potential hydro-power.
Political consciousness has been aroused only recently among 
the people. The idea of a separate Hill State was first advocated by 
Professor Cov^land in 1943» He said that the inhabitants of the tribal
eg
areas are not Indians or Burmese but are of Mongol stock. When India 
became independent, the Indian government was too preoccupied with even 
more gigantic problems created by the partition of the subcontinent to 
consider the hill people's grievances. The States Reorganization Com­
mission considered and rejected various proposals for creating autonomous 
hill states, but it did recommend that the role of the district councils
57S. G. Chaphekar, "Another Nagaland in the Making," Triveni. 
XXXV, No. 4 (January, 1967), I4 .
^^irendra Kumar Bhattacharyya, "Separate Assam Hill State:
What Does it Mean," Economic and Political Weekly. II, No. 9 (March 4, 
1967), 4 9 1.
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and the administrative relations between the tribal areas and the state
59government be reexamined. The Commission decided that the formation 
of a separate hill state in the northeast was neither administratively 
feasible nor in the interests of the tribal people themselves.
Because of this decision, Naga tribesmen intensified their 
hostile activities and renewed their efforts to achieve independence. 
Roads were damaged, bridges cut, and official buildings burned. Looting 
was widespread, murder was frequent, and the intimidation of government 
servants was commonplace. The government, however, supported by public 
opinion throughout the country, insisted that the creation of a sover­
eign Naga State was unrealistic. The result of many meetings between 
Naga leaders and the parliament was to create a 16th state in the Indian 
Union on August 1, I960. The Governor of Assam would also be the gover­
nor of the new state, and the Assam High Court would continue to exercise 
jurisdiction in Nagaland. Dissatisfied rebels continued hostilities and 
forced the Indian government into a cease-fire.
Since its establishment, other groups have opposed the. formation 
of Nagaland. The Government of India has not been getting a penny from 
Nagaland in taxation, whereas over Rs. 80,000,000 are spent annually on 
civil administration alone. Since Nagaland is not likely to become 
economically self-sufficient, at least for a very long time, it will be 
a continuing financial drain on the Indian government. Assam's Chief 
Minister has not been prepared to concede full-fledged statehood to the
59l^on Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity; Public Pressure and 
Political Response in India (Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 4-6.
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hill areas. He has felt that yielding to the demand of Naga rebels 
would strengthen the national disintegration forces.
Similar grievances have been raised by other tribal peoples of 
the northeast. A niamber of these hill groiçs have begun to believe 
that they can manage their own affairs.The All Party Hill Leader's 
Conference (APHLC), which has been demanding a single hill state, can 
claim to speak fbrrthejfkyrdÿïKhàpi and Jaintia Hill tribes. In the last 
general election, the Conference captured all the seats in the Assam 
Assembly. However, the delegates have repeatedly emphasized the point 
that their pressure for self-determination is not looking toward sepeira- 
tion from India, but rather toward autonomy within the Indian Union.
The Mikir and North Cachar Hills seats were captured in the 1967 general 
elections by the Congress Party. By this vote these areas seem to have 
rejected the idea of a new or separate state (Fig. 17).
The Mizo National Front is waging its own campaign for separate 
statehood, and its rebels are being trained in East Pakistan. Mizo 
leaders are firm in their demand for a separate state within the Indian 
Union. Similar demands from other hill districts.may lead to further 
fragmentation of the area and a still greater strain on central 
resources.
The Government of India is conscious of the importance of the 
northeast region. Now after letting months and years slip by, the 
Government of India has decided to form a new substate. The newest 
state, more accurately called a "substate," is known as Meghalaya, a
*̂̂ Panna Lai Gvçta, "Focus on North-East India: Need for a
Common Perspective," Mainstream. V, No. 32 (April 8, 1967), 20.
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61Sanskrit word meaning "abode in the clouds." It consists of the 
Garo, Khasi, and Jaintia Hills. The other hill peoples will have the 
option of joining Meghalaya (Fig. 17). The control over law, order, 
and security will remain with Assam. The new state can elect its own 
government and legislative assembly.
One result of creating a separate hill state has been to arouse 
a cry for more autonomous states from other tribal groups in the north­
east and elsewhere. The Mizo hill state in the northeast and the Konkani 
speaking area in the former Portuguese colony of Goa have both demanded 
autonomy. The primary reason for forming Meghalaya was the fear that 
the hill people in Assam would join forces with the tribal rebels in 
Manipur, Nagaland, and the Mizo hills, t^st officials admit that con­
siderations of defense and integrated economic development make it 
imperative to evolve some sort of common link between the states consti­
tuting this region, i.e., Assam, Meghalaya, North East Frontier Agency, 
Manipur, Tripura, and United Mikir and North Cachar Hills. Since the 
Chinese invasion in 1962, an urgent need has been recognized to make this 
region self-sufficient in defense.
The Nagas and Mizo Hill groups, however, will weaken the 
precarious unity they now have and create danger for the safety of the 
most strategic area in the Indian Union. On a sensitive border such as 
this, the tribes can be potentially dangerous unless they are won over 
through a sympathetic approach. Every person in a tribal community 
should feel that he is a member of the Indian national family by his own
Earnest Weatherall, "India Fights Language Splintering," The 
Christian Science Monitor. Monday, October 7, 1968, p. 2.
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right and that the general progress and prosperity of his land can best 
be ensured by staying Tvith India.
Achieving internal stability in the NEFA area is even more 
important than in the hill tribe districts. This area was not considered 
to be an integral part of the British Dominion in India, but neither was 
it considered to be a part of any other political entity. After 1911, 
the British paid somewhat more attention to this area, and by the 
Government of India Act of 1919 the NEFA area constitutionally became 
part of Assam. In August of 194-7 the British surrendered their sovereign 
rights in the entire northeastern frontier tract of Assam to the new 
Indian government.The widespread migrations and disorders that 
accompanied the partition in India were, for the most part, avoided in 
NEFA. India took an active interest in the area and made administrative 
changes in 1950 which provided for a separate NEFA administrative system. 
However, the area remained constitutionally a part of Assam. With the 
recognition of the threat of a Communist Chinese invasion of Tibet, the 
NEFA administration was transferred from the foot of the hills to newly 
constructed quarters in the hills. The area was divided into six 
divisions, each having one political officer and three assistants.
More vigilance is required because of the refugees from Tibet, 
Burma, and Pakistan who have entered the NEFA area since 1959» The 
Chinese are supporting and instigating insurgent activities among 
NEFA's tribal people. The border areas of Tawang and Longju are claimed
62Leo E. Rose and Margaret W. Fisher, The North-East Frontier 
Agency of India (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, Univer­
sity of California, 1967), p. 23.
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by both China and India. China now controls both of these areas by 
virtue of her sweeping victory in the 1962 invasion. Reasonably normal 
life now prevails in the NEFA area, and the people seem generally faith­
ful to India. Some of them have been converted to the Christian faith. 
But above all, the northeastern tribal people are permanent settlers of 
their respective lands and want toi .lead a peaceful, settled life. India 
should ensure peace in this region and help the people to develop 
economically, culturally, and politically.
The inq>ortance of the northeast region is so vital from a 
strategic, economic, and political point of view that its internal 
stability should continue to have top priority. The tribal people 
should be integrated psychologically, politically, economically, and 
culturally into India without delay. Partial autonomy should be granted 
either within Assam or in some direct relationship to the Union, in 
order to develop pride, confidence, and faithfulness.
Foreign Possessions
When India attained its independence from Britain in August, 
1947, there remained on the subcontinent a few small pockets or enclaves 
belonging to France and Portugal. To Indians, it seemed axiomatic that 
independence would not be con^lete until these enclaves were also in­
corporated into India. Moreover, during the days of the freedom
63struggle, India's goal was independence for the entire subcontinent.
This meant that regardless of how long they had been there, not only
63R. P. Rao, Portuguese Rule in India (New Delhi: Asia 
Publishing House, 1963), p 1.
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the British but also the French and the Portuguese should withdraw.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated in several of his speeches that, 
for a variety of reasons, it was natural and proper that all foreign 
possessions in India be united with India. Foreign dependencies, he 
insisted, could not be tolerated in any part of the country. These 
enclaves were like pimpj.es, on the face of India.
The French were realistic enough to sign an agreement with India 
in 1948 setting forth the principle by which the people of French India 
would determine their future. Chandernagor, by a municipal election in
1948, was the first of the French territories to install a strongly 
pro-Indian government. The decision to join India was by a majority of 
98.1 per cent of votes. France transferred Chandernagor on a de facto 
basis to the Union of India on August 14, 1949.^^ De .jure sovereignty, 
of course, awaited a treaty between the two countries. The Prime 
Minister of India in a message to the people said that the change in 
Chandernagor was inevitable by reason of history, geography, culture, 
and the spirit of the times.
Other French territories, however, were not handed over so 
easily. The elected municipal councils of Pondicherry, Yanaon, Karikal, 
and Mahë unanimously agreed to a referendum to be held on December 11,
1949, but it was postponed till February, 1950, and finally permanently 
postponed. Troubles arose at the time of the elections, especially in 
MahS, and friction developed between India and France on the issue of 
transfer. The Indian position was that the municipal elections were not
^^Bussell H. Fifield, "The Future of French India," Far Eastern 
Survey, XIX, No. 6 (March 22, 1950), 6 4.
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fair because only one party, one which was known to be pro-French, 
participated in the elections• Moreover, the Government of France did 
not permit any Indian observers to be present at the time of the munici­
pal elections. Pondicherry was the largest of the five enclaves and had been 
a stronghold of French power in the assembly. Edward Goubert, who 
controlled 37 seats out of 39 in the assembly, s\q)ported France; France 
siçported him by not inquiring into his business activities.Finally, 
however, the French intervened in his business, and Goubert switched his 
allegiance to India and organized spontaneous demonstrations against 
France in every district of the territory.
It is significant to note that, other than Chandernagor, the 
French territories were not landlocked (Fig. 13). Due to their coastal 
location, the PYench territories had long since developed smuggling as a 
major industry. Liquor was easily available in Pondicherry, but Madras 
was a dry state. Therefore, smuggling liquor into Madras earned for­
tunes for private liquor owners. Moreover, the French did not want to 
grant freedom immediately to their subjects in India for fear that this 
would encourage the nationalists in North Africa to step up their pres­
sure for independence.
Economically, however, the enclaves were a burden on the 
French economy. After carefully considering all the consequences, the 
French government agreed to negotiate with the Government of India, and 
the de facto transfer of the territories was announced on October 13,
1954, in a joint declaration. On November 1, 1954, the territories
India: Flag in Pondicherry," Time.. LXIII, No. 15 (April 12,
1954), 37.
1 %
were legally transferred to India without référendums being held 
(Table 7).
Even 15 years after integration, French influence has not 
conç)letely faded from the former enclaves. These enclaves joined India 
as autonomous areas, each with an administrator working under the Home 
Ministry and with an elected assembly in the territory. Politics in 
Pondicherry is played around liquor.The Chief Minister, Farook 
Maricar, supported prohibition, but Vankatasubba Reddiar, the former 
chief minister, favors retaining licensed liquor laws. Both are members 
of the Congress Party. The Congress Party controlled 20 seats in an 
assembly of 30 until the recent elections of February, 1969, and most 
Congressmen in the state are liquor traders. Ten other members were 
associated with an anti-Communist group srçporting Goubert. In the 
recent elections the DMK party got hold of the assembly and ousted the 
Congress Party. Until February, 1969, Pondicherry was a stronghold of 
the Congress Party.
The story of the Portuguese enclaves is quite different from 
that of the French territories. Their detachment from Portugal began 
at midnight on August H-15, 1947, when the British transferred power 
to India, and ended on December 19? 1961, with the surrender of the
LnPortuguese at Panjam.”' The Portuguese were less accommodating than 
the French and had even refused to consider transferring their terri­
tories to India. They maintained that all their overseas territories
^̂ "Pondicherry; Unstable Con^romlse," Link., X, No. 13 
(November 5? 1967), 15.
67R. P. Rao, op. cit., p. 1.
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TABDE 7
FOREIGN POSSESSIONS IN INDIA AND THEIR INTEGRATION
Territory Date of Integration into Didia
French
Chandernagor 26 4,486 June 19, 1949
Pondicherry 280 222,572 November 1, 1954
Karikal 135 40,541 November 1, 1954
Mahe 59 18,293 November 1, 1954
Yanaon 15 5,853 November 1, 1954
Total 515 332,045
Portuguese
Dadra ) July 21, 1954
Nagar Haveli ) 554 69,005 August 2, 1954
Daman ) December 19, 1961
Diu 35 31,138 December 19, 1961
Goa 3,390 547,448 December 19, 1961
Total 3,979 637,591
GRAND TOTAL 4,494 969,636
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were an integral part of metropolitan Portugal, although the territories 
in India were more than nine thousand kilometers away.
Indian nationalists, however, insisted that Portugal was 
neither the fatherland nor the motherland destined to rule eternally on 
the margins of the Indian subcontinent. Geographically, economically, 
culturally, and even religiously, they argued, Portugal had no justifi­
cation for being there. On the matter of a possible transfer, neither 
Portugal nor India wished a plebiscite to be held. Portugal did not want 
a vote to be taken on the grounds that the alternative of accession to 
India was not possible, and India because a referendum among the 637,591 
Goans and other Portuguese subjects could very possibly end in victory 
for Portugal. The people of the core region of Goa were overwhelmingly 
Roman Catholic and possibly more loyal to the church than to the secular 
state of India. In order to create loyalty to Portugal, Portuguese 
administrators for generations had forced the Indians to adopt 
Christianity, but the caste system prevailed even among the Christians.
There were occasional revolts and recurrent agitation for 
independence from the Portuguese in the territories. Primarily, the 
people of the Portuguese enclaves resorted to Satvagraha (non-violent 
agitation) when Portugal refused to discuss the subject of cession with 
the Government of India. On occasion, the non-violent Satyagrahis' 
were beaten mercilessly. On July 21, 1954, Dadra broke with Portugal 
through the efforts of the IMted Front of Goans with the siyport of 
local villagers. Within two weeks, on August 2, 1954, the Independent
^®Lewis M. Alexander, World Political Patterns. 2nd ed.,
(Chicago; Rand McNally Company, 1963), P< 472.
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United P&rty and the Goa People's Party helped the local population 
overthrow the Portuguese rule in Nagar Haveli (Table 7). The Government 
of India then refused passage to Portuguese forces through Indian ter­
ritory. The whole matter was referred to the International Court at 
the Hague, and after hearing the arguments the decision was in favor of 
India. The Court decided that "Portugal did not have in 1954 such a right 
of passage in respect to armed forces and arms and ammunition. ..." 
further that, "India has not acted contrary to its obligations result­
ing from Portugal's right of passage in respect of private persons, 
civil officials and goods in general.Thus, Dadra and Nagar Haveli 
became autonomous administrative territories. Two bills were passed in 
the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha (Lower and %per Houses of the Indian 
Parliament) in August, 1961, which made Dadra and Nagar Haveli the 
seventh Union Territory within India (Fig. 16). Other territories 
remained in dispute, with Portugal unyielding on the question of 
transfer.
In the other Portuguese territories (Goa, Daman, and Diu) the 
Satyagrahis intensified their activities. Agitators were encouraged by 
the President of the National Congress of Goa to scatter among the 
people of Goa and preach freedom until captured. Prime Minister Nehru 
decreed that only Goans could participate in the movement for freedom.
For this decree Nehru was criticized from all quarters. The "libera­
tors" on the Indian side of the border were mostly Communist and Praja
India: Judgement of the International Court of Justice 
on the Right of Passage over Indian Territory Case (New Delhi:
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, I960), p. 38-41»
138
Socialist (leftists) and Jan Sangh followers. In the 1957 elections
Communists and Pro-Communists made large gains on the Goan border areas
in India. Nehru finally indicated that armed intervention should not
70be ruled out as a means of achieving the release of Goa. Harsh 
treatment to the liberators and attacks on Indian fishing boats by 
Portuguese armed personnel finally, led to the Indian decision to invade 
Goa. Within 24. hours after the invasion, Goa, Daman, and Diu were 
restored to India, on December 19# 1961. The casualities were extra­
ordinarily light. It was one of the least bloody anti-colonial wars 
71in history.
International opinion was much aroused over the Indian 
annexation move. While the British government failed to siçport its 
oldest ally and a NATO member against a Commonwealth nation, the Western 
world generally was against India's move. The Afro-Asian nations nat­
urally stçported India. Mr. John Foster Dulles, the United States 
Secretary of State said that his nation considered Goa to be a province 
of Portugal. The matter was taken to the United Nations Security Coun­
cil, where Mr, Adlai Stevenson's speech strongly supported the Portu­
guese case and contended that India's action had weakened the world 
organization. India, on the other hand, pleaded that if the invasion 
of Egypt, Cuba, and Hungary by powerful permanent Security Council 
members did not weaken the world organization, how could India's action
70B. Shiva Rao, "An Indian Rq>ort on the Goan Crisis,"
Reporter. XXVI, No. 2 (January 18, 1962), 26.
71Cbreighton Bums, "Goa Since Liberation," Reporter, XXVI,
No. 6 (March 15,11962), 28.
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to liberate a part of its territory produce such a disaster. Finally, 
the Security Council resolution in favor of Portugal was defeated by a 
Soviet veto. Normalcy was soon restored. The former Portuguese ter­
ritories became a part of the Indian Union on December 19, 1961. This 
achievement made possible an easy victory for the Congress Party in the 
1962 general election.
Liberation has led to much political discussion in the 
territories. In January, 1967, in an opinion poll, Goa rejected union 
with the state of Maharastra by 54.2 per cent to 43«2 per cent. This 
attitude can be attributed to the united efforts of anti-merger parties 
such as the United Goan Party, the Goan Congress, and the Anti-Merger 
Front. Daman and Diu opted to remain as a Union Territory by the over­
whelming majority of 87.78 per cent of the votes. Currently, Goa, Daman, 
and Diu form one Union Territory, whereas Dadra and Nagar Haveli form 
another one.
Of all the once foreign enclaves, India has profited most from 
Goa. The area has reserves of iron ore and manganese which are now 
exported directly to several foreign countries. In spite of its valu­
able mineral resources, the Portuguese were not economically benefited 
by Goa, because they had to keep a large number of administrative and 
military personnel in the overseas territory. India has been able to 
administer the area with considerably less expense. No longer is there 
a danger of a foreign military base being established on Indian soil, 
as happened during the Second World War when German merchant ships 
took shelter in the Goan ports of Marmagoa and Panjim and transmitted 
valuable information. Panjim, a particularly good port, has been much
uo
appreciated by India, and the people of Goa are being integrated into 
Indian national life.
Offshore Islands 
The offshore islands of India have great significance to the 
Indian Union in relation to the defense of the mainland. Strategic bases 
on these islands can help discourage China and Pakistan from making a 
naval attack. Furthermore, the islands can be developed for sea food 
purposes to help alleviate the chronic food shortage in India. The 
offshore islands can be divided into two groups, namely, the Bay of 
Bengal islands and the Arabian Sea islands. In general, the Bay of 
Bengal islands are more important than the Arabian Sea islands. These, 
the Bay of Bengal islands, are a group of 225 small islands, 204. of them 
in the Andaman group with a combined area of 6,494 square kilometers, and 
21 of them in the Nicobar group with an area of 1,645 square kilometers 
(Fig. 16). Whereas the islands are almost 1,300 kilometers from the 
nearest Indian ports, Calcutta, Visakhapatnam, and Madras, their south­
ern extremity is only about 120 kilometers from Archien Head in Sumatra
and their northern limits only 200 kilometers from Cape Nagrais in 
72Burma.
The southernmost tip of the Nicobar Islands is the most 
southerly part of India, rather than Cape Comorin. The cultural fea­
tures of these Bay of Bengal islands are unique in themselves because 
they were kept in isolation by the British. The population of the
72K. R. Ganesh, "Introducing Andamans; India's Island 
Outpost," Mainstream. V, No. 49 (August 5, 1967), 22.
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Andaman Islands is now almost entirely of recent immigration. Almost 
every regional and linguistic group of the mainland is represented. 
Irrespective of their caste, color, or language, the islanders feel 
bound by a common destiny. The lingua franca from the extreme north to
73the extreme south is spoken Hindustani. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands 
are the only regions in India where a caste system was never prevalent 
and where Hindustani has evolved as a common language. The peaceful 
coexistence of religious groups is another characteristics of the islands. 
There has never been any instance of Hindu-Muslim conflict, even during
7Z.tension-charged times when rivers of blood were spilled on the mainland. 
Intermarriage between religious groups has been widespread. A number of 
East Pakistani refugees have come to settle in the islands. For reasons 
of national security, however, it is not considered advisable to allow 
uncontrolled and unplanned migration.
The aborigines of the Andamans are one of the few surviving 
groups of pygmies, who in the past were widely scattered all over the 
world. The Nicobars are peopled by a very ancient Mongoloid race. In 
these islands there are no Europeans residing permanently. However, as 
mentioned, a large number of Indians do live there. The population 
is increasing at a rapid rate. It was 31,000 in 1951 and is now about
77,000.
^̂ "Andaman: Neglected Outpost," Link, X, No. 15 (November 19, 
1967), 19.
R. Ganesh, "Andaman: India's Outpost, II; A Many
^lendoured Community," Mainstream. V, No. 50 (August 15, 1967), 20.
nc
Lidio Cipriani, The Andaman Islands (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1966), p. 2.
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The Andaman and Nicobar islands are important because of their 
strategic location. The Japanese occupation and fortification of the 
islands between March, 1942, and November, 1945? in support of their 
offensive on the mainland, attracted attention to them. The Chinese 
aggression in 1962, followed by the expansionist claims of Sukarno, 
former President of Indonesia, also created an awareness of the strate­
gic significance of the Andaman and Nicobar islands as India's outposts 
on the southeast. The territorial waters around these islands are a 
favorable fishing ground for Singapore-based Chinese poachers. The 
Andaman and Nicobar islands have great potentiality in any future 
program of naval development. Serious government study is being devoted 
to the future development of these islands, in order to use them for 
Indian naval bases.
Timely visits by top-ranking Indian leaders and the active 
government interest in the development of the islands have enhanced the 
loyalty of the islanders. In the 1967 general election the islanders 
chose their first representative to the Indian parliament. For the 
defense and safety of the Republic, these islanders should be brought 
closer to the mainland by giving them an opportunity to participate in 
the national development programs.
One offshore island became a bone of contention between India 
and Ceylon. A dispute arose between India and Ceylon over possession 
of the island of Kachcha Thivu, which is about five square kilometers 
in area. Situated in Pak Strait between India and Ceylon, the island 
is a desolate, half-coral, half-sand inlet, of no immediate strategic 
value. It is used mainly by fishermen at the time of the celebration
U3
of Saint Anthony's festival. The complaint of the Government of Ceylon
has been that thousands of Indians are smuggled into Ceylon illegally
at the time of the festival every year by organized gangs. Neither
Indians nor Ceylonese pilgrims carry any passports or identity cards
with them. India claims the island because the. Raja of Ramnad, in the
state of Tamilnadu (Madras) exercised the rights of ZAminrlari (land
ownership) for a long time and collected taxes from the people using
the island. He leased the island several times to pearl divers. In
December, 1947, the Raja of Ramnad leased the chalk quarrying right on
ncthe island of Kachcha Thivu to two people for two years.
Ceylon's claim to Kachcha Thivu is based on maps. It was shown 
as part of the Jaffna Peninsula of Ceylon as early as 1544, and British 
maps of 1800-1802 also mention the island as Ceylonese. In addition, 
there are religious considerations involved. Officials of the two 
governments have had joint meetings in an effort to determine the status 
of the island. Probably the Ceylonese government is mainly concerned 
about the illegal smuggling of immigrants. If this is so, the Govern­
ment of India should assure Ceylon that it will not allow such smuggling
77and take measures to implement that assurance. In any case, the matter 
should be settled peacefully. India should never forget that Ceylon is 
neither a Pakistan nor a Communist China. It has given unmistakable 
proof of respect for, and friendship with, India.
76Urmila Phadnis, "Kachcha Thivu: Background and Issues," 
Economic and Political Weekly. Ill, No. 20 (May 18, 1968), 783.
"̂̂ "Less than Two Square Miles of Territory," Thought. XX,
No. 10 (March 9, 1968), 1.
144
In contrast to the Bay of Bengal islands, the Arabian Sea 
islands consist only of small ones which are nearer to the mainland and 
hence easier to govern. The Arabian Sea islands include three main 
groupsj all of coral formation, the Amindivi, Laccadive, and Minicoy 
islands, 19 islands in all, comprising a total area of 28.$ square kilom­
eters. The majority of the population on these islands is Muslim. The 
States Reorganization Commission recommended that these islands be 
included in Kerala for administrative convenience. The principle that 
the Government of India has followed, however, has been to form states 
with one contiguous area, and in the case of fragmented areas like these 
islands to have them controlled by the central government as a union 
territory. In line with this practice, the Government of India took 
over the administration of the islands and posted an administrator to 
run the governmental machinery smoothly. Special attention has been 
given to the development of communications between the mainland and the 
islands as well as between the islands themselves. The islands are 
only 200 to 400 kilometers away from the Kerala coast, and hence it is 
easy to control them from the mainland. Some attention is being given 
to the problem of economic development. The main commercial activity 
in the Arabian Sea islands is the coir business which is handled by the 
government to prevent profiteering by middlemen.
Although not a part of India, the Maldive Islands are inportant 
to that nation. They are a group of about 2,000 low-lying coral islands 
out of which only 220 are inhabited with a total population of 93,000.
By virtue of their strategic location, these islands have threatened 
to bring the cold war right into the erstwhile quiet area of the Indian
U5
7AOcean. Their importance was realized when the British established a
base on Gan, the largest island after Male. In return for complete
independence from the United Kingdom, granted on July 25, 1965, the
Maldivian government turned over to Britain, as a free gift, the island
of Gan to be used for the construction of a military airfield, and
Hithadoo Island to be used for a radio station. On the eve of Maldivian
independence, Ohina was one of the first to announce recognition of the
country, a ready acknowledgement of the strategic importance of the
Maldives in the Indian Ocean and of China's keen interest in that 
79ocean. China hopes to establish an embassy in the Maldives in order 
to keep a close watch on British and American troop movements in the 
area. The Soviet Union has also tried to work out a suitable program 
for a base in the Maldives, but it has not been successful.
For India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, peace in the Indian Ocean is 
of vital importance. No industrial development, no commercial growth, 
no stable political structure is possible for them unless there is 
peace in the region. The Indian government was disturbed by the 
arrangements made for use of the Gan base by Britain because India feels 
that its long-range future necessitates command of the Indian Ocean.
All of the offshore islands, as well as the Indian Ocean itself, are
7ftR. D. Dixit, "Maldive Islands: The Harbinger of Cold Wax 
in the Indian Ocean," The Indian Geographical Journal, XLI, Nos. 1 and 
2 (January-June, 1966), 31.
790. Navaratne, "China Woos the Maldives," Atlas. XII, No. 2 
(August, 1966), 49.
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considered to be very important from the point of view of national 
security.
CHAPTER V 
PATTERNS OF POLITICAL PARTIES
The integration of Indian states, the reorganization of states 
on a linguistic basis, and concern for the peripheral areas of Kashmir, 
the Northeast Frontier Agency, and the offshore islands are all major 
problems affecting the internal political stability in India. A more 
immediate problem, however, is the changing pattern of political parties 
which suggests a basic political instability of the nation.
India is a politically conscious country with a high voter 
participation, in spite of widespread illiteracy. Of 250,681,530 
eligible voters in 1967, 61.60 per cent voted in the L^ Sabha (the 
lower house of the Indian Parliament) elections and 60.66 per cent for 
the state assemblies fvidhan Sabhas). Some new voting patterns have 
appeared in the last general elections. Until the fourth general 
election, the Congress Party won a clear majority each time; all other 
parties plus the independents could not match its strength. In analyf 
zing the changed patterns now evident in the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas, 
several basic questions arise, such as: What is the role played 1?y the 
different political parties in the political stability of the nation? 
What are the factors responsible for current distributional patterns of 
the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha constituencies? What are the effects of
U7
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the changing patterns on the economics and politics of India? These 
and other questions beg for rational answers, and the analysis which 
follows is an attempt to provide some insight into the questions posed.
Patterns of the Lok Sabha Elections
During most of the period since independence, Indian politics 
have evolved around one dominant political party, the Congress Party, 
and several smaller opposition parties. In the first general election, 
that of 1951-52, 14 all-India and 52 state parties were recognized by 
the election commissioner. The total number of political parties seek­
ing recognition from the election commissioner eventually reached 178,
1excluding the 14 all-India parties. A total of 77 political parties 
contested in the first general election, 52 in the second (1957), 34 
in the third (1962), and 35 in the fourth (1967). In a general way the 
regional, religious, ethnic, linguistic, social, and cultural diversity 
of the continental society of India accounts for the multiplicity of 
political parties. The very large number of political parties is 
somewhat misleading, however, for in the first three general elections 
political opinions were essentially crystallized in 15 national and 
local parties representing nationalist, socialist, liberal, pragmatic,
3secular, communal, tribal, caste, and regional-linguistic tendencies.
1Gopal Krishna, "One Party Dominance— Development and Trends," 
in Party System and Election Studies, ed., by Rajni Kothari (New Delhi: 
Allied Publishers, 1967), p. 25.
2
Raj ni Kothari, ed.. Party System and Election Studies (New 
Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1967), p. 33*
3■̂ Gopal Krishna, pp. cit., p. 34«
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Some of the parties are ordinarily confined to a single region or a 
community such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazakham in Madras (Tamilnadu), 
the I'luslim League in Kerala, the Akali Dal in the Punjab, the Peasant 
and Workers Party in Maharastra, the All Party Hill Leaders Conference 
in Assam, and the Ganatantra Parishad in Orissa.
The most important national party is the Congress Party which 
has represented a kind of historical consensus and enjoys a continuous 
basis of siçport and trust among the masses. Its main objectives since 
independence have been to create a socialistic pattern of society and to 
close the gap between the rich and the poor, but these aims have not 
been fully achieved. The party held power for 20 years and during that 
time achieved a considerable amount of progress.
Among the opposition parties, the Communist Party of India has 
the longest record of existence. It has a particular stronghold in 
Kerala. The party split into Right Communist (Moscow-oriented) and Left 
Communist (Chinese-oriented) divisions in 1964. In the democratic 
parliamentary machinery of India, Communism itself has undergone radical 
changes in its ideology-and strategy. Rajni Kothari has asserted that 
"political change is now sought through electoral majorities and not 
through revolutionary action, violent or non-violent. Even the left­
ist parties follow democratic methods, de-emphasizing violence. Besides 
the left and right Communist parties of India, other leftist parties are 
the Praja Socialist Party (PSP), the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP),
^Rajni Kothari, op. cit., p. 37.
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the Peasant and Workers Party, the Revolutionary Socialist Party, and 
the Forward Bloc.
Among the rightist groips, the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh 
developed as important parties during the fourth general election. The 
Swatantra Party is conservative and anti-Communist, and is opposed to 
many of the socialist policies of the Congress Party. It was formed to 
stçport the anti-cooperative farming measures, but favored increased 
state participation in industrial sectors. It opposed expropriation in 
any form, rejected joint cooperative farming, bureaucratic management 
of the rural economy, heavy taxation, abnormal deficit financing, and 
foreign loans which it considered beyond the capacity of the country 
to repay. ̂ The Jan Sangh Party believes that the state is a secular 
body and, therefore, should not align itself with any particular relig­
ion or sect. This party has been branded as Hindu communal or the 
Hindi linguistic party, but it has followers of all faiths and 
languages.
Besides the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh, other rightist 
parties include the Muslim League, the Dravida Munnetra Kazakham (IMK), 
and the Janta Party. There are also Congress dissident grotçs such as 
the Kerala Congress; the Bangala Congress in West Bengal; the Jana 
Congress in Orissa, Mysore, Haryana, and Madhya Pradesh; the Janta Party 
in Rajasthan; and the Jana Kranti Dal in Bihar. All these dissident 
groiçs are rightist in their ideologies.
%otilal A. Jhangiani, Jana Sangh and Swatantra; A Profile of 
the Rightist Parties in India (Bombay: Mankatala, 1967), p. 182.
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For two decades the role of the opposition parties has been 
restricted to influencing the policies of the ruling party rather than 
to challenjge its monopoly of power. Moreover, none of these parties 
emerged as a recognized opposition in the parliament. No opposition 
party could secure the necessary minimum of 50 seats in a parliament of 
523 members. In addition to the candidates of various opposition parties, 
there have been independent candidates but their strength has declined 
with each election.
The pattern of distribution of the Lok Sabha seats changed very 
little following the first four general elections. In the first general 
election, the Congress Party gained 45 per cent of the total votes but 
secured 74*43 per cent of the seats, whereas the Socialist Party received 
10.6 per cent of the votes but secured only 2.4 per cent of the seats 
(Table 3). Other important opposition parties have been the Communist 
Party of India, and the Kishan Majdoor Praja Party. Their strongholds 
were in lÿderabad, Madras, Orissa, and tribal areas of Bihar, Madhya 
Bharat, Rajasthan, and Tranvancore-Cochin, all of which were formerly 
under princely rulers (Fig. 18). A significant number (15.8 per cent) 
of the Lok Sabha seats were secured by independent candidates from over 
the country in the 1952 elections, when thousands of Indian voters were 
unwilling to support any party.
In 1957 the Indian people voted with more confidence, greater 
understanding, and better judgment than they apparently had in 1951- 
52. While the Congress Party gained only 47.78 per cent of the Lok 
Sabha votes, it secured 75.1 per cent of the seats (Table 9)• The 
Communist Party of India and the Praja Socialist Party were the strongest
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Assam 12 2,647,127 1,210,707 506,943 265,687 Nil 9 6 ,3 0 3 330,623
(53.2) (22.5) (10.0) (3.6) (12.1)
Bihar 54 9,991,510 4,573,058 2,126,125 339 ,341 39,272 39,939 1,277,856
(45 o 8) (21.3) (3 .4 ) (0 .4) (0.9) (12.8)
Bombay - 44 11,528,290 5,781,277 1,682,494 639,788 1 5 4 ,0 7 3 Nil 1 ,3 5 0 ,1 4 9
(50.2) (1 4.6 ) (5 .6 ) (1.3) (11.7)
Madhya Pradesh 29 7,192,591 3,713,537 877,392 4 5 1 ,7 4 9 2 9 ,4 2 2 355,356 858,407
(51.6) (12.1) (6.2) (0 .4) (4 .9 ) (11.9)
Madras 73 19,929,665 7,253,461 1,0 5 5 ,4 1 5 1,9 5 2 ,1 9 6 1,780,407 Nil 4,612,714
(36.4) (5 .3 ) (9 .8) (8 .9) (2 3.1)
Orissa 19 3,659,493 1,555,787 563,462 52,654 2 1 1 ,3 0 3 Nil 316,538
(42.5) (1 5.4 ) (1.4) (5.8) (8.7)
Punjab 18 4,992,338 2,134,588 1 0 7 ,7 1 3 Nil 2 5 1 ,6 2 3 279,639 930,380
(4 2.8) (2.2) (5.0) (6.0) (18.6)
Uttar Pradesh 86 17,074,825 9 ,0 4 7 ,3 0 5 2,208,687 836,129 59,699 1,2 4 4 ,0 2 7 1,9 5 6 ,1 1 4(53.0) (1 3.0 ) (5.0) (0 .4 ) (7.0) (11.0)
West Bengal 34 7,613,932 3,205,162 1 5 2 ,2 9 9 679,149 7 2 0 ,3 0 4 452,278 1,408,361






















Hyderabad 23 4,854,862 1,945,798 651,316 Nil Nil Nil 388,939(4 0.0 ) (13.4) (8 ,0 )
Madl^ Bharat 11 1,953,571 992,159 268,399 4 ,6 4 8 24,716 188,569 7 4 ,3 9 2
(50.8) (13.7) (0.2) (1.3) (9.7) (3.8)
Mysore 11 2,824,427 1,509,075 181,430 6 5 0 ,6 5 8 73,322 117,470 2 9 2 ,4 7 2
(53.4) (6.4) (2 3.4 ) (2 .5) (4 .1) (10.3)
Pep su 5 1,475,112 392,408 38,222 39,749 Nil 43,349 311,635
(33.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.9) (21.1)
Rajasthan 20 3,526,957 1,460,971 119,287 3 1 ,4 4 3 5,490 107,089 1,028,388
(41.4) (3.4) (0 .9 ) (0.2) (3 .0) (2 9.2)
Saurashtra 5 762,705 506,112 36,980 3 2 ,1 9 3 Nil Nil 58,343
(66.6) (4.7) (4 .6 ) (8 .3 )
Travancore-Cochim 12 3,490,476 1,224,533 459,669 Nil Nil Nil 1,265 ,051
(35.1) (1 3.2) (36.1)
Part "C" State
Ajmer 2 178,999 89,761 Nil Nil 25,128 2 8 ,9 9 0 10,718
(50.0) (14.0) (16,2) (6.0)
Bhopal 2 169,457 97,292 3,329 Nil Nil Nil 25,316
(57.0) (1.9) (1 4.0 )





















Co or g 1 63,813 38,063
(5 9.0 )
Nil Nil Nil Nil 2 5 ,7 5 0  
(4 1.0 )
Delhi 4 6 5 5 ,9 0 0 3 2 4 ,2 1 4
(4 9.4 )














1 9 ,0 9 9
(8 .5)




Nil Nil Nil 34,824
(29.1)
Manipur 2 152,467 3 6 ,3 1 7
(2 3.0 )




Nil 1 3 ,7 3 7
(9.0)


















Total for All 
States
479 1 0 5,9 4 4 ,4 9 5 47,665,875 11,216,779
(45.0) (10.6)









Note; Percentages of valid votes polled by smaller parties in the elections were; Forward Bloc 
(Marxist Group) 0.9#; Forward Bloc (Ruikar Grovç) 0,10#; ffi.ndu Maha Sabha 0.95#; Ram Rajya 
Parishad 2.03#; Scheduled Castes Federation 2.3#; Revolutionary Socialist Party 0.37#; 
Revolutionary Communist Party 0.02#; Bolshevik Party of India 0.02#; Krishikar Lok Party 
1 .40# and other parties 8.3#.
155
Legend for Maps 18, 19, 20 and 21
I "] Indian National Congress
I .. Independents
liliilllliiiii Communist Party of India 
Praja Socialist Party
c. . . . . . ,  ........
j Bharatiya Jan Sangh
All India Ganatantra Parishad 
Swatantra
Samyukta Socialist or Socialist 
Represents bodies of water in insert map.
I A "RM 1  Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha
Akhil Bharatiya Ram Rajya Parishad 
I  AHC 1 Hill Leaders' Conference (Assam) (All Party)
I •Rr. 1  Bangla Congress
I  CP "] Communist Party of India (Marxist Groiç)
I DMK n  Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 
I H 1  Harijan Mandai
f  HS I Haryana Lok Samiti
I ICP ~1 All India Scheduled Castes Federation
JH I Jharkhand Party
JP I Janta Party
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Krishikar Lok Party 
Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party 
Lok Sewak Sangh
All India Forward Bloc (Marxist Groiç) 
Muslim League
] National Conference
NMP I Nutan Mahagujarat Janta Parishad
Peoples' Democratic Front
PE I Peasants' and Workers' Party 
Praja Party
Peoples' Front (Pondicherry)
Republican Party of India 
Revolutionary Socialist Party 
Shiromani Akali Dal (Sant Fateh Singh Grovç) 
Tarailnad Toilers'
Tamilnad-Travancore Congress Party 
United Goans
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Total Total Number and Percentage of Valid Votes Polled by Parties











Andhra Pradesh 39 9,531,373 4 ,9 0 6 ,0 4 4 345,418 1,144,811 3,769 3 ,131 ,331
(5 1.4 7) (3.63) (12.01) (0 .0 4) (32.85)
Assam •10 2,292,612 1,184,708 457,643 2 3 5 ,0 4 4 4 1 5 ,2 1 7
(5 1.6 8) (20.00) (1 0.2 4) (18.10)
Bihar 51 10,007,876 4,450,208 2,1 6 5 ,4 6 2 502,707 7 ,9 7 3 2,881,526
(4 4.4 7) (21.64) (5 .2 0) (0.08) (28.79)
Bombay 66 16,760,285 8 ,1 5 6 ,2 7 2 1,4 5 7 ,2 0 3 1,0 5 5 ,0 1 3 566,008 5,525,789
(4 8.6 6) (8.66) (6 .3 0) (3.38) (33.00)
Kerala 18 6 ,0 5 0 ,2 4 6 2,102,887 438,459 2,267,888 1,2 4 1 ,0 1 2
(3 4.7 5) (7 .24) (3 7.4 8) (2 0.5 0)
Madhya Pradesh 35 7 ,6 1 4 ,2 2 2 3,967,199 1,2 2 5 ,7 3 5 3 1 ,4 2 4 1,062,936 1,326,928
(52.10) (16.10) (0 .4 1) (13.96) (17.43)
Madras AO 1 0,9 50 ,841 5,0 9 4 ,5 5 2 399,789 1,101,338 4,355,162
(4 6.5 2) (3 .6 5) (10.06) (3 9.7 7)
îtysore 2A 5,798,440 3 ,2 1 9 ,0 1 4 1,082,698 85,373 143,606 1,267,749
(5 5.5 2) (18.67) (1.47) (2 .4 8) (21.86)
Orissa 20 4 ,4 4 0 ,4 9 0 1,776,767 684,023 2 1 4 ,9 0 3 1,764,797
(4 0.0 1) (1 5.4 0) (4 .8 4) (3 4.7 4)
Punjab 22 7,183,830 3,682,219 41,285 1,207,600 1,152,672 1,1 0 0 ,0 5 4
(5 1.2 5) (0 .5 7) (16.81) (16.04) (1 5.3 0)
vno»
TABLE 9— (Continued)
Total Total Number and Percentage of Valid Votes Polled by Parties
No. of No. of Other
Con­ Valid Congress P.S.P. Communist Jan Parties &
tested Votes Sangh Inde­
Seats Polled pendents
STATES - (Continued)
Rajasthan 22 4,649,083 2,494,094 58,916 223,416 518,355 1,354,302
(53.60) (1.30) (4.80) (11.10) (29.20)
Uttar Pradesh 86 22,896,103 10,599,639 3,511,157 383,509 3,385,247 5,016,551
(46.29) (15,34) (1.67) (14.79) (21.91)
West Bengal 36 10,4 4 0 ,1 0 0 5,031,696 590,692 1,985,181 149,351 2,683,180
(48.20) (5.66) (19.01) (1.43) (25.70)
UNION TERRITORIES
Delhi 5 811,344 440,775 28,656 38,236 159,907 143,770
(54.32) (3.53) (4.71) (19.72) (17.72)
Himachal Pradesh 4 362,641 171,591 42,838 9,912 138,300
(47.30) (11.80) (2.80) (38.10)
Manipur 2 174,091 48,687 12,692 19,298 93,414
(27.96) (7.29) (11.08) (53.65)
Tripura 2 550,338 253,241 248,422 48,675
(46.01) (45.31) (8.84)












opposition parties. The opposition was concentration in Maharastra 
(coastal and bilingual area) and the coastal states of Kerala, Madras, 
Orissa, and West Bengal. Opposition proved weakest in the hinterland 
of Madhya Pradesh (especially in under-developed areas), and in the 
Punjab, eastern Bombay State, Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan (Fig. 19).
In addition to the national opposition parties, the local and regional 
parties such as the Ganatantra Parishad in Orissa, the People's Demo­
cratic Front in Andhra Pradesh, and the Peasant and Workers Party in 
Bombay showed significant strength. The independents, although reduced 
in number, still influenced many voters in Madras, Bombay, Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, and Kerala (Fig. 19).
In the third general election (1962) the Congress Party secured
i44..72 per cent of the total votes cast and gained 73.03 per cent of the 
Lok Sabha seats. It lost some seats from Madhya Pradesh, where it had 
had 100 per cent of the representation prior to the 1962 elections, but 
it gained seats in Maharastra. Its support from the coastal states of 
Bombay, Gujarat, West Bengal, Orissa and Madras rose.^ With the 
exception of Orissa, these are the most industrialized and modern parts 
of the country. The Congress Party lost support in the hinterland, i.e., 
Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan and Mysore 
(Fig. 20). The Communist Party of India was second in overall strength 
to the Congress Party in 1962 and secured 29 seats (Table 10). During 
this third general election the Swatantra and the IMK (in Madras)
^Myron Weiner, "India's Third General Elections," Asian Survey, 
II, No, 5 (May, 1962), 5.
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Andhra Pradesh A3 11,908,021 5,711,263 2,505,619 1,775,495 8,287 139,049 118,872
(47.96) (21.04) (14.91) (0.07) (1.17) (0.96)
Assam 12 2,495,311 1,126,977 176,098 478,099
(45.16) (7.05) (19.16)
Bihar 53 9,9A6,2AA 4,365,148 634,516 1,811,170 1,262,106 233,151
(43.89) (6.38) (18.21) (12.69) (2.34)Gujarat 22 5,282,558 2,776,327 1,320,405 374,813 76,033 47,308
(52.56) (25.00) (7.10) (1.44) (0.89)
Kerala 16 5,528,983 1,895,226 1,960,683 9,675 546,621 37,485
(34.28) (35.46) (0.17) (9.89) (0.68)Madhya Pradesh 36 6,704,A17 2,651,882 60,196 48,864 824,703 1,197,957 123,117
(39.55) (0.90) (0.73) (12.30) (17.87) (1.84)Madras AD 12,424,036 5,623,013 1,272,313 1,300,526 209,101 4,581 191,162
(45.26) (10.24) (10.47) (1.68) (0.04) (1.54)Maharashtra AA 11,148,615 5,895,958 451,152 31,036 597,666 490,627 1,299,940
(52.89) (4.05) (0.28) (5.36) (4.40) (11.66)
Vyaore 26 6,419,142 3,381,276 98,668 501,212 930,061 171,929 247,461
(52.67) (1.53) (7.81) (14.49) (2.68) (3.86)
Orissa 19 1,968,965 1,093,297 100,577 22,743 305,116











Congress Communist Swatantra Republican
STATES
Punjab 22 6,785,637 2,802,692 320,588 2 9 0 ,5 8 4 1,029 ,831 4 2 4 ,3 2 4
(41.30) (4 .7 3) (4.28) (15.18) (6 .25)
Rajasthan 22 5,192,952 1,951,507 155,380 940,106 482,138
(37.58) (2 .9 9) (18.10) (9.28)
Uttar Pradesh 8$ 17,910,056 6,842,472 6 5 0 ,2 5 5 9 0 3 ,0 9 4 1,851,857 3 ,1 4 7 ,2 9 3 763,788
(38.20) (3.63) (5 .0 4) (10.35) (17.57) (4 .2 7)
West Bengal 36 9,733,184 4,553,667 2,859 ,731 9 9 ,2 9 3 4 4 1 ,6 5 6 102,184
(46.78) (29.38) (1.02) (4 .5 4) (1.05)
UNION TERRITORIES
Delhi 5 894,149 453,174 1 9 ,1 3 5 1 ,0 4 8 292,016 28,072
(50.68) (2 .14) (0.12) (32:66) (3 .1 4)
Himachal Pradesh k 242,908 166,749 3 1 ,0 4 9 10,896 15,941
(6 8.6 5) (12.78) (4 .4 9) (6 .56)
Manipur 2 264,627 81,860 2 1 ,5 0 3 1 0 ,9 0 9
(3 0 .9 3) (8 .13) (4 .1 2)
Tripura 2 319,085 1 3 6 ,5 8 6 163,623 6 ,3 0 2
(42.81) (51.27) (1.98)































Assam 72,006 125,338a 516,793
(2.88) (5.02) (20.71)
Bihar 608,284 24,109 19,767 467,338* 520,655 *Jharkhand
(6.12) (0.24) (0.20) (4.70) (5.23)
Gujarat 2,581 20,259 195,812* 469,020 *Nutan Maha
(0.05) (0.38) (3.71) (8.87) Gujarat Janta
Parishad
Kerala 248,038* 199,377b 631,878 *Muslim
(4.49) (3.60) (11.43) League
Madhya Pradesh 354,595 254,779 324,083 35,421* 828,820 *Forward
(5.29) (3.80) (4.83) (0.53) (12.36) Bloc
Madras 45,097 2,315,610c 529,483d 933,150
(0.36) (18.64) (4.26) (7.51)
Maharashtra 82,649 8,990 703,582* 1,587,015 *Peasants &
(0.74) (0.08) (6.31) (1 4.2 3) Workers
Mysore 213,460* 875,075 *Lok Sevak
(3.33) (13.63) Sangh
Orissa 52,633 342,970* 51,629 *Gantantra
(2.67) (17.42) (2.62) Parishad
o\VJl
(a) Ail Party Hill .Leaders' Conference— 91,850 (3.68); (b) Revolutionary Communist Party— 33,488(1.34); 
(c) Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam— 2,315,610 (18.64); (d) Muslim League— 169,723 (1.37); Tamil National
Party 92,389 (0.74); Socialist Labor— 80,227; We Tamils— 11,372 (0.09); Forward Bloc— 175,772 (1.41).
TABLE 10— (Continued)






























1 1 ,4 4 0
(0.22)


































6 9 ,5 8 6
(2 6.3 0)


























(e) Haryana Lok Samiti; (f) Revolutionary Socialist Party— 253,340 (2.59), Lok SeveLk Sangh—  
68,295 (0.70); Gorkha League— 46,127 (0.47).
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developed as new parties, and the Jan Sangh, in the north, increased its 
strength in the parliament (Fig. 20).
In the fourth general election (1967), the pattern of distribution 
of the Lok Sabha seats changed tremendously. Direct elections to the Lok 
Sabha were held for the first time in Jammu and Kashmir, the Andaman and 
Nicobar islands, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, and the Laccadive, Minicoy, and 
Amindivi islands. Although the total vote secured by the Congress Party 
declined only five per cent from that of the third general election, 
from M-75 per cent in 1962 to 39-57 per cent in 1967, the party secured 
only 282 seats as compared with 361 in 1962. This distribution provided 
an overall majority of 44» but this was a precarious margin in the light
n
of factionalism within the party. (See Table 11.) In 1967 the Con­
gress Party won only 54-24 per cent of the Lok Sabha seats. Five impor­
tant ministers, three state ministers, and six deputy ministers at the 
central level were ousted. The Swatantra and the Jan Sangh parties gained 
a number of seats, from 18 and 12 respectively in 1962 to 44 and 35 in 
1967, but these parties gained only 5-03 and 4-07 per cent respectively 
in the popular vote. The Swatantra Party's gains were in Gujarat,
>fysore, Rajasthan, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and Madras where the ex- 
princely rulers had their kingdoms. The Jan Sangh won most of its seats 
in the Hindi dominated areas but also some in the areas of the former 
princely rulers. The Chinese branch of the Communist Party of India won 
42 seats, mostly in Kerala and West Bengal. The Socialist Party in Bihar 
and the IMK Party in Madras showed gains (Table 11). The Congress Party
7Michael Brecher, "Succession in India 1967; The Routinization 
of Political Change," Asian Survey, VII, no. 7 (July, 1967), ^4-
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lost heavily in the Gangetic plain, in western and central India, along 
the northeastern coast in the Assam hill areas, and in the deep south 
(Fig. 21). It is significant to note that no other geographical region 
had been as politically turbulent as the north.
Patterns of State Assemblies
In the races for various state assemblies the Congress Party 
secured 4 2 .2 0 per cent of the votes and 68.50 per cent of the total seats 
in the first general election (Table 12), but it was still able to form 
ministries in all the states of India (Fig. 22). In Travancore-Gochin, 
Madras j Hyderabad, and PEPSU (how in the Punjab), independents and the 
united leftist front were the main opposition groups- The election 
gains of the Communists in Madras, Travancore-Cochin, and Efcrderabad 
pronçted some observers to suggest a possible Communist takeover in
g
South India. In general, however, the Congress Party had strong con­
trol over all India after the election of 1951-52.
The Congress Party reached the peak of its power, prestige, and 
glory during and after the second general election. It secured 45-41 per 
cent of the total vote {3.22 per cent more than in 1951-52), and 65.1 per 
cent of the total seats (Table 13). It formed state governments in all 
states but Kerala (Fig. 22). The Communist Party of India formed a 
coalition government in Kerala which lasted for 28 months until presi­
dential rule was proclaimed on July 31 j 1959. Kerala is said to have 
been the first constitutional government in the world to be captured by
g
"Three Steps in Democracy," Eastern Economist. XLVII, No. 25 
(December 30, 1966), 1175-
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Assam 102 2,448,890 1,075,331 3 2 5 ,6 9 0 1 4 6 ,7 9 2 69,431 7 ,191 662,492
(4 3.9 ) (1 3.2 ) (5 .9 ) (2.8) (below 1) (27.0)
Bihar 329 9,548,840 3 ,9 5 1 ,1 4 8 1,7 3 7 ,4 6 6 273,911 108,671 1 1 3 ,2 3 4 1,863,661
(4 1.37) (18.19) (2.86) (1.13) (1.18) (9 .5 1)
Bombay 311 11,1 2 3 ,2 4 2 5,556,334 1,3 3 0 ,2 4 6 5 5 9 ,4 9 2 159,994 4,876 1,9 1 7 ,5 7 4
(4 9.9 5) (11.96) (5 .0 3) (1 .4 4) (0 .0 4) (17.24)
Madhya Pradesh 225 7,006,588 3,281,983 660,883 276,723 24,460 249,899 1,852,452
(4 0.8) (9 .4 ) (3 .9) (0.3) (3 .5) (26.4)
Madras 372 1 9,9 9 7 ,2 5 6 6,998,667 1,3 1 2 ,7 0 3 1,793,629 2 ,591 ,341 8,216 4,749,184
(35.0) (6.56) (8.97) (12.96) (0 .0 4) (2 3.7 5)
Orissa 135 3,677,046 1,4 2 8 ,4 1 4 432 ,731 16,948 206,757 Nil 822,521
(38.84) (11.76) (0 .4 6) (5 .6 8) ’ (2 2.3 3)
Punjab 125 4,978,589 1,830 ,601 224,608 Nil 2 5 1 ,7 1 3 277,616 1,182,408
(37.0) (4 .0 ) (5.1) (6.0) (2 5.2 4)
Uttar Pradesh 430 16,758,627 8 ,0 3 2 ,4 5 5 2,0 3 2 ,5 9 4 954,196 155,869 1,0 6 6 ,7 1 4 3 ,2 7 5 ,3 1 0
(4 7.9 3) (1 2.1 3) (5.69) (0 .9 3) (6 .3 7) (1 9.54)
West Bengal 237 7,444,225 2,897,881 215,385 667,445 800,951 417,879 1,638,399












Number and Percentage of Valid Votes Polled by the Parties
Congress SocialistParty







lÿderabad 171 5,178,593 2,162,659 592,071 4 ,0 4 7 Nil 2,328 742,187
(38.0) (11.0) (0.1) (0.07) (1 4.0 )
Madhya Bharat 98 1,987,410 938,919 145,843 6,510 39,600 193,627 258,156
(47.3) (7.3) (0 .3 ) (2.0) (9.07) (1 3.0 )
t^sore 98 2,753,868 1,276,318 2 4 0 ,2 9 0 3 9 1 ,6 5 3 25,116 62,118 696,667
(46.35) (8 .7 3) (1 4.2 3) (0 .9 1) (2 .2 5) (2 5.3 0)
Pepsu 59 1,354,478 376,297 17,480 15,613 8 6 ,1 9 1 37,494 4 1 9 ,7 2 5(27.7) (1.2) (1.0) (6 .3 ) (2 .7) (3 0.9 )
Rajasthan 153 3,261,442 1,286,953 136,464 16,411 17,181 1 9 3 ,5 3 2 896,178
(39.5) (4 .3 ) (0 .5 ) (0 .5) (5 .9 ) (2 7.4 )
Saurashtra 57 951,509 606,534 34,778 3 0 .9 0 7 7 ,791 4,346 75,624
(63.9) (3.6) (3 .2) (0.8) (0 .5) (7.9)
Travancore-_ 104 3,398,193 1,204,364 485,194 Nil Nil Nil 1,1 5 1 ,5 5 5
Cochin (35.4) (1 4.3 ) (33.9)
Part "C" States
Ajmer 30 234,788 101,441 1 ,0 9 4 Nil 3,494 28,612 84,366

























29 226,220 117,656 1,744 Nil Nil 1 1 ,1 3 5 5 1 ,7 4 6
(52.0) (0.7) (4 .8 ) (22.8)
24 8 8 ,0 4 7 48,945 Nil Nil 1,386 Nil 37,716
(5 5.6) (1.6) (4 2.6 )
47 521,766 271,812 12,396 1 3 ,6 4 6 2,591 1 1 4 ,2 0 7 89,972
(5 2.9 4) (2 .3 7) (2.61) (0 .4 9) (21.88) (15.89)
34 179,783 85,079 2 ,6 6 4 26,471 Nil 6,212 4 7 ,4 3 2
(4 7.3 ) (1.4) (1 4.7) (3 .5) (26.3)
59 681,799 272,255 128,787 111,825 Nil 67,330 5 7 ,9 0 0
(3 9.9 ) (18.9) (16.4) (9 .9 ) (8 .5)
Total for 3229 103,601,199 43,602,546 10,071,211 5,306,219 4,552,537 2,866,566 22,566,226
All States (42.20) (9.70) (5.11) (4.38) (2.76) (21.74)
Note: Percentage of valid votes polled by smaller parties in the elections were: Forward Bloc
Marxist Groiç) 0.7156} Forward Bloc (Ruikar Grotgp) O.I656; Hindu Mahasabha 0.82%; Ram Rajya 
Parishad 1.21%; Scheduled Castes Federation 1.66%; Revolutionary Socialist Party 0.24%; 
Revolutionary Communist Party 0.23%; Bolshevik Party of India 0.02%; Krishikar Lok Party 
0 .99%; and Other Parties 8.23%.
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CHANGING PATTERN OF STATE ASSEMBLIES 
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1957 E L E C T IO N
NON-CONGRESS COALITION CONGRESS
1967 E L E C T IO N
Fig. 22.
TABLE 13
GENERAL ELECTION 1957 VIDHAN SABHAS















Andhra Pradesh** 101 3,603,585 1,707,364
(47.37)
































6 ,2 1 3 ,6 4 7
(37.18)




2 ,0 5 9 ,5 4 7
(35.28)
9 4 0 ,5 1 8
(16.09)











*Other parties include People's Democratic Front, Scheduled Castes Federation and Peasants & 
Workers Party.
**Qnly Telengana area of Andhra Pradesh went to the Poll.
***CPI entered elections as a part of People's Democratic Front which contested 63 seats and had 
won 22 of them.
table 13— (Continued)























ttysore 200 6,420,159 3,343,839
(52.08)
9 0 2 ,3 7 3
(1 4.0 5)




1,9 6 4 ,4 6 0
(30.58)
















2,2 1 1 ,3 2 4
(29.08)


















West Bengal 251 10,469,803 4,830,998
(46.14)












8 ,721 ,941 4,372,420 
(7.70) (4 .0 3)
3 7,3 2 3 ,1 7 7
(3 2.9 7)
0»
* Other parties include People's Democratic Front; Scheduled Castes Federation and Peasants & 
Workers Party.
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9a Communist Party without the assistance of an armed force. In the 
mid-term election of I960, the Congress Party secured 34-42 per cent of 
the votes but formed a government in coalition with the Muslim League 
and the independents. Finally, the ministry resigned on September 8, 
1964, and a presidential rule which lasted until the fourth general 
election was proclaimed.
In the third general election to the state assemblies (1962), the 
Congress Party won a clear majority in every state except Madhya Pradesh 
where it received 49*30 per cent of the seats (Table 14)* It suffered 
several setbacks, however, in Rajasthan, the Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and 
Bihar. It is significant that the opposition could not form a govern­
ment in any area. It was therefore clear that a defeat of the Congress 
Party in any state meant unstable rather than alternative government.
The third general election indicated that the Hindi region of the Gan­
getic plain was showing clear signs of political instability.
The pattern established in party distribution on the basis of 
the fourth general election (1967) differed greatly from these shown in 
the previous three elections. This time the Congress Party did not 
secure a majority in eight of the states, the Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa, Madras, and Kerala. Non-Congress 
coalition governments were formed in Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa, the 
Punjab, Madras and Kerala (Table 15 and Fig. 22). Temporarily presi­
dential rule was proclaimed in Rajasthan, but on April 26, 1967, the 
Congress Party won majority support and formed the government. The 1967
^Richard L. Park, India's Political System (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,Inc., 1967), p. 70.
TABLE 14








































































































































1 4 5 ,0 4 0
(2 .15)






















6 6 5 ,3 6 5
(3.74)











































































































^All Party Hill Leaders' Conference (134,591-5.51); Revolutionary Communist Party (29,249-1.19); 
Achik Asongna Chil chakgipa Kotsdc (5,169-0.21).
^We Tamils (117,640-0.98); Muslim League (89,968-0.71); Forward Bloc (173,261-1.37); Tavil National 
Party (44,048-0.35); Socialist Labour (43,186-0.34).
TABLE 14-— (Continued)
States
Number and Percentage of Valid Votes by Parties
Socialist Mahasabha
Ram Rajya Other Recog- 
Parishad nized Parties
Unrecognized Indepen- ^ 
Parties dents
Mysore 62,809 305,210° 1,091,011(1.00) (4.84) (17.32)
Punjab 93,801 893 3,434 799,925* 137,649* 1,157,113 *Akali Dal
(1.39) (0.01) (0.05) (11.87) (2.04) (17.17)
Rajasthan 189,147 17,481 102,988 1,071,581(3,68) (0.34) (2.01) (20.88)
Uttar Pradesh 1,462,511 188,581 52,290 2,249,565(8.21) (1.06) (0.29) (12.63)














°Lok Sevak Sangha (159̂ 54-5-2.53)î Maharashtra Ekikaran Samiti (136,878-2.17); Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam (8,787-0.14).
^Haryana Lok Samiti (128,036-1.91); Haryana Front (8,613-0.13).
^Revolutionary Socialist Party (245,261-2.$6); Sanjukta Biplabi Parishad (58,806-0.61); Lok Sevak 
Sangh (68,583-0.72); Gorkha League (38,076-0.40); Socialist Unity Centre of India (69,844-0.73); 
Workers' Party of Didia (26,913-0.28).
TABLE 15
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Andhra Pradesh 90 287 165 29 11 9 3 - 1 1 — 68 287
Assam ---- 126 73 2 7 ---- — 5 4 - 9 25 125 1
Bihar 96 318 128 3 24 4 26 18 68 1 13 33 318
Gujarat ---- 168 93 66 - ---- 1 3 5 168
Haryana ---- 81 48 3 - ---- 12 - — 2 - 16 81
Jammu & Kashmir ---- 75 61 3 8 3 75
Kerala —— 133 9 19 52 - - 19 —  — 19 15 133
Madhya Pradesh 90 296 167 7 1 — 78 9 10 - - 24 296
Madras 63 234. 50 20 2 11 - 4 2 - 138 7 234
Maharashtra 78 270 203 - 10 1 4 8 4 5 19 16 270
*Figures are based on the results of the 1967 General Elections except in the case of Nagaland and 
Pondicherry where these relate to the results of elections held in February 19&4 and August 1964- 































Mysore 63 216 126 16 1 1 4 20 6 1 ---- 41 216
Nagaland " 46 44 2 46
Orissa ---- 140 31 49 7 1 — 21 2 ---- 26 3 140
Punjab 40 104 47 - 5 3 9 ---- 1 3 26 10 104
Rajasthan — — 184 89 48 1 — 22 ---- 8 - — 16 184
Uttar Pradesh 108 425 199 12 13 1 98 11 44 10 - 37 425
West Bengal 75 280 127 1 16 43 1 7 7 — 47 31 280
Delhi
Goa, Daman & Diu - 30 28 2 30
s
**(Continued)Jammu and Kashmir National Conference 8; Kerala: Muslim League 14. (0.38%); Kerala 
Congress 5 (0.34%)J Madras : Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 138 (4.41%); Maharahstra: Peasants and 
Workers' Party 19 (0.61%); Nagaland: Nationalist Organization 32; Democratic Party of Nagaland 12; 
Orissa : Jana Congress 26; Punjab: Akali Dal (Sant Grotç») 24 (0.62%), Akali Dal (Master Groiq) 2
(0.14%); West Bengal: Forward Bloc 13; Goa, Daman and Diu: Maharashtravadi Gomantak 16 and
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elections demonstrated that the Jan Sangh Party has little or no influence 
in the south, east, and west. In its home state of Maharastra it secured 
only four seats, although 165 candidates contested in the elections.
Out of 1 ,5 6 7 Jan Sangh candidates, only 264 won state assembly seats 
securing 8.75 per cent of the votes, even with the support of princes in 
Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. The Jan Sangh emerged as the main opposi­
tion party in Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh, and it captured 
the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. It gained strength in Bihar, Rajasthan, 
the Punjab, and Himachal Pradesh.
The second most important party, the Swatantra, formed a 
government in Orissa in coalition with the Jan Sangh. It became the 
largest party in Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Gujarat, and secured seats 
in Madras, Mysore, and Uttar Pradesh.
Other inçortant parties were the Communist Party of India with 
its Chinese branch. It formed coalition governments in Kerala and West 
Bengal. The Samyukta Socialist Party became the main opposition party 
in Bihar. The DMK in Madras became the most powerful regional party in 
India. All the previous Congress ministers were defeated except the
Minister of Information, the EMK candidates defeated every Iftiion minister
10and deputy minister by large margins. Other successful local and 
regional parties were the Akali Dal in the Punjab, the All Party Hill 
Leaders Conference in Assam, the National Conference in Jammu and Kash­
mir, and the Peasant and Workers Party in Maharastra. Significantly, in
K. S. Nathan, "The DMK and the Politics of Tamilnad, "
Economic and Political Weekly. II, No. 48 (December 9, 1967), 2137.
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the nation as a whole, no opposition party won more than 10 per cent of 
the total votes, and the strength of each such party was copfined to a 
few states or even to a single state. An important fact of the fourth 
general election in the state assemblies, however, was that four Chief 
Ministers (Bihar, Madras, the Punjab, and West Bengal) and no less than 
52 other cabinet ministers were defeated in the 1967 elections. It was 
nothing short of a major electoral purge of Congress Party leaders.
On the basis of the 1967 elections, the Congress Party formed 
the governments in Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh, but the 
defection of Congressmen resulted in the fall of these governments 
(Table 16). In addition to the fall of Congress ministries, the coali­
tion ministries in the Punjab, Bihar, and West Bengal were also toppled. 
]h November, 1967 alone, three non-Congress governments were toppled 
within 24 hours, and presidential rule was proclaimed (Table 16). Thus, 
before the mid-term elections in February, 1969, the Punjab, Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal were under presidential rule, and else­
where the patterns of government have changed considerably since March, 
1967 (Fig. 23).
Mid-term elections were held in West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar 
Pradesh, and the Punjab, all situated in the Gangetic plain. Along with 
these mid-term elections, there were regular elections in Nagaland and 
in Pondicherry in February, 1969. Mid-term elections were also conducted 
in Haryana in May, 1968, where the Congress Party returned to power with 
48 seats out of a total of 81, The defectors from the Congress Party 
who formed the Vishal Ikryana Party won five seats, but of their 15 
candidates 10 were defeated. Other parties have not fared well. After
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TABLE 16
CHANGING POWER POLITICS IN THE VARIOUS STATE ASSEMBLIES 
SINCE THE FOURTH GENERAL ELECTION, 1967
State









Kashmir Congress None Congress
The Punjab United Front United Front until 
November 22, 1967
Minority Government 
with the Congress 
Sigpport from Novem­
ber 25, 1967, to 
August 20, 1968.
United Front 
with maj or 
parties. The 
Akali Dal and 








Congress until March 
22, 1967.
United Front with 
the Jan Sangh and 
the Vishal Haryana 
Party from March 22, 










from November 21, 
1967 to May 20,1968.





United Front-Samyukta election. 
Vidhyak Dal from 



































Presidential rule from 
February 25, 1968.
United Front until 
January 25, 1968
United Front of 
Soshita Dal and the 
Congress alliance from 
January 31, 1968, to 
March 18, 1968.
United Front opposition 
to the Congress and the 
Soshita Dal from March 
21, 1968, to June 25,
1968.
Presidential rule from 
June 29, 1968.
Presidential rule until Congress 
April 26, 1967. from April 26,
Congress until 
July 30, 1967.
United Front from 




























from October 25, 1967, 
to February, 1968.
United Front vith the 
Communist Party of 
India with its both 
factions and the 








Front with the Congress 
support from November 21, 
1967 to February 20,1968.











United Front with 













Mysore Congress None Congress
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table 16— ( Continued)
State












Madras Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam
None DMK
Kerala Tftiited Front, 




Pondicherry Congress Congress until 
February, 1969
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the major mid-term poll of February, 1969, three of five states were 
governed by the Congress Party and two by coalition parties (Fig. 23).
In Uttar Pradesh, the Congress Party secured 209 seats and formed a 
government along with the independents (Table 17).
The small parties were eliminated from representation, and the 
Communist Party suffered heavy losses. The Bhartiya Kranti Dal, organ­
ized by Congress defectors, emerged as the second largest party; its 
strength was greatest in the western districts of Meerut, Agra, and 
Rohilkhand, where it had 61 seats out of a total of 98 in the assembly. 
The Jan Sangh Party lost 47 seats and the Samyukta Socialist Party 11.
In Bihar the Congress Party secured the largest number of votes and 
seats, and formed the ministry with the help of the Janta Party and the 
independents. In Nagaland, the Naga National Organization (Congress 
oriented) won 22 of the 40 seats in the assembly, the United Front 10, 
and the independents 8. The rest of the 12 members were to be nominated 
from the Tungsang district council.
In the Punjab Assembly, the Akali Dal secured 43 seats in the 
mid-term election whereas in the 1967 elections it won only 26 seats.
The party vote, however, had increased by only 4*8 per cent. The Con­
gress Party gained 38 seats as compared with 48 in 1967, but increased 
its vote by 1.82 per cent. The Malwa area on the left bank of the 
Sutlej River has weakened the Congress Party's stronghold. The Congress 
lost all seats in the Patiala district, and it also lost control of 
Amritsar and the Gurdaspur districts of the western part of the state.
It is significant to note that all of the Republican Party candidates
TABLE 17




Bengal Nbgaland Pondicherry Haryana**
Total Seats 425 104 318 280 52 30 81
Seats Filled 423 103 315 280 52 30 81
Congress 209 38 118 55 22* 10 48
Jan Sangh 49 8 34 — — — — — — 7
Swatantra 5 1 3 - . « —  — — — 2
Communist Party 
of India 4 3 25 30 __ 3
Communist Party (M) 1 2 3 80 — — — — —
Praja Socialist Party 3 1 17 5
Samyukta Socialist 33 2 51 9 — — — — —
Paaryiya Krsuiti Dal 99 ---- 6 — — ---- —  — 1
Akali Dal — — 43 — — — —  — — —
Bangala Congress 33
*Naga Nationalist Organization (ideological similar to the Congress Party of India)





Bengal Nagaland Pondicherry Haryana**
DMK 15
United Front
(Nagaland) — — — — ---- ---- 10 — — —  —
Other Parties 2 1 39 57 ---- — — 14
Independents 18 4 19 11 8 2 9
**The Mid-term Elections took place on May 12 and 14., 1968, in Haryana.
Note: Other Parties in Bihar include Janta (14), Lok Tantrik Congress (8), Hul Jharkhand (10), 
Soshita Dal (6), and Forward Bloc (1).
Other Parties in West Bengal include Forward Bloc (22), Revolutionary Socialist Party (12)
Lok Sevak Sangh (4), Gorkha League (4), Socialist Unity Center (7), Workers' Party (2),
Revolutionary Communist Party of India (2), Progressive Muslim League (3), and Indian
National Democratic Front (1).
Other Parties in Haryana include Vishal Ifeiryana Party (13), and Republican Party (1).
»
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(32) lost their deposits, and most of the defectors as well as the old
members of the house were defeated.
In West Bengal the 12-party united front won 218 seats out of
280, with the lion's share of 110 won by the Communist Party of India and
its Chinese faction. The Congress Party won only 55 seats (127 in 1967)
and its faction known as the Bangala Congress 33» The mid-term election
was fought around the straight issues of the Congress Party versus the
United Front. The Swatantra and the Jan Sangh, the first and second
strongest opposition parties in the nation, were unable to secure a single
seat in West Bengal. Only two of the independent candidates were returned.
The progressive Muslim League has been able to survive the tide against
communalism and sectarianism somewhat better, for three of its nominees
11have been returned.
Analysis of Political Patterns 
On the basis of the first three general elections the Congress 
Party controlled the Lok Sabha and all the state assemblies except in 
Kerala. The top freedom fighters easily won the first general election.
The rather strong position of the Communist Party of India in the south 
was mostly due to the weak organization of the Congress Party there and 
the regional fear of domination by the northern plains people. The 
reason for the large vote of the independent candidates was that many 
of the Indian voters had avoided affiliation with any party and were 
unaware of the existing parties' future programs. Moreover, the
11 "Many Bengal Parties Share Debacle with Congress," The 
Times of India (Bombay), Sunday, February 16, 1969, p. 11.
198
illiterate voters had no knowledge of the political performance of the 
various parties, and hence they simply voted for the candidates whom 
they knew best.
The second general election was again an easy win because the 
Congress Party had acceded to the widespread demand for reorganization of 
the states on a linguistic basis. The losses of Congress and especially 
the boosting of Communist strength in Kerala, however, can be attributed 
to the reorganization of the states. The princely area of Traveincore- 
Cochin was ceded to Madras, where the Congress Party was already strongest, 
and where the Communists had practically no influence. Malabar, now part 
of Kerala, was the Communist stronghold. Moreover, in both the first 
and second general elections the Communists took advantage of the regional 
caste lobbies in the south, where the numerous Kammas and Reddies in 
Andhra Pradesh loomed large within homogeneous linguistic groups. Their 
power in the delta region, where landless laborers were in the majority 
(33 per cent of the agricultural population), decreased in the third 
general election due to the selection of a Congress Harijan chief 
minister who was from a lower caste of landless labors.
By the time of the third general election the bifurcation of 
Bombay into Gujarat and Maharastra had occured, Goa, Daman and Diu had 
become a part of India, and Nagaland had been formed as a separate state. 
The bifurcation of the state of Bombay brought about a decline in the 
linguistic movement in that region and a substantial rise in the Con­
gress Party's strength. The integration of Goa boosted the morale of 
the country and the nationwide strength of the Congress Party. The poor 
performance of the Congress Party in the Gangetic plain can be attributed
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to factionalism within the party. Many Congressmen openly gave support 
to opposition candidates. The parliamentary election was less affected, 
however, because opposition candidates often bargained for legislative 
assembly seats. Moreover, virtually everywhere there was voter concern 
about local rather than national affairs. Another important cause of 
Congress victory was the lack of understanding among the different 
opposition parties, which had often led to division of the votes of the 
opposition and thus to a larger measure of success for the Congress 
candidates for the Lok Sabha.
The changing patterns in the 1967 elections had several 
implications for the nation. As a result of these elections the Congress 
Party was pushed out of power in the entire Ganges Valley, from the Pun­
jab to Bengal. In the Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, and West Bengal, the Congress Party was displaced by either 
dissident grotçs of the Congress Party or by coalition governments. The 
Congress Party retained its hold on the food surplus areas of Andhra 
Pradesh, Madliya Pradesh (where later on ministries temporarily collapsed 
due to defections), and on the three, neighboring states of Gujarat, Mysore, 
and Maharastra which have a reasonably contented peasantry.
Causes of the Defeat of the Congress Party
There were several causes for the Congress Party’s defeat in the 
1967 elections. Chronic inflation, continually rising prices, the recur­
ring shortage of essential commodities, famine conditions in many parts 
of the country, stagnation in industrial activity, and the uneasy out­
look for the future all bred resentment and hostility among various
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segments of the voting community. The central government employees, the
industrial workers in Bombay and Calcutta, the lower middle class families
in Kerala and Madras, and the starving peasants in Bihar and Rajasthan
were all concerned about food shortages, inflation, and the general
atmosphere of violence.
The most important issues facing the nation, those affecting the
survival of India as a democratic state, such as economic development,
national security, and foreign policy, seemed hardly to figure at all in
12the minds of the voters. Even China and Pakistan were almost totally
ignored. In short, the masses were no longer willing to tolerate poverty
and disparity, and to their minds socio-economic and political changes
were necessary. In the election campaign, local and personal grievances
rather than major national issues predominated. The. Times of India wrote
on the eve of the 1967 elections that, "there are no all India issues
13as such— there are only all India grievances." In Madras the principal 
issue was anti-Hindi feeling, in the Punjab the question of Punjabi Suba 
and the status of Chandigarh were at issue, in Bihar and Rajasthan food 
scarcity was uppermost in the minds of the electorate, in Kerala the 
problem of rice distribution was foremost, and in Crissa the development 
of a steel mill assumed great significance. Elsewhere still other impor­
tant local issues occupied the attention of the electorate.
1 2 Norman D. Palmer, "India's Fourth General Elections," Asian 
Survey. VII, No. 5 (May, 1967), 287.
^̂ The Times of India (Bombay), February 15, 1967, p. 1.
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Factionalism in Congress 
An important contributor to the Congress Party's defeat was 
internal fighting and factionalism. The party was accused of an uncon­
cealed passion for power, position, and wealth; of a complete loss of 
its former sense of idealism; of an indulgent attitude toward corruption; 
of an unprincipled capacity for compromise; and of general inefficiency in 
its government machinery. Disaffection from the Congress Party, then, 
was often caused by its own internal disruption rather than by any real 
failure of policy. The nation was felt to be overburdened with an army 
of unemployed selfish politicians, an army much more costly than an army 
of occupation. A national leader with a commanding personality like 
Nehru did not exist, and two new prime ministers followed him in quick 
succession. Two armed clashes with Pakistan and two successive years of 
drought made the political situation even more difficult for the Congress 
Party. A large portion of the voters nursed grudges against the Congress 
Party, which appears to have been corrupt in some states and inept in 
virtually all. In 1967 election results generally reflected a protest 
against the Congress Party rather than an endorsement of the opposition 
parties. No all-India party could successfully challenge the Congress 
Party, but regional parties such as these of the Communists in Kerala, the 
EMK in Madras, the Swatantra in Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Orissa, and the 
Jan Sangh in Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Delhi could and did 
challenge the Congress Party.
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Unity Among the Opposition Parties 
An important cause for the changing distribution pattern of the 
political parties was the capacity of the opposition parties to form a 
coalition for the purpose of defeating the Congress Party. In the previous 
three elections the non-Gongress votes were split among a number of oppo­
sition candidates, and as a result the Congress Party emerged as the 
majority party. On the other hand, in the fourth general election the 
opposition parties often joined together and backed one candidate against 
the Congress candidate. There was, therefore, no split in the non-Gongress 
votes, and Congress was defeated in many states. The coalition in West 
Bengal was formed by uniting 14 different parties; followers of Gandhiji, 
Netaji (Subhash Chandra Bose, a national hero of the freedom struggle),
Mao, and even Liu came together as strange bedfellows in the United 
14Front. In Kerala the Muslim League and the Communists, and the Samyukta 
Socialist Parties joined forces; and in the Punjab the Jan Sangh Party and 
the Akali Dal Party formed a coalition government. In each situation, 
the coalition members, although representing opposing ideologies, used 
their common hate for the Congress Party as a factor of unity. Some 
coalition governments were formed by parties with similar ideologies such 
as the rightist parties in Orissa (the Jan Sangh and the Swatantra), and 
the leftists in Kerala. The greatest likelihood of success in a coalition 
government is when like-minded parties, similar in their ideologies, are 
brought together.
^^Sabinal Pal, "The Leftist Alliance in West Bengal," The Indian 
Political Science Review, Special Issue; Indian Elections 1967, I, Nos.
3 and 4 (April-October, 1967), 189.
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Defection of the Legislators from the Congress Party
Recently defections from the Congress Party have occurred all 
over the country, and Congressmen have left the party in large numbers.
In this new phenomenon of defection, nearly two-thirds of the opposition 
leaders have at one time or another been associated with the Congress 
Party.The party nominations disappointed some candidates, and sup­
porters of these candidates then worked against the official Congress 
nominees, forming rival groups or joining opposition parties. Nearly
1,000 Congress Party members opposed Congress candidates in the nation. 
Because of party defections, especially from the Congress Party to 
opposition parties, the stability of the new ministries was threatened, 
particularly in the north. Four leading Congress ministries were brought 
down by dissident Congressmen. The leaders of dissident groups in 
Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, and the Punjab 
secured the post of chief minister, and most of their followers obtained 
cabinet Posts. In the Punjab bribery was rampant. In July, 1967,
Mr. Gumam Singh's government succeeded in getting five Congressmen to 
defect to his coalition by offering all of them ministerial posts. On 
the other hand, defectors to the Congress Party in Rajasthan included 13 
members of Swatantra, two members of the Jan Sangh, and five indepen­
dents.^^
^̂ Gopal Krishna, "Political Leaders: Party Leadership," in
Asian Political System, ed., by Betty B. Burch and Allan B. Cole 
(Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1968), p. 259*
^̂ The Hindu Weekly Review (Madras), December 18, 1967, p. 16.
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The bribing of legislators by offering them money or power 
unfortunately has become an integral part of Indian politics. The prin­
ciple that defection pays off has done considerable harm by creating an 
atmosphere of political instability. It weakens the people's faith in 
democracy, and lowers the prestige of politicians and legislators in 
the eyes of the general public. Most recent defections have apparently 
occurred for power rather than for principle or ideology; large size 
cabinets in which defectors secure the greatest number of posts have 
been unavoidable. There seems to have been little public interest in 
these defections.
Altogether a total of nine per cent of the legislators (314 out 
of 3,447) had changed their loyalties by the time of the mid-term elec­
tion, and the practice has increased considerably since October, 1967.
For example, in Bihar, 85 legislators have defected at one time or 
another. Two new parties have been organized by defectors in that state. 
In Haryana 37 of the 79 members of the legislative assembly have changed 
affiliations, and four of them have done so four times each. In Uttar 
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal defection has overthrown the 
ministries. Northern India represents the highest index of political 
instability. Only Kashmir has been able to maintain ministerial sta­
bility. No defections have occurred in Madras, Kerala, and Maharastra, 
and only one in each of Ifysore, Kashmir, and Orissa.
The defectors frequently have several grievances in common; for 
example, in Haryana the socio-economically underprivileged Jat-Ahir groiçs 
have formed a group. In Uttar Pradesh also, the Jat-Ahir groiçs combined 
to oppose the Brahmln-Banya groiç) of C, B. Giçta. In Madhya Pradesh the
205
lower castes revolted against the Brahmin-Marwari group of D. P. Misra, 
and in Bihar the lower caste Yadvas formed a group against the high 
caste Brahmin-Kayasthas. In Madras and Maharastra the revolt was 
against the Brahmins, and in the Punjab the defection was by Akali 
extremists.
Opposition by the Youth 
An inportant element in the changed pattern after the fourth 
general election was the revolt of youth against the existing government. 
Half of the total electorate of 250,681,530 was under 35 years of age, 
and these included 35,000,000 youths who were not old enough to vote 
in the 1962 elections.The young people who had just acquired the 
franchise for the first time had already witnessed the India-China war 
of 1962, two wars with Pakistan, the food scarcity of 1965-66, faction­
alism in Congress during the election of the new prime ministers, youth 
unemployment, and direct conflicts with authority on university campuses 
in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala, West Bengal, and other 
states. All of these observations served to antagonize them against the 
Congress Party. The votes of most young people, including the student 
communities, clearly opposed the Congress Party. In West Bengal a- large 
number of seats were captured by the Communists in the urban areas, pri­
marily through the sipport of unemployed educated young people. In 
Madras a 26-year old student defeated a nationally famous Congress leader. 
Even within the Congress Party younger leaders were favored. Among the
17Paul Wallace, "India: The Disperson of Political Power,"
Asian Survey. VIII, No. 2 (February, 1968), 88.
206
21 to 35 age group, including those who are near literates and belong 
to the lower income class, have definitely swung away from the Congress 
Party.
Active Participation by Ex-Princes 
Further opposition to the Congress Party developed as a result 
of the more active and direct participation of former princes, big busi­
nessmen, former I. G. S. (Indian Civil Servants) officers, and high 
ranking military officers, as evidenced in Orissa, Gujarat, Rajasthan, 
the Punjab, and Madhya Pradesh. In these states the illiterate older 
voters manifested strong feelings of allegiance to the former princes, 
and the young voters who were disgusted with the performance of the 
Congress Party also voted for the princes in protest. The overwhelming 
defeat of the Congress candidates from Madhya Bharat and Vindhya Pradesh 
(former princely states now in Madhya Pradesh), Rajasthan (mostly an 
area of former princely states), PEPSU (former princely state now in the 
Punjab), Saurastra (now in Gujarat), and the hilly areas of interior 
Orissa was unavoidable. The Congress Party never successfully estab­
lished itself in the erstwhile princely states. In the outer regions of 
the former princely states the Congress did not develop grass-roots 
control, and not one Congress candidate was returned from the eight 
northern districts forming the old Gwalior State, now in Madhya Pradesh. 
Almost all the opposition candidates were those supported by the Maharani.^®
1 g
"Unique Feature of Polling," The Hindu Weekly Review (Madras),
February 13, 1967, p. A.
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The influence and financial backing of the native princes put the 
Congress Party into immense difficulty in their respective areas.
Caste and Communalism
Caste and communalism also influenced the party performance in
the fourth general election. For example, Hindus form 61.6 per cent of
the total Kerala population, Christians, 10.8 per cent, and Muslims,
17.4. per cent. All three of these groups are involved in a struggle for
power in the state. The Hindus are socially and politically divided
among the untouchables, the low-caste Ezhavas, the middle caste Nairs,
19and the Brahmins. The Ezhavas favor the Communists, while the Nairs 
and the Christians favor the Congress Party. The Ezhavas are greater in 
number than the other Hindu groiçs, a fact which assisted in the Commun­
ist victory.
The Muslim League voted against the Congress Party for the first 
time in 1967 and assisted the Communists in Kerala. To satisfy the 
Muslim League a new district has been formed containing the major part 
of the Muslim population in Kerala. The Muslim candidates have increased 
their share of the total votes polled in successive national elections.
In West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh the Muslim voters have sided with the 
left rather than with the Congress Party. In fact, the Muslim voting 
pattern in earlier elections did not follow communal lines, nor were 
Muslim legislators always elected solely on the basis of support within
19Vincent C. Watson, "Communal Politics in India and United 
States," Political Science Review. V, No. 2 (October, 1966), 217.
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20the Muslim community. Other caste and communal groups which were 
successful in the fourth general election all over India were the anti- 
Brahmin group in Madras (the DMK) and Maharastra (Maratha, anti-Brahmin 
organization), the Yadvas (anti-Brahmin and Kayastha) in Bihar, the 
Sikhs in the Punjab (the Akali Dal), the Jat-Ahir group in Haryana and 
Uttar Pradesh, and the Jat group (anti-Brahmin-Banya) in Rajasthan.
Although there has been a decrease in the influence of caste
considerations in voting patterns among all groups, it is evident that
people of the higher income groiç) and urban dwellers are less inclined
to vote for a candidate of their own caste than are the rural and lower 
21caste voters. The urban and high income groips voted for party can­
didates rather than on the basis of caste. In rural areas the low castes 
are commonly guided by their caste leaders, but this practice changed in 
the fourth general election when the voters did not always vote for the 
caste candidates. In general, caste considerations differ in importance 
in voting behavior in various regions; for example, in West Bengal caste 
is no longer a political factor in voting. In Assam and Orissa the 
significance of caste as a political factor is peripheral, but in the 
Madras, Kerala, and Maharastra the caste factor is still strong. The 
Communists follow the caste lobbies very closely and exploit caste fric­
tions to their advantage. This was evident in Kerala where the friction
20Paul Brass, Functional Politics in an Indian State; The 
Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (Berkeley; University of California 
Press, 1965), p. 207.
21Personal e:çerience of the writer as a Returning Officer in 
the Panchayat election in Bharatpur District, Rajasthan in I960, and as 
Presiding Officer in the third general election in Ajmer District, 
Rajasthan.
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between Nairs, Brahmins, and Ezhavas gave the Communists an easy victory 
in 1967. In the Jhunjhunu District of Rajasthan the Communist won votes 
as Jats, not as Communists. In summary, it seems fair to say that the 
fourth general election has indicated that political competition is 
undermining caste solidarity, and that a single caste no longer forms 
the basis of power for any party in India. Political organization and 
leadership constantly cut across existing loyalties, and cleavages of 
caste create new loyalties in political association.
The Congress Party also does not command substantial si:ç)port 
among the tribal people of India. It is rapidly losing the support of 
minorities, such as Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians, and of the backward 
classes. These minorities feel that the Congress Party has become 
unable to protect their interests.
Linguistic ^d Regional Differences
Linguistic and regional disparities greatly affected the outcome 
of the 1967 elections. In the Hindi heartland, the Gangetic plain of the 
north, the Jan Sangh Party has emerged as a strong political force, 
although in the east, west, and south it could not achieve much success 
because of its Hindi orientation. While linguistic feeling may be sub­
siding, regional rivalries are increasing steadily. Only in Madras has 
the linguistic issue worked against the Congress Party, but here it has 
helped to establish the new regime of the Tamil Party (the DMK). The 
record of achievement of the Congress Party in Madras has been outstand­
ing. As Bawa puts it, "Madras is probably the one state where Congress
210
QQhas done some good." The administration in Madras was a well-knit team, 
and there was no charge of corruption against any of the ministers. It 
is obvious that north-south regional feeling is still very strong among 
the voters.
Rural-Urban Disparity
Although linguistic and regional feeling are prevalent in certain
areas, rural-urban voting disparities are obvious over most of the country.
In rural areas neither the large landowners, now outlawed in most of the
states, nor the landless laborers played a decisive role in the outcome
of the election, the former because their power has been limited by
recent legislation and the latter because they are often economically
23dependent upon others. The self-cultivating landowners, on the other 
hand, played a prominent role in the elections, for any change in the 
administration can directly or indirectly affect them economically. In 
general, the Congress Party fared far better in 1967 in rural areas than 
in urban areas. The Jan Sangh Party did well in the urban areas of the 
Punjab and other states in the north, but in the Punjab the Akalis received 
a large number of votes in the rural areas. In West Bengal, the Congress 
Party did better in rural areas than in urban areas, especially in metro­
politan Calcutta where the Communists achieved great success. But the 
Congress Party lost heavily even in rural areas in the mid-term election,
^%oorjahan Bawa, "The Elections in Madras," The Indian Politi­
cal Science Review, Special Issue; Indian Elections. 1967. Nos. 3 and 4 
(April-October, 1967), 221.
23Myron Weiner and Rajni Kothari, Indian Voting Behavior:
Studies of the 1962 General Elections (Calcutta; Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 
1965), p. 8.
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primarily because of the Communist tactic of fomenting class conflicts. 
Landless peasants were encouraged by the Communist government in West 
Bengal to seize farmland in an area called Naxalbari, and some of the 
farmers actively participated in this violent act. The Communists also 
had great success with Bengali middle class families and lower class 
industrial laborers.
West Bengal has the highest proportion of university students 
among all the Indian states and the second highest literacy rate. The 
unemployed educated students with degrees but no jobs faced an unbear­
able situation, and in their frustration they voted against the Congress 
Party. In the 1969 mid-term elections in West Bengal the Communists 
acquired a large number of seats in the rural areas due to the Naxalbari 
incident, and from the urban industrial workers due to the Gherao con­
flict (workers shutting management personnel into their offices)•
In essence, no single all-India voting pattern emerged; regional 
and local parties and issues predominated in the fourth general election. 
The voting pattern was affected by several factors, among them the active 
participation of young students and ex-princes, the defection of Congress 
legislators from various state Congress governments, the shifting of 
loyalties by the minority groiçs, by caste and communalism, and by the 
linguistic issue. In some parts of the country a combination of factors 
affected the voting pattern. In the northern plains (Rajasthan, Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Haryana) the caste factor was probably 
predominant; in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, the Punjab, and Gujarat it 
was the ex-princes; in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, and Madhya 
Pradesh it was the dissatisfied youth; in West Bengal it was labor, rural
21,2
and urban disparities, and factionalism within the Congress Party.
Party defections throughout the north have created instability in the 
area. On the other hand, in the south different factors were at work.
For example, although language was not an issue in the north, it was 
an important matter in the south. Caste considerations, the distribution 
of rice, factionalism in the Congress, and the restless youth were major 
factors in Kerala and Madras. Thus, the only nationwide factor respon­
sible for the Congress losses vsls the widespread dissatisfaction with 
the Congress Party among the several opposition parties.
Effects of Altered Patterns on Indian Economy and Politics 
The more diversified pattern of political thinking evident in 
the results of the fourth general election creates some concern for the 
future political stability of the nation. Because the Congress Party 
had a sound political base and a well established party organization, it 
developed a viable democratic system which the other parties probably 
could not have acconplished. Some of the other parties, particularly 
the leftist ones, have followed a disruptive path and thus brought 
instability to certain parts of the country. The collapse of several 
Congress and non-Congress coalition governments, especially in the north 
(Table 16), has retarded the economic progress in those states because 
of the instability of government functions in the states concerned. The 
uncertainty of a stable administration has created a fear in the minds 
of the state leaders that the ministry can collapse at any time. Thus 
the ministers are constantly busy trying to secure the support of a 
majority of the legislators, and they have insufficient time to attend
213
to the progress of the state. Power-hungry politicians have sometimes 
tried to bribe the party defectors in an effort to keep their positions 
intact. As a result, several important projects have been delayed.
Central leaders in turn worry about the downfall of the state ministries 
and spend much time devising programs to stabilize them. As a result, 
they sometimes neglect their obligation to carry out effective planning 
and the execution of existing national development plans. Mid-term 
elections in the four northern states in February, 1969, cost a consid­
erable amount of money which could have been used for development projects 
in these states. Opposition parties of the left have started putting 
pressure on the central government to change its foreign policy towards 
Communist China and the Soviet Union, but their voice in the Ink Sabha is 
negligible due to their small number of votes. This is a new problem 
faced by the central government, however, and its slender majority in 
the Lok Sabha creates a hazard to the smooth running of the administration.
On the other hand, it is a sign of health to see coalition 
governments working effectively in Orissa and Tamilnadu (Madras), where 
•considerable economic progress has been attained. There is a competitive 
spirit among the politicians of these states as they attempt to perform 
better than the previous Congress government. If similar coalitions 
could be formed elsewhere, they would probably contribute to the progress 
of the states and finally to the progress of the nation. Cohesive coali­
tions of different parties are, however, very difficult to form in India 
because of the different ideologies of the various parties. Moreover, 
most of the politicians are power hungry and seem to have little desire 
to work for the public good.
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In summary, the political patterns which emerged after the 
fourth general election created some economic distress, and aroused 
suspicion in the minds of the general public concerning the stability 
of the state governments, especially in the northern plain. Although 
regional parties have gained power in Madras and the Punjab, really 
no distinct political pattern has emerged after four general elections. 
No viable alternative to the stable government formerly provided by the 
Congress Party was produced by the 1967 election except in two or three 
states.
Several prognostications may be ventured by the writer with 
regard to future patterns. First, on the basis of the 1967 elections, 
it seems likely that the Swatantra influence should be confined to 
Gujarat, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, and Mysore, and that the Jan Sangh 
influence will be concentrated in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, 
and Delhi. In their respective areas both parties received a high 
percentage of the votes in the last general election. Both parties are 
ideologically similar and so could participate in a coalition government 
at the center. Such a coalition might well bring stability and, there­
fore, might work efficiently for the betterment of the nation. The 
attitudes of these two parties are also similar in regard to foreign 
policy, and they agree on most national development policies.
If the Congress Party is prepared to enter into an alliance with 
the Swatantra or with the Jan Sangh there is some chance of producing 
stable ministries in several of the states. In such a coalition, how­
ever, either the Congress Party or the party in coalition with it would 
have to change its foreign policy and adjust its ideology, A change of
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this type might take some time. For the present, such a coalition would 
produce stability in the internal political system, thereby aiding in 
the economic development of the unstable states. But, in the long run, 
a coalition of two or more parties can create some problems due to differ­
ing ideologies. Over the country as a whole, we may expect to see a right 
wing coalition in some states and a left wing one in others. The Congress 
Party will probably control the remaining states as well as the national 
government, at least for the near future.
There is a considerable danger in this pattern, however, as some 
states may get more attention than others from the central administration. 
The people in states with an opposition coalition in power would be at a 
disadvantage, and their economic progress would suffer. There are obvious 
dangers in unstable ministries at either the state or the central level. 
After its recent reverses in the fourth general election, the Congress 
Party may reform its ways and evolve into a party more concerned with 
the betterment of the people and once more work effectively. But, for a 
clean administration there should be a strong opposition party which can 
be provided by either the rightists or the leftists. This is what is 
needed for a truly viable system.
CHAPTER VI
EXTERNAL RELATIONS; INDIA'S BORDERS AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS
India's land frontier is approximately 15,200 kilometers long.
Of this length, about 8,000 kilometers are shared in common with Pakis­
tan, 4,000 kilometers with China, 1,450 kilometers with Burma, and the 
remainder with Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal. The India-Burma border creates 
no political stress. The boundary with Pakistan was finalized at the 
time of partition in 1947 through the Radcliffe Award. Minor changes 
were executed later, including a recent delimitation in the Kutch area. 
Significant boundary friction exists on the India-China border, for 
centuries a peaceful line of separation in southern Asia, but one which 
in recent years has become a battlefield.
The India-China Border 
The Himalayan Range forms an impressive natural boundary, one 
which has been recognized by tradition and custom dating as far back as 
1500 B. C. Innumerable references in Indian mythology and the religious 
lore of the Vedic and post-Vedic ages established the Himalayas as the 
limits of the Indian frontier. The sacred books of Ramayana, Mahab- 
harata, and Puranas all considered the Himalayas as a part of India.
During the Medieval period, India controlled the area ajacent to the
T̂he Sino-Indian Border Dispute (New Delhi: The Afro-Asian
Council, 1961), p. 3*
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Himalayan watershed and in some cases the area beyond the watershed.
This control has continued through the ages. The Mauryan Entire (at the 
end of the sixth century B.C.), the Ashokan Empire (at the beginning of 
the Christian era), the Rushan Empire (in the third century A.D., which 
extended control beyond the watershed), and the Gupta Enpire (in the sixth 
century A.D.), as well as the Mughal Empire (eleventh to eighteenth cen­
tury) of the Muslims extended their rule as far as the Himalayan natural 
boundary. Thus, for more than 3,000 years the Himalayas have been regarded 
as the frontier of India.
The powerful rulers of India confined their ambitions within the
natural frontiers of India, and did not try to extend their rule beyond
them. The question of space has never worried Indian political thinkers
in the past nor does it at present. "Himachal Setu Paryant (the area from
the Himalayas to the Rameshwaram at the tip of the peninsula) was their 
2concept of India." During the last three centuries numerous inter­
national agreements and treaties have established the Himalayas as the 
limit of administrative control between India and China.
The Sino-Indian border as it stands today is the product of 
Manchu policy, Chinese Republican policy, and British policy. The British 
policy was to develop friendship with China and enhance trade relations 
with that northern neighbor. The extension of Indian territory was not 
a British concern. The British administration could have returned part 
of the currently disputed Tawang region to Tibet at almost any time be­
tween 1914 and 1947, but it did not do so because it regarded that region 
as properly belonging to India. Even Chou En-lai has had occasion to
K̂. M. Pannikar, "The Geographical Factors in Indian History," 
op. cit.. p. 20.
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remark that, century after century, history has recorded peaceful 
cultural and economic intercourse between India and China. There has 
been no historical animosity between them. Their relations were entirely 
cordial, based on mutual respect and good neighborliness since antiquity. 
Until recently, Indian territory had never been invaded through the 
passes on the north or east, and China had never exercised its power over 
Ladakh.
The question arises, therefore, as to why such traditionally and 
friendly relations between the two neighbors have been replaced by hostile 
co-existence. The Chinese invasion of 1962 was not due to a single 
factor; rather, it was a multi-factor phenomenon. Among the factors, 
foremost was the establishment of a firm, strong, and stable central 
government for China with an aggressive nationalist outlook in various 
directions. This nationalism has generated a desire to return to vassal- 
dom all those territories which once formed part of the Chinese Eknpire, 
and which became independent or detached as a result of general political 
disintegration. This policy of expansionism has been apparent along the 
northwestern frontier with the Soviet Union, as well as in the Pamirs, 
Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Assam, Burma, the Andamans, Malaya, Thailand, 
Annam, Taiwan, the Î yukyus, and the Kuriles.^
According to the Chinese government, India in the 20th century 
had interfered in Tibetan affairs; consequently, she deserved punishment. 
The ultimate aim of the present Communist regime appears to be an expanded 
China as large as the land mass of Asia exclusive of the Soviet Union.
^"A Map Published in," Link. V, No. 14 (November 11, 1962), 16-17.
219
There seems to be a long term plan to annex the outlying territories of 
Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan, and NEFA. These, with Nepal, are to form part 
of the Chinese Five Fingers (five fingers of which Tibet is the palm) 
for the purpose of controlling and influencing the entire subcontinent.
The whole Himalayan area is to form a federation of Himalayan states 
which would presumably function as a Chinese protectorate. China has 
long felt a great need for a road across the Aksai Chin and for enough 
territory in Ladakh to insure the defense of the road. This was unques­
tionably the major strategic element underlying the Chinese invasion.
The Chinese authorities felt also that the Tibetan rebels and Khan̂ as 
might use the territory, if it was not under their control, for guerrilla 
activities against the Chinese regime.
A very important cause for the Chinese invasion of India was 
the ideological difference between the two countries, one swearing by 
sectarian communism and the other by democratic socialism, one by align­
ment and the other by non-alignment, one by dictatorship and the other by 
democracy. The New York Times once commented that communist nations are 
extremely sensitive about their frontiers with non-communist countries. 
Accordingly, they recognize three types of neighbors: pro-communist 
states, friendly neutrals, and anti-communist states. The first two 
types are acceptable, but the third is intolerable.^
Communist China’s long-range goals for India were the destruction 
of Indian prestige and, more specifically, of Nehru’s dominant position 
in Indian and world politics. Some observers feel that there may be a
\"he New York Times. February 26, 1961, p. 16.
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grand design on the part of China for leadership of the Afro-Asian world 
and for the elimination of India as a serious obstacle to such Chinese 
ascendancy. The leaders of China long ago learned from Joseph Stalin 
that it is necessary to have a well-developed base from which to oper­
ate.̂  Evidently India’s support of Tibetan rebels and the Dalai Lama, 
its philosophy of anti-communism, its cooperation with the capitalist 
Tata family in increasing arms production, and its friendly relations with 
the United States and the other western powers have been the basic causes 
of antagonism. In addition, China seems to have been jealous of India's 
economic progress and has wanted to retard it by diverting Indian resources 
to war material production. Political collusion with Pakistan and mili­
tary aid to that country is a means of continuing the diversion. 
Aggressiveness is now as much a part of China's ideological and power 
game as it is a product of her territorial lust.^
After centuries of peaceful co-existence, China in recent years 
has claimed large sectors of Indian territory along the northern and 
northeastern borders of India, citing in support of these claims a map
7published in 1922 by Sun Yat-Sen. The really serious India-China border 
conflict started in 1951, when the Indian government brought to the 
notice of the Peking government some Chinese maps which showed tradi­
tional Indian territory as a part of China. In reply to this protest and
R̂obert Dean Tice, Geopolitics and the Ladakh Boundary (Unpub­
lished Ph.D. Dissertation, Saint Louis University, 1965), p. 239»
^Gondkar Narayan Rao, The India-China Border (New Delhi: Asia
Publishing House, 1968), p. 1.
n
Sun Yat-Sen, The Jhtemational Development in China (New York: 
G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1922), Map.
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again on a later occasion, Premier Chou En-lai assured the Indian Prime 
Minister that these were old maps produced by the "pre-liberation regime" 
in China and that China had had no time to revise them. As soon as the 
Chinese government felt relieved of more pressing problems, he said, the 
necessary corrections of the maps would be made after mutual consultation. 
Mr. Nehru made it clear to Mr. Chou En-lai that "our boundaries were quite
9clear and were not a matter of argument." The Chinese Prime Minister did
not protest this statement. Between 1954 and 1959, however, India's
northern border was continuously threatened and invaded, and eventually
about 31,000 square kilometers of its territory were occiqjied by China.
During these five years several border incidents occurred, among others
at Bara Hoti (July, 1954)» Damzan (September, 1955), Nilang and Shipki
Pass (î ril, 1956), Kurik (1956 and 1957), Walong (September, 1958),
Khumak Fort (July, 1958), and Lapthal and Sangcha Malla (October, 1958).
India protested all these incidents, but to no avail. By Semptember, 1959,
China had occvçied Bara Hoti, Lapthal, Sangcha Malla, and the Khumak 
10Fort. Then for a time the Chinese contented themselves with minor 
border activity, probing here and there, and occasionally publishing maps 
suggesting claims to territory well to the south of the line which India 
considered to be the border.
g
Notes. Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreement Signed 
Between the Government of India and China, White Paper I. 1954-59 (New 
Delhi; Ministry of EDctemal Affairs, Government of India, 1959), p. 47.
^Ibid.. p. 49.
1ARamesh Singhvi, India's Northern Frontier and China (Bombay: 
Conten^orary Publishers, 1962), p. 15.
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Mr. Nehru, referring to these incidents, warned his country 
that the Indian border had become a big and dangerous issue and might 
remain so for a long time. China's claims extended along the border 
for a distance of 4,000 kilometers, but the major areas were in Gil jit 
Agency and Ladakh. They also included large parts of Bhutan, altogether 
some 5,000 square kilometers in the north, northeastern, and southeastern 
parts of that protectorate. In the correspondence that followed these 
border incidents, the Chinese government claimed some 132,000 square 
kilometers of Indian territory and refused to recognize the traditional 
Indian boundary in spite of the existing data of customs, usages, trea­
ties, geographical configurations, and racial affinities which for so 
long had sanctioned it. Nehru and Chou En-lai met in New Delhi between 
^ril 19 and 25, I960, in order to eîçlore avenues toward a peaceful 
settlement. As a result of this conference, the two prime ministers 
agreed that appropriate officials of the two governments should meet to 
examine, check, and study all of the historical documents, records, and 
accounts on which they respectively relied in support of their boundary 
claims. Representatives of both governments met at Peking, Delhi, and 
Rangoon and submitted a report on February 14, 1961. In their report 
the officials agreed to discuss all of the treaties and agreements, 
traditions and customs, administrative decisions, natural features, and 
miscellaneous data of relevance to the boundary question.
In general, the Chinese government claimed that the momentary 
alignment of the boundary was the result of British imperialist agression 
against China and especially the Tibetan regime of China. It argued that
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11the Sino-Indian frontier had never been formally delimited, and
insisted that the traditional and customary line as drawn on the Chinese
maps was correct. In contrast, the Indian government strongly affirmed
that the entire length of the boundary had been defined, either by
treaty or by custom, or both, and pointed out that until recently no
Chinese government had protested against the exercise of jurisdiction by
12India np to this boundary. The lofty mountain ranges and watershed 
buried in eternal snow, it was asserted, would facilitate verbal defini­
tion, and demarcation on the ground was either impossible or superfluous. 
During the discussions, the Indian delegates described in precise details 
the physical features along the mountain crest, giving the coordinates of 
all peaks and important points, in addition to answering 57 questions 
asked by the Chinese side. The Chinese representatives, however, answered 
only 59 of the 118 questions asked by the Indians, and the evidence they 
submitted was recent in origin, imprecise 6Uid, what was more striking, 
internally inconsistent both in facts and arguments. The Chinese arbi­
trarily stated certain principles, applied them to particular instances
when it suited their convenience, and discarded or ignored them when
13they were inconvenient. The discussion revealed that while the Indian
Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreement Signed 
Between the Government of India and China. White Paper II. September- 
November. 1959 (New Delhi; Ministry of External Affairs, Government 
of India, 1959), pp. 52 and 57.
Ŝjhite Faner III. November. 1959-March. I960 (New Delhi;
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, I960), p. 85.
Krishna Rao, The Sino-Indian Boundary Question and Inter­
national Law (New Delhi: Bombay Mutual Building, Parliament Street,
1963), pp. M-4.5.
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government had a thorough knowledge of the boundary, the Chinese
government was not even familiar with the topography of the territory
which they claimed to have possessed and administered for centuries. It
could not produce even a single official map published prior to 1950
1Adepicting the alignment which it now claimed, ^ whereas India was able 
to produce 44 official maps including eight of Chinese origin.
It is significant to note that China agreed with India that the 
Sino-Indian boundary was a natural one. It further conceded that in 
determining the course of this boundary the geographical location of the 
watershed should be treated as an important factor, although its acts 
had belied its acceptance of a watershed boundary.
When it suited their convenience, the Chinese modified their 
ençhasis on geographical principles of boundary determination and con­
tended that the historical facts could not be negated by geographical 
principles. The historical claims mostly pertained to the collection 
of religious dues or the exercise of religious stçervision over the 
Lamaist monasteries and the Buddhist faith. On March 7, 1914, however, 
Ivan Chen, the Chinese delegate to the Simla Convention, had stated,
"What is termed spiritual influence should not be confused with what is
15termed temporal authority." The Dalai Tama only exercised spiritual 
authority and not temporal authority. The Tibetan never collected any 
secular revenue as distinct from the religious dues. It is evident that
^̂ Report of the Indian Officials on the Boundary Question (New 
Delhi ; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1961), p.
253.
^̂ The India-China Boundary Question (New Delhi: The Indian
Society of International Law, 1963), p. 39.
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whereas the Indians have presented a legal case, the Chinese have put 
forward a political one.
An important, larger consideration in the talks was the status 
of Tibet. China asserted that Tibet was a part of Chinese territory, and 
that China had exercised full sovereignty over Tibet. The Tibetan admin­
istration, however, has in the past entered into several treaties, 
sometimes with and sometimes without the concurrence of the Chinese 
government. The treaties between Tibet and Ladakh of 1684 and 1687 are 
cases in point. In the 1842 treaty between China, Tibet, and Kashmir, 
China not only concurred in Tibet's right and power to take part in such 
formal legal transactions but considered Tibet and China to be equal 
parties. This administrative authority of Tibet was also seen in its
independent conclusion of the 1852 agreement with the Maharaja of 
1 AKashmir, and the treaty with Nepal in 1856 in which extra-territorial
17privileges were granted to Nepal and Tibet. This last treaty was
renewed ly the government of the Republic of China in 1961 with minor
adjustments. The convention of April 27, 1906, between China and Britain
referred to the refusal of Tibet to recognize the validity of, or to
carry into full effect the provisions of, the Anglo-Chinese convention
18of March 17, 1890, and the related regulations of December 5, 1895.
1 fiSir C. Aitchison, Collection of Treaties. Engagements, and 
Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring Coi^tries. 5th Rev. ed.
(Calcutta: Government Printing Press, 1929), p. 43.
17Ibid.. p. 50.
18K. Krishna Rao, op. cit., p. 26,
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It also mentioned the fact that the 1904. Lhasa convention between Tibet 
and Britain had been validly concluded and put into operation.
In an earlier instance, Tibet did not recognize the 1876 
arrangement between China and Britain for a mission to be sent to Tibet. 
Early in the 20th century Tibet took advantage of the Chinese revolution 
of 1911, rose in revolt, expelled the Chinese troops, and declared its 
independence.̂ '̂  The events of 1911-12 mark the re-emergence of Tibet 
as a fully sovereign state, independent in fact and in law from Chinese 
control. Indeed, China was prepared in 1914 to accord to Tibet the right 
and power to conclude treaties not only with other nations but also with 
China. At the 1914 convention, the credentials of the Chinese pleni­
potentiary stated that Chen I-fen (Ivan Chen) "was hereby appointed 
special plenipotentiary for Tibetan negotiations." Moreover, the Chinese 
plenipotentiary accepted the credentials of the Tibetan plenipotentiary 
as being in order. It is thereby clear that India and China have often 
treated Tibet as being on an equal political footing.■ Without question, 
from 1914 to 1950, Tibet definitely controlled its own destiny.
The arguments extended by India in the discussion leading to 
the 1961 boundary report were strong, valid, and supported by legal 
documents, whereas Chinese territorial claims were unconvincing. Unable 
to succeed in her aims to achieve a large chunk of Indian territory by 
peaceful means, China, therefore, attacked the northern border of India.
The new massive thrust by China on October 20, 1962, was 
entirely unexpected in its scale and intensity. Such an attack must
19Charles Henry Alexandrowicz-Alexander, "The Legal Position of 
Tibet," American Journal of International Law, XLVIII, No. 2 (April, 
1954), 270.
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have required at least five or six weeks of preparation. In Ladakh the 
Chinese troops rapidly seized an area larger than that which had pre­
viously been claimed. Ju ohe NEFA area, they came far down the mountain 
slopes in several places and threatened the Assam Valley and its oil 
fields. Fighting broke out all along the boundary. After gains in all 
sectors, the Chinese unilaterally announced a cease-fire on October 24, 
1962. The Colombo Plan nations suggested that both combatants should 
withdraw 20 kilometers in the western sector from the November 7, 1959, 
line. This line was not really acceptable to India but had been accepted 
as part of a package deal. India now insisted following the 1956 line 
of control, and pressed for complete withdrawal of Chinese troops from 
the central and eastern sectors except Tawang and Longju.
For more detailed evaluation, the Indian boundary is divided 
into three segments, the western sector including the Gilgit-Hunza and 
Ladakh portionsj the middle sector the Himachal Pradesh and Uttar 
Pradesh portions; and an eastern sector including the North-East Fron­
tier Agency (Fig. 24). The boundary in the western sector between Jammu 
and Kashmir and Sinkiang and Tibet is about 1,770 kilometers in length. 
The frontier between Sinkiang and the Pakistan-occupied portion of 
Kashmir is 480 kilometers long and involves a disputed area of about
13 ,000  to 1 5 ,500 square kilometers. The rest of this border is between 
Ladakh and Tibet. In the western sector the boundary runs along the 
Mustagh Range and the Aghil Range, across the Karakoram Pass via the 
Qara Tagh Pass, and along the main Kuen Lun ranges to a point east of 
longitude 80° E. and 24 kilometers north of Ha jit Langer. This boundary 
is an obvious physical boundary between the Gilgit area and Sinkiang,
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following the main Karakoram watershed dividing the streams flowing into
20the Indus basin from those flowing into the Tarim basin. Farther 
southeast, the boundary runs along the watershed across Lanak La,
Kona La, and Kepsang La, then follows the Chumesang River across Pangong 
Lake and the Kailash Range (Fig. 25). Here the boundary constitutes the 
watershed between the Indus system in India and the Khotan system in 
China. In this area China claims the Aksai Chin district, the Changmo 
Valley, Pangong Tso, and the Spanggar Tso area of northeast Ladakh, as 
well as a strip of about 5,000 square kilometers down the entire length 
of eastern Ladakh.
The Aksai Chin plateau is a kind of no-man's land. The area is 
so remote, rugged, and uninhabited that some Indian leaders have regarded 
it as not worth enough for India to risk a real breach with China over 
it. The plateau is a desert area without a single blade of grass.
The whole of Ladakh is a sparsely populated area. It is, 
however, the highest inhabited country in the world. The topography is 
unique, consisting of very high mountains with high intervening valleys 
and scattered high plains. Recently the Ladakhis have adopted a blend 
of the Hindi and Munda tongues which also appears in the languages of 
some of the tribes of eastern India. They have traditionally had a 
status independent from Tibet and China, although they closely resemble 
the people of these two countries in race and culture. The religious
^^Alastair Lamb, Asian Frontiers; Studies in a Continuing
Problem (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 102.
S. Bains, India's International Disputes: A Legal Study 
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ties between Ladakh and Tibet have been strong ever since the center of 
Lamaist Buddhism was established at Lhasa, but Tibet did not exercise 
significant political control over Ladakh at any time after the 10th 
century.
The western sector boundaries were defined by the treaties of
1665 and 1684. (Ladakh-Tibet agreements), and were confirmed by the 1842
Dogra-Ladakh agreement. The authoritative international commission of
jurists concluded that the treaty was a tripartite treaty to which the
Raja of Jammu, the Government of China, and the Government of Tibet 
22were signatories. The boundary was again reaffirmed in an agreement
between Tibet suid Kashmir in 1842. This agreement stated that the
boundary between Ladakh and Tibet would remain the same as before.
The Government of China later contended that the 1842 treaty did not
bind it because: (a) China had not sent a representative to participate
in the negotiations concerning the conclusion of the 1842 treaty, nor
had she ratified it; (b) the treaty in any case did not define or locate
the Ladakh-Tibet boundary and only provided in general terms that Ladakh
and Tibet would acknowledge each other's frontiers; and, (c) Sinkiang's
23consent to the treaty was not obtained. None of these allegations is 
valid. The provisions of the preamble to the treaty clearly mention the 
Enperor of China as a party. The treaty did not attempt to define the 
boundary but merely referred to the earlier established frontiers, 
because these frontiers were well known and did not require any formal 
delimitation.
22White Paper II, og. cit., p. 76.
^ Ŵhite Paper III, op. cit.. pp. 61-62 and 86-89.
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In 184-6-4-7 the Chinese government informed the British
government that its boundaries on the southwest were sufficiently well
established and well enough known that there was no need for additional
measures in order to fix them»^^ Also, the Kashmir Atlas of 1868 depicted
a well-authenticated boundary between Ladakh and Tibet. Even an official
Chinese map of 1893 showed the boundary in this area the same as it is
depicted in current official Indian maps. The official Tibetan Chron- 
25ides, records of travellers, official and unofficial maps and surveys, 
the revenue records, and the construction of public works all fully 
support the Indian position. India's possession of the Aksai Chin 
area was further confirmed by a British note to the Chinese government 
in 1899. The note explains that the boundary line does not show the 
Aksai Chin road on the Chinese side. China has not produced any concrete 
evidence to prove its actual exercise of control over the disputed terri­
tory.
Sinkiang became a province of China in 1884-, and China, 
therefore, could not claim any Sinkiang rights in 1842, because it was 
not a part of China in 1842. Moreover, the Chinese maps and documents 
invariably recognized that Sinkiang did not extend south of the Kuen 
Lun Range. There is no continuous range which can be considered an 
effective barrier or a boundary south of the Kuen Lun Range. Pakistan, 
which had been in illegal occupation of the Kuiza area of Kashmir for
^̂ Ibid.. p. 87.
25Report of the Indian Officials on the Boundary Question, 
op. ext., po 4 ̂.
^̂ Ibid.. p. 137 and 140.
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several years, ceded its right over that part of the area lying between 
the Aghil and Karakoram ranges on March 2, 1963. The people of the 
ceded area are Muslims of the Aga Khan sect and speak Urdu, Buru Shaski, 
and Sheema languages.
In 1892 China accepted the Kuen Lun Range as the international 
frontier and, in fact, erected a pillar in support of its claim that the 
Kuen Lun Range was the frontier. The Indian surveys in the Aksai Chin 
area were openly conducted over a period of years, and their results 
were published as early as 1866. No subsequent protests were ever made 
by the Chinese.
Since 1954, however, the Chinese have repeatedly intruded deeper 
and deeper into this section. By November 7, 1959, the date of the 
renewed Chinese aggression, the line of actual control was not a line 
but rather a series of positions that the Chinese forces had progres­
sively established in Indian territory. By 1962, the Chinese had pene­
trated far deeper than the November 7, 1959, line (Fig. 25). The 
Chinese occupation line now runs from 16 to 240 kilometers west of the 
traditional line. China is in actual occupation of about 31,000 square 
kilometers of Indian territory in this mostly uninhabited region. At 
the time of the Colombo proposal China occupied nearly 38,000 square 
kilometers in the Ladakh area alone.
A real settlement between India and China in the western sector 
is difficult to attain due to the conflicting claims. China insists 
that India has to surrender all its claims in the Aksai Chin area 
through which the Sinkiang-Tibet highway passes in order to settle the 
dispute. At one point in the negotiations the Peking government made
23U
it clear that all other territorial claims would be dropped in return 
for New Delhi's concession of Aksai Chin.̂ "̂  India agreed that China 
would be allowed to use the Aksai Chin road, but for civil purposes 
only. The Chinese did not approve of this provision since it prevented 
military usage of what was essentially a military road. Actually, the 
construction of the road was the starting point of the entire dispute. 
The Chinese are now in full possession of the entire area which they 
claimed in Ladakh except for a small strip of territory in the Demchok 
region^^ (Fig. 25). The Chinese claims in Aksai Chin are based on their 
unilateral occiçation and ^  facto administrative jurisdiction.
The boundary in the middle sector runs along the watershed 
from Ladakh to Nepal. It is 625 kilometers long and adjoins the states 
of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh (Fig. 26). The traditional fron­
tier of Himachal Pradesh follows the water parting between the Spiti and 
the Para Chu rivers and then continues along the watershed between the 
eastern and western tributaries of the Sutlej. The Uttar Pradesh 
boundary lies on the water parting between the Sutlej and the Kali, the 
Alakananda, and the Bhagirathi (Jadhganga). The boundary crosses the 
Sutlej near the Shipki La (pass) on the Himachal Pradesh-Tibet border. 
From there it runs along the watershed passes of Mana, Niti, Jungri- 
Bingri, Dharma, and Lipu Lekh, finally joining the triple point junction 
of China, Nepal, and India. The Chinese claim nearly 1,300 square 
kilometers in this area, particularly in the Ari district of Tibet, Bara
27Margaret W. Fisher and Leo E. Rose, "Ladakh and the Sino- 
Indian Border Crisis," Asian Survey. II, No. 8 (October, 1962), 31*
28J. S. Bains, og. cit., p. 161.
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Hoti (which the Chinese call Wu je), Nilang-Jadhang, Sang, Tsungsha 
Malla, Lapthal, Chuve, Gbuje, Shipki Pass, and Pussing-Sumdo (Fig. 26).
Concerning these areas, the Chinese have asserted that Bara 
Hoti (Wu je) (with an area of about 4. square kilometers) and Nilang- 
Jadhang belong to Tibet, since Tibet has been exercising jurisdiction 
over them. They also maintain that the Sang and Tsungsha areas, south­
west of Tsaparang Dzong in Tibet, were gradually invaded and occupied
by the British some 30 to 40 years ago and hence must be returned to
29proper legal authorities. Bara Hoti, however, is south of the water­
shed and situated in the state of Uttar Pradesh between the Sutlej and 
the Alaknanda rivers. In this area, the Chinese have recognized Tun j un 
La as the border pass. Bara Hoti is more than three kilometers south of 
Tun j un La. This segment of the boundary was confirmed by the Tibetan 
and British governments under the 1890 and 1919 treaties.Local 
officials of the Garhwal district had been exercising administrative 
jurisdiction for centuries.
Sangcha Malla and Lapthal, both claimed by China, are other 
areas situated in the Almora district of Uttar Pradesh. They are from 
three to 10 kilometers south of the border. Effective Indian adminis­
tration has persisted here, and neither the Chinese nor Tibetans have
31ever previously laid claim to them. Another claim of China is on 
Nilang-Jadhang, an area of about 140 square kilometers situated south of
29White Paper I, og. cit., pp. 15-16.
30"Report of the Indian Officials on the Boundary Question," 
og. cijb., p. 97.
31White Paper I, og. cit., p. 32.
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the main watershed and north of the main Himalayan range. The main 
Himalayan range is not a waterparting range in this area, but the water­
shed is north of it It was been administered by the Darbar of Tehri since 
1677 A.D. The Chinese base their claims to Chuve and Chuje only by 
reason of having raised funds for religious purposes from these areas.
The topographical surveys conducted by the British and Indian governments, 
as well as other maps, however, strongly support the Indian claim. Even 
a Chinese wall map published as recently as January, 1951, showed Chuve 
and Chuje situated within Indian territory.
In all these places, the collection of land revenue and other 
taxes; the exercise of civil, criminal and police jurisdiction; tours of 
officials; orders of local officials; census operations; the administra­
tion of forests; maintenance of schools; construction of roads; estab­
lishments of check posts; and the conducting of official surveys have
32all been under the jurisdiction of India. Moreover, the Chinese show
a gross lack of knowledge of the location and extent of the areas which
they are claiming. They have gone so far as to ask India for details
of the grid coordinates of areas over which they claim to exercise 
33sovereignty. China has not extended any evidence to support its
claims, whether these were based on tradition, custom, or administrative
jurisdiction. China has of late recognized that most of the areas dis-
3Z.puted by it in this sector have been under the control of India.
"Report of the Indian Officials on the Boundary Question,"
op. cit.. p. 165.
^^White ]
^^Gondkar Narayan Rao, op. cit.. p. 100.
33 Paper II, op. cit., pp. 48-51.
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All of the disputed areas just described are situated south of 
the six border passes which were mentioned in Article IV of the Sino- 
Indian agreement of 1954- Although until recently there has never been 
any dispute about this sector of the boundary, the Chinese aim now seems 
to be to get control of all the important passes through which trade 
routes pass» Bara Hoti is a key place for border defense. China's 
claim to these areas is motivated by strategic reasons, since a major 
military base built here could easily dominate the entire Gangetic plain. 
The Indian government apparently is not adverse to negotiating and dis­
cussing minor changes along the border, even though its claim to sover­
eignty over the disputed areas is unassailable. According to the 
Colombo proposal, the general status quo will be maintained in the middle 
sector, although the local Bara Hoti dispute will be settled by 
negotiations.
Between the middle sector and the eastern sector, Nepal, Sikkim, 
and Bhutan form a kind of zonal frontier between India and China. The 
boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan are of concern to India, since both of 
these countries are bound by treaties with India, and their defense is 
India's responsibility. Sikkim's boundary with Tibet extends for a 
distance of about 225 kilometers. This line was approved by a conven­
tion between Britain and China, signed in Calcutta on March 17, 1890, and 
was demarcated in 1895. The Bhutan-Tibet boundary, which is about 500 
kilometers long, was also explicitly demarcated in the Simla Treaty map, 
and the treaty is still valid. The Nepal-Indian boundary is a peaceful 
one and not disputed. The boundaries between Nepal and China, Sikkim 
and China, and Bhutan and China all follow the watershed principle.
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The boundary in the eastern sector is 1,1 AO kilometers long 
and runs from the eastern limit of Bhutan to a point near the Talu Pass 
at the tri-junction of India, Tibet, and; Burma. This line is called 
the McMahon Line, after Mr. Henry McMahon, the British representative 
who signed the 1913-1A Simla convention. The boundary was established 
along the Himalayan crest of the northern watershed of the Brahmaputra, 
except where the Lohit, Dihang, Subansari, and Namjang rivers break 
through that watershed. The only variance from the watershed princple 
is near Miguitm and the two Tibetan pilgrim places of Tstokaro and 
Tsari Sarpa.
China in this eastern sector claims about 9A, 700 square
kilometers of Indian territory, including the Kemang Frontier Division,
the Subansari Frontier Division, the Siang Division, and three-fourths
of the Lohit Division of the North-East Frontier Agency. In 1911 Tibet
revolted against the Manchu Dynasty, and until the end of 1912 there
were continuous skirmishes on the Sino-Tibetan frontier. In 1913,
Tibet declared full independence. It was to resolve this conflict that
35the Simla Convention was called by Great Britain. After full discus­
sion, the three plenipotentiaries (Chinese, Tibetan, and British), 
initialled the map and drew up the draft convention. The final draft 
of the Simla Convention, dated April 27, 191 A, contained two copies of 
a map which delineated the boundary between inner and outer Tibet with 
red ( India-China) and blue (Tibet-China) lines respectively. The docu­
ment was signed and sealed by the Indian and Tibetan representatives on
Krishna Rao, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
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JixLy 3> 1914. The status of Tibet at the time was undoubtedly that of 
an independent state. The Chinese plenipotentiary remained obdurate, 
however, and refused to sign because he did not agree to the proposed 
boundary between inner and outer Tibet (blue line). China raised no 
objection to the Ihdia-China boundary and made no protest when the 
agreement was published in the Aitchison Volume in 1929.^^
When Jawaharlal Nehru, on November 20, 1950, stated that in the 
eastern sector of India's northern boundary the McMahon Line was the 
official one, maps or no maps, China raised no protest. In 1956-57 the 
Chinese government agreed to accept the McMahon Line as the boundary 
between China and Burma. Moreover, Chou En-lai, about the same time, 
said that in view of the new developments and friendly relations which 
existed between India and China, the Chinese government would give 
general recognition to the McMahon Line. The McMahon Line, then, did 
not create a new border, but rather merely confirmed the natural, tra­
ditional, ethnic, and administrative boundary existent between India and 
Tibet— a boundary which had been recognized for centuries before the 
Christian era and which had been referred to in the great Sanskrit epics 
such as the Hamayana and the Mahabharata. The British-Indian government 
prior to Indian independence, exercised authority affecting the legal 
rights and all civil and criminal ^fairs of the people within the tribal 
areas, both among themselves and between them and the peoples living on
36Sir C. Aitchison, op. cit.
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37the plains. Since 194-7, Indian welfare legislation has been operative 
in the region.
Suddenly in 1959 the Chinese contended that the so-called 
McMahon Line was a product of the British imperialistic policy of aggres­
sion against the Tibetan region of China and reminded India that it had 
never been recognized by any Chinese central government and was, there- 
fore, decidedly illegal.^ Tibetan rule, however, had never been 
extended to the south of the Mc%hon Line. Moreover, .the people of NEFA 
are of the same ethnic stock as the other hill tribes of Assam, and they 
have no kinship with the Tibetans as contended by China. The Indians 
exercised administrative jurisdiction in this area long before 1914- 
Prior to 1952 China had not produced even one map or chart, or any other 
proof, to show the alignment of the boundary which it now professed to 
claim. India, on the other hand, has been able to produce several maps, 
including some of Chinese origin, showing the boundary alignment as the
McMahon Line. The British after 1914. made no attempt to create a
39treaty basis for this boundary.
The Chinese e^çanded their military activities of August, 1959, 
by launching a massive attack on India in late 1962. On October 20,
1962, China occupied the Thagla Ridge, Dhola, Tse Dong, Tawang, Bomdila, 
Walong, and the Longju and Sela outposts in the UEFA area (Fig. 27).
'̂̂Report of the Indian Officials on the Boundary Question, 
op. cit., pp. 202-206.
38White Paper II, op. p^., p. 29.
^^Alastair Lamb, Aslan Frontiers Studies in a Continuing 
Problem, pp. cit., p. 128.
96'95'92' 93*
E A S T E R N  SEC TO R  ( N E F A )  A N D  M c M A H O N  LINE
i j T r o n g  K o n g  L<^nggyop l(100 100
KM
29®29* :yen Pj
M ig yi lu n
l O H I T  FO




S U BA NS IR I  FO
Kenzi
( B U R M A« Z i r o
T I R A P  FD
K A M E N G  FD






Just before this massive offensive the Peking radio broadcast that China 
absolutely could not permit the establishment of a military bridgehead 
in any area near the Chinese border.
The dispute over the Tawang and Longju areas was the most 
critical in this section. China argued that Tibet had previously exer­
cised authority over these areas and that such authority should be 
transferred to China. In fact, however, only religious gifts and dona­
tions had been collected by Tibet from the Tawang area. The British 
administration had allowed this practice as a friendly gesture, although 
Britain, and later India, actually administered the region. The Colombo 
proposal of December, 1962, entitled India and China to move their 
forces up to the McMahon Line except in the Thagla and Longju areas, 
which were to be subject to negotiations. The Indian forces, thus, 
moved to the south of the line of actual control j Lujia suggested that 
if the Chinese would withdraw from Longju, the Government of India would 
not reoccupy that area pending further discussion, but China rejected 
the proposal. The McMahon Line is the real cultural, natural, admin­
istrative, and traditional boundary between India and China. According
to Lamb, the McMahon Line is, on the whole, quite a fair and reasonable
40boundary between China and India along the Assam Himalayas.
Considering the India-China boundary problem in its entirety, 
it seems fair to say that India has continued to explore avenues to a 
peaceful settlement in order not to jeopardize international peace and 
security. India accepted the Colombo proposal, whereas China accepted
^Alastair Lamb, The Ihdia-China Border; The Origin of the 
Disputed Boundaries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1%4)> P* 169.
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it only with some reservations. India has offered to refer the dispute 
to the International Court or to arbitration, whereas China has rejected 
that idea. India is even now ready to concede some small pockets of 
territory here and there as a compromise in order to help effect a 
settlement.
China, on the other heoid, has sought to capitalize on its
aggression. In an attempt to emphasize India's alleged obduracy and to
isolate it diplomatically, the Chinese have called attention to the
existence of their friendly and uncontested borders with Burma (I960),
with Nepal (1961), with Mongolia (1962), with Pakistan (1963), and with
Afghanistan (1963). It might be mentioned that the border with Burma
follows the McN^hon line for a considerable distance, that the border
with Nepal follows a watershed, and the the agreed boundary with Pakistan
accords to China some territory which India rightfully regards as its
own. China has made it clear that there can be no negotiations about the
Akeai Chin area, but suggests that a negotiated settlement might be
possible on the McMahon line, about which China has expressed a willing-
Z.1ness to take a realistic view.
The aim of the Chinese invasion of 1962 was to deprive India of
its moral leadership in the world, especially among the Afro-Asian
nations, and to put pressure on it to join the socialist canp. China's 
collusion with Pakistan is a clear indication of this political ambition. 
After India appealed to some of the western powers for arms and had 
actually begun to receive them, China appeared to be unprepared to
^̂ C. N. Satyapalan, "The Sino-Indian Border Conflict," Qrbis, 
VIII, No. 2 (Summer, 1964), 379.
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counter such a move fortunately and was unwilling to let the conflict 
develop into one such as occurred in Korea. China, it seems, had mis­
calculated in its political power strategy. It thought that the war 
would topple the Nehru government and that the Indian Communists could 
then assume power. India's unity in the face of Chinese aggression was 
unanticipated. For a time, internal agitation ceased and unity reigned. 
China's abortive action was motivated not by law, custem, treaties, the 
facts of geography or of administration, but rather by purely ideological, 
political, and strategic considerations.
The Indo-Pakistan Boundary
Just before independence day, August 15, 1947, chaos prevailed 
in the Punjab and Bengal areas. These ethnically mixed states rocked 
under an orgy of insensate communal rioting and murder, generated by the
/9
pernicious two-nation theory and its attendant cult of hate. The 
boundaries of East and West Pakistan were finalized on communal grounds. 
Sir Cyril Radcliffe, charged with establishing the new international 
boundaries, obviously had great difficulty in balancing the sinqple 
Muslim claim to territory on a population basis against the undeniably 
cogent economic and social arguments advanced by the other side, com­
plicated as these were ty the explosive political situation.
Radcliffe tried to be fair, but fairness was difficult when the facts
^P. P. Karan, "Indo-Pakistan Boundaries," The Indi^ Geo­
graphical Journal. XXVIII, Nos. 1 and 2 (January-March, 1953), 20.
^̂ 0. K. H. Spate, "The Partition of the Punjab and of Bengal,"
The Geographical Journal. CX, Nos. 4-6 (October-December, 1947), 210- 
211.
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on which claims were based were poorly substantiated, and the claims 
were too conflicting. The Indo-Pakistan boundary is divided into the 
East and West Pakistan boundaries for the purpose of this study.
The West Pakistan boundary adjoins the Eann of Kutch (Gujarat 
State), Rajasthan, the Punjab, and Kashmir. Under the Radcliffe Award 
the boundary was well defined and partly demarcated on the ground. 
Pakistan, however, asserted that the boundary in the Rann of Kutch area 
was not delimited. It declared that the Rann was not a marsh but a 
land-locked sea or inland lake and, therefore, it should be divided into 
half between India and Pakistan. The British administration in India 
before the partition, however, had formally recognized the Rann as a 
marsh and not as a lake or inland sea. According to Webster 's Geo­
graphical Dictionary. R$nn denotes a "large salt marsh." United States 
newspapers described the Rann as a salt-flat or marsh. Rann is an 
Indian word which means desert or salt marsh. From November to May in 
the retreating monsoon season, when there is no rain and the tidal waves 
recede, the swamp dries up and becomes a salt waste, and only then is 
the area passable. The Rann of Kutch covers an area of 20,720 square 
kilometers of salt flats, brackish ponds, and marsh, interrupted by a 
few rocky elevations.
Pakistan claimed 9,065 square kilometers of the Rann of Kutch, 
and in 1965 its troops invaded the area and reached far inside Indian 
territory. The Prime Minister of Britain intervened, and the dispute • 
was referred to a boundary tribunal consisting of Gunnar Lagergren of 
Switzerland, as president. Ales Bebler of Yugoslavia as Indian repre­
sentative, and Nasrollah Entezam of Iran as Pakistani representative.
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The tribunal's award contains 10,000 pieces of evidence and 350 maps. 
India produced maps and records published prior to 1947 which showed 
that the Rann of Kutch belonged to the Kutch State which after inde­
pendence had become a part of Gujarat. Various documents issued on the 
authority of the political department of the British government of India 
showing political changes in 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1942, clearly depicted 
the Rann of Kutch within the western state ' s agency and never a part of 
the Sind Province.^ Even after the partition of India and Pakistan 
there was no open dispute regarding the border. The Kutch tribunal, 
however, awarded 906.5 square kilometers to Pakistan, nearly 10 per cent 
of its claim, in a decision announced on February 19, 1968 (Fig. 28).
Ales Bebler abstained from the judgment, as he felt it was not just to 
India in light of the evidence available. Only by launching an offen­
sive attack, he felt, had Pakistan acquired any of this Indian territory. 
The award gave Pakistan two inlets on either side of Nagar Parker penin­
sula and a marginal area south of Rahim ki Bazar, including Pirol Valo 
Kun as well as Dhara Banni and Chad Bet. The Nagar Peirker peninsular 
areas were given to Pakistan because they were surrounded by Pakistan 
territory. M. G. Chagla reacted by saying that the Kutch award seemed 
to be based more on political than on judicial considerations. Finally, 
both sides accepted the award. The demarcation of the Kutch-West 
Pakistan border in accordance with the international tribunal award 
proceeded smoothly and was completed by early June, 1969.
0. Saxena, "The Kutch Award in Perspective," Socialist 
Congressman. VII, No. 22 (March 7, 1968), 18.
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The rest of the West Pakistan boundary was delimited by the 
Radcliffe Award on communal and economic grounds. A part of Kashmir 
occupied by Pakistan with continuing threats on the Kashmir border is 
a regular feature of the Indian defense problem.
Of the total border of 3,910 kilometers between East Pakistan 
and India, nearly 2,450 kilometers has been demarcated on the ground. 
The establishment of this boundary provoked a sharp comment from the 
non-Muslims in Bengal who protested against the arbitrary transfer of 
Khulna, a Hindu majority district with 49.4 per cent Muslims to East 
Bengal.The cutting of a road from Purnea to Darjeeling could have 
been avoided by allotting to India a strip of territory of the Khulna 
district some 16 by three kilometers. India also resented the loss of 
the Chittagong hill tract and Jalpaiguri, which were respectively 97.6 
per cent and 77 per cent non-Muslim. Pakistan claimed these areas on 
the grounds of their non-contiguity with other Hindu areas, though in 
fact the area of Jalpaiguri adjoined Hindu Bihar. On purely geographi­
cal and economic grounds there should have been no partition of Bengal 
at all. The East Pakistan-West Bengal boundary follows the principle 
of communal majorities more closely than in the Punjab, but probably 
with less reason, and it rather seems to favor the Muslims.^ In the 
Gooch Behar region, the boundary award left a number of small enclaves 
of Indian and Pakistan territory on either side of the border. In
^̂ P. P. Karan, Indo-Pedcistan Boundaries, op. cit., p. 26.
p. 211,
^0. K. H. %)ate. The Partition of Punjab and Bengal, pp. cit..
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effect, the areas on the Indian side had been in possession of India 
and the areas on the Pakistan side in the possession of Pakistan. The 
Nehru-Noon discussion of 1958 had resolved by I960 a number of problems 
including that of the enclaves of the Gooch-Behar region (Fig. 29). 
Several disputes were referred to a tribunal in which the judge. Justice 
A. Bagge of Sweden, had been elected by both parties.
There were four areas of overlapping claims. The first was 
between Rajshahi (Pakistan) and Mushidabad (India), in a district where 
the channel of the Ganges fluctuates frequently and the boundary has 
shifted several times (Fig. 29). The award here was in favor of India. 
The northern portion of the district boundary was confirmed as the 
international boundary. Another disputed area was along the West Bengal- 
East Pakistan border between Karinçur (India) and Daulatpur (Pakistan).
In this instance the Radcliffe Award was amended and a half way line in 
the Matabhanga River was designated to form the boundary. Pakistan 
gained nearly 13 square kilometers from this award/^? A third disputed 
area, this one between East Pakistan and Assam, was in the Sylhet dis­
trict of Pakistan and the Garo, Khasi, and Jaintia Hills districts of 
India. This is a densely forested area, and hence demarcation is 
difficult. The Radcliffe Award was confirmed, and India's claim was 
sustained. Finally, a dispute existed in the boundary zone between 
Barisari and Gobindpur, and here no compromise solution has yet been 
reached.
Tayyeb, Pakistan; A Political Geography (London: Oxford
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Still another disputed area is the "Berubari Union 12" which 
has an area of 22.7 square kilometers, half of which under the arbitra­
tion award would be given to Pakistan. Berubari is a village on the 
West Bengal-East Pakistan border in the Jalpaiguri district. In Feb­
ruary, 1968, the Bengal High Court passed a stay order on the transfer 
of the territory. The court argued that by virtue of an agreement 
(Nehru-Noon agreement of 1958) the property of the citizens of Berubari 
could not be transferred to a foreign state. The territory is still 
under Indian control. In the Lathitilla-Damabari area a district of 7^8 
bighas, about 200 hectares, was illegally occupied by Pakistan in 1962.
Of the 2,272 kilometers of international border between West 
Bengal and East Pakistan, only 153 kilometers are still to be demarcated. 
Some boundary pillars have been put in place, but these exist at great 
intervals, and the legal line between any two is not necessarily 
straight. The demarcation can only be successful if the intentions of 
both neighbors are friendly. Numerous international boundaries in 
various parts of the world are not demarcated on the ground, but 
friendly relations and respect for law help to maintain peaceful borders.
The India-Bunna Boundary
The India-Bunna boundary is about 1,450 kilometers long from 
its southern extremity to its northern end which is the tri-j unction of 
the boundaries of India, Burma, and China. The boundary line passes 
through deeply forested hill country, with the Mizo Hills, Manipur, and 
Nagaland on the Indian side and the Chin Hills,.Naga Hills, and Kachin 
State on the Burma side. This line has always been regarded by the
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natives of the region as an arbitrary line drawn by the British under 
the treaty of Yundaboo. in 1826.^ The Chins and the Arakanese of Burma 
are of the same stock as the Mizos of India. On the Burmese side, 
Communist supported rebels are playing a significant part in instigat­
ing Karens, Kachins, and Shans to fight for their independence from 
Burma. Similarly, on the Indian side, the Nagas, Mizos, and Assam Hill 
people are receiving aid and encouragement from the Chinese and Burmese 
Communists. The Burmese and Indian governments, therefore, have sealed 
off their borders for protection from the Communist rebels, in an effort 
to stop the secret supply of arms from China, and to keep the Chinese 
from smuggling goods into India. Burma's help in sealing off the 
border was a gesture of friendship. This India-Burma boundary has 
always been a friendly one, and there has never been a dispute regarding 
any part of it.
The India-Burma boundary is based on natural features and was 
defined in the pre-independence period.Nearly 870 kilometers of the 
boundary follows major or minor watersheds, and about one-third coin­
cides with median lines of streams and rivers. The remainder of the 
border comprises straight lines between established boundary pillars.
It was delimited precisely by a bilateral treaty signed on March 10, 
1967, although the boundary had been a traditional one, and there was no 
special need for delimiting or demarcating it. In reconsidering their
^Shillong Gial Vung, "Frontiers of Freedom," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, XLI, No. 33 (August 15, 1968), 318.
^^"India-Burma Boundary Commission," India and Foreign Review. 
No..2 (November 1j 1967).
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friendly relations, both nations felt that their frontier should be 
formalized. Even after the demarcation the tribal people inhabiting 
the border zone will be permitted to migrate up to 20 kilometers on 
either side of the border. The demarcation is now under way. Some 
difficulty in demarcation may arise near the Dhipu Pass, the tri-junction 
between India, Burma, and China. India's claim has been that the Dhipu 
Pass is not the tri-j unction but rather a few kilometers south of it 
(Fig. 30).
The India-Burma boundary will probably remain peaceful in the 
future, but the India-China and India-Pakistan borders may continue to 
cause trouble, because the Chinese Communist philosophy of expansionism 
and war is radically different from India's democratic, secular principle 
of peaceful co-existence. India and Pakistan also differ in their 
philosophical and political attitudes. Pakistan's antagonism towards India 
and its recent collusion with China perpetuates the dangerous border 
situation. The external threats which confront it may help to keep 
India united internally and assist in developing a strong nationalist 
feeling.
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CHAPTER VII
INDIA'S RELATION WITH HER NEIGHBORS AND THE WORLD
Southern Asia will doubtless continue to be among the world's 
most politically volatile areas. In this context India's relationships 
with its neighbors and with the major Communist and anti-Communist power 
blocs have a direct bearing on the stability and peace of the region. 
Currently, when southeast Asia is threatened with a tide of Communist 
expansion south of the Chinese mainland, the United States is actively 
helping the people of the region to resist this tide while maintaining 
their sovereignty. The long range destiny of the Indian people is 
surely tied up with that of the people of southeast Asia. India's 
present and future relations with the democratic world, particularly 
with the United States, are of special significance.
Good relationships with her immediate neighbors are of obvious 
importance to the stability and peace of the Indian nation as well as 
to southeast Asia at large. At present, India has peaceful relation­
ships with Nepal, Burma, and Ceylon, but a rather hostile relationship 
with Pakistan and China, although it had friendly relations with China 
until 1959» Relations with both the IMted States and the Soviet Union 
are friendly. In siçport of India's national interest, Nehru and his 
successors, i.e., Lai Bahadur Shastri and Mrs. Indira Gandhi, have
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followed the principle of non-alignment and of non-involvement in 
military pacts»
India's Relations with China 
Relations between India and China were cordial for more than 
2,000 years. Cultural and spiritual ties were developed with the 
introduction of Buddhism in China in the second century B.C. In modern 
times, western involvement in both countries created similar reactions 
toward colonialism. Until the proclamation of the People's Republic of 
China, on October 1, 1949, India has enjoyed peaceful relations with 
whatever kind of regime was in power in China, and she was the second 
of the non-Communist nations to recognize the new Communist government. 
Friendship with China was one of the most important elements in India's 
foreign policy throughout the 1950’s. India took the lead in attempt­
ing to secure membership for the People's Republic of China in the 
United Nations. In doing so, Prime Minister Nehru must have been 
deeply concerned with the supreme need for peace, particularly in 
Asia, since the only power that might conceivably have wanted to dis­
turb the peace was China, which did have certain long-standing 
irridentist ambitions. India and China signed a trade and intercourse 
agreement in 1954? based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence : 
(1) mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual 
non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in internal affairs, (4) 
equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence.
Edward D'Cruz, India; The Quest for Nationhood (New Delhi: 
Lalvani Publishing House, 1967), p. 189.
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Between 1954- 4nd January, 1957, Chou En-lai visited India four
times and always received a warm welcome. During this period "Hindi
Ghini Bhai-Bhai" ( Indies and Chinese are brothers) was a popular
slogan, and India openly supported China's claim on Formosa and the
offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. India also favored China in the
Korean war crisis as evidenced by its refusal to label North Korea as
an aggressor. India had already recognized the rights of China in Tibet
in 1951 for the sake of establishing friendship and peace in that region.
Although China's general attitude at the time was somewhat imperialistic
and expansionist, she showed a different face to India while she was
busy in Korea. In October, 1954, Chou En-lai said that the friendly
cooperation of the 960,000,000 people of India and China constituted an
2important factor in safeguarding peace in Asia and in the world.
China's attitude toward India changed radically, however, after the 
Tibetan revolt when India gave political asylum to the Dalai Lama.
After the Communist regime gained power in China in October, 
1949, the new Chinese leaders began to disseminate Communist ideology 
in India and to help the Communist forces to grow in strength and 
numbers. Mao Tse-tung sent a message to B. T. Ranadive, the Secretary 
of the Communist Party of India at that time, encouraging him in his 
desire to overthrow the Government of India by force. He expressed the 
hope that, "relying on the brave Communist Party, . . . India would 
not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators," 
and that, "Like free China, a free India would one day emerge in the
2P» C. Chakravarti, India's Chim Policy (Bloomington,
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 61.
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3socialist and people's democratic family." China's obvious intention 
was to become the undisputed leader of Asia. To achieve this leader­
ship Mao Tse-tung stated that, "power grows out of the barrel of a gun,"
and further, that "the world can be organized only by means of the 
4.rifle." As Mr. Paul Martin, the Canadian Secretary of State for Exter­
nal Affairs, said in Parliament, "Mao Tse-tung has pointed out that after 
the first world war, there were 200 million Connnunists and after the 
second 900 million; so he predicts that after the third. Communism will
5take over what remains of the world."
Mao stated on November 18, 1957, in Moscow that,
There are now two winds in the world: the east :jind and the west
wind. There is a saying in China: "If the east wind does not
prevail over the west wind, then the west wind will prevail over 
the east wind. " I think the characteristic of the current 
situation is that the east wind prevails over the west wind; 
that is, the strength of socialism exceeds the strength of 
imperialism. °
China's strategy in southern and southeastern Asia has been 
synonymous to that of post-war Russia in wanting to create satellite 
states around its periphery. The occupation of Tibet was the first step 
toward this goal and served to shift the buffer zone to the Himalayan 
border. Acharya Kripalani prophetically declared that China had
^India. Tibet and China (Bombay: Democratic Research Press,
1959), p. 22.
K. Acharya, India and China: A Brief Survey (New Delhi: 
Information Service of hidia. Government of India, 1965), p. 2.
^India and China: A Brief Survey (New Delhi: Ministry of 
External Affairs, Government of India, 1966), p. 2.
Â. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: Challenge to Amer­
ican Policy (New York: Ifarper and Brothers, I960), pp. 106-107.
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demolished a buffer zone. In international politics, he said, vhen a
buffer state is abolished by a powerful nation, it is considered to
7have aggressive designs on its neighbors. For the first time in his­
tory, China stationed troops along the 3,200 kilometers of India's 
northern frontier and established Chinese air bases in Tibet, thus 
making India's great cities vulnerable to air strikes.
China's propaganda branded India as the "running dog of Merican 
imperialism, " and Nehni as "a liar, a rumor-monger and an apostate to 
Afro Asian solidarity." Peking, convinced that the Indian independence 
movement had fallen under control of the landlord class, was sure of the 
perpetuation of in^erialism and the retention of the ing)erialistic 
economic influence on India. India's acceptance of the American aid 
program and subsequent dependence on American delivery of agricultural 
products and industrial equipment provided further evidence of India's 
attitude in the eyes of Chinese leaders. Ringed by two hostile powers, 
the Soviet Union on the landward side and the United States on its sea­
ward margin. Communist China was concerned with India because of the
8letter's relationship with these powers. In becoming more aggressive 
on its southern border, China seemed to be stressing a deepseated 
feeling of rivalry with India.
In order to challenge the Soviet Ibion for the ideological 
leadership of international Communism, China felt that it had to 
establish itself as an Asian superpower. Its animosity toward India
7John Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations; Hostile 




seems to derive from this ambition, an aspect of which is the border 
conflict. It has been partially successful in reducing Indian influence 
in the border states of Nepal and Bhutan. Marshal Chen Yi admitted that 
Chinese friendship for Pakistan stemmed from the elementary principle
Qthat one should be friendly with the enemies of one's enemies. A chain 
of events followed: border intrusions, the invasion of 1962, open col­
lusion with Pakistan, the ultimatum to India during the India-Pakistan 
war of 1965, the detachment of Nepal from India's sphere of influence, 
anti-Indian propaganda in Sikkim and Bhutan, open siçport and arms 
assistance to the Nagas and Mizos in Assam, and general support of other 
disruptive elements in India. All of these activities seem designed to 
eliminate India as a rival from the Afro-Asian scene and to reestablish
China as a powerful "middle kingdom, " surrounded by tribute-paying,
10barbarous, doctrinal, and politically oriented satellites.
The India-China border conflict, then, is one aspect of the 
deeper contest which will determine whether democracy and freedom will 
survive in Asia or whether Communism and tyranny will hold sway over the 
whole of that continent. If India is humiliated and subsequently de­
stroyed, China will perhaps then not need to use coercion with the 
smaller countries of southern and southeastern Asia in order to make 
them satellite states. If India becomes Communist, this entire area 
will face the sweeping tide and succumb.
^Ministry of External Affairs Report 1966-67 (New Delhi: 
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1967), p. 15*
^̂ P. C. Chakravarti, "Evolution of India's Northern Borders," 




Pakistan, like China, is hostile toward India but with obviously 
different objectives- The story of Indian-Pakistani relations since 
independence has been full of contradictions, suspicion, distrust, frus­
tration, communal fanaticism, and ill will, a continuation of the same 
circumstances that led to partition in India and Pakistan, as
sovereign nations, were conceived in bitterness, and the same mood has 
persisted in both. The independent emergence of Pakistan was the 
result of opposing religious ideologies. Islam is the most important 
element in the concept of Pakistani nationhood, and the religious 
factor has been regarded as essential for the viability of Pakistani 
nationhood. The constitution of Pakistan declares that only a Muslim 
can be the Head of the State, and the state is to be known as the 
"Islamic Republic of Pakistan."
Indian leaders, on the other hand, rejected the concept of the 
two nation theory, that is, that the Hindus were one nation and the 
Muslims were another. Nehru said, "We cannot accept that because once 
we accept that nationality goes by religion, we break up our whole con­
cept of India . . . 35,000,000 Muslims remained in India (after parti- 
12tion)." India's aim is to safeguard its secular character and to 
exclude religion from all questions of politics. Many people in the
S. Ghare, India and Her Neighbors," in India and Her 
Neighbors, ed., by Harnam Singh (Jullundhar City: Book International, 
1967), p. 42.
^^Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia: A Political Analy­
sis (London: Oxford IMversity Press, 1963), p. 207.
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United States, Latin America, and Western Europe think that in India 
there exists religious persecution of the minority communities, i.e., 
the non-Hindus, but in fact there is no discrimination against any 
religious community in India.
Pakistan has continued its hate-India campaign with persistence 
and even fanaticism, and has undertaken to arm itself as fully as pos­
sible. It has received weapons from the United States, Communist China, 
and the Soviet Union, and used them from all three sources during the 
Indo-Pakistani conflict in 196$. Pakistan's military equipment is 
nearly half that of India's, although its population is less than one- 
fourth as great. Moreover, it continues to dwell on the same tune of 
military preparedness. Z. A. Bhutto, the former Foreign Minister of 
Pakistan, declared that if India decided to manufacture the nuclear 
bomb, Pakistan would have to endure every sacrifice in order to make
13its own nuclear weapon, even if the people had to eat grass.
Kashmir is a particularly sore point betwjen the two countries. 
Kashmir, however, is not a cause of conflict but rather the effect of 
it, and, in a sense, the symbol of it. The conflict between the two 
countries is basically a conflict of ideology, but also a conflict of 
power. Z. A. Bhutto said in November, 1962, that even if the Kashmir 
issue were settled amicably his country would not join India against
14China. In amazingly blatant fashion, Pakistan is getting help from 
13Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis (New 
York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 209.
K. Nehru, India-Pakistan Relations (Washington, D. 0.: 
Information Service of India, Embassy of India, 196$), p. 19.
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two ideological enemies, the United States and Communist China, for the 
purpose of confronting India with military strength.
Apart from Kashmir, other problems which have troubled the 
relations of India and Pakistan are those of migration, refugees, evac­
uee property, communal disturbances, economic relations, boundary 
uncertainties, and water disputes. Nearly 10,000,000 people migrated 
across the borders of India and Pakistan during the first few weeks fol­
lowing partition. Approximately 4,000,000 people crossed from East 
Pakistan into West Bengal during the first three years of independence.
A particularly troublesome problem has been the continued illegal migra­
tion of Muslims into A s s a m . D u e  to Pakistan's theocratic state 
objectives, Hindus and other non-Muslim minorities are migrating in 
great numbers to India. "India's main concern is that progressive 
Islami-zation of Pakistan is reducing the non-Muslims to the status of 
half citizens.
One important agreement which was finalized between India and 
Pakistan was the "Indus Water Treaty of September 19, I960." This treaty 
assigned three upper tributaries of the Indus River, the Ravi, the Beas, 
and the Sutlej, to India for its exclusive use, whereas the waters of 
three other tributaries, the Jhelum, the %per Indus, and the Chenab, 
were assigned to Pakistan. On the other hand, a number of other prob­
lems have not been settled, including the recent controversy over the
^%orman D. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy (New 
York; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 219.
^^Jyoti Bhusan Das Giçta, Indo-Pakistani Relations (Amsterdam: 
Uitgeverij De Brug-Djambatan, 1958), p. 4»
265
Farakka Barrage. During the last 100 years or so the Ganges has flowed 
more and more through its eastern arm, the Padma, now in East Pakistan.
As a result, the water available to the Hooghly from the Ganges has been 
drastically reduced and even that is maintained only three months 
during the flood season. The Farakka barrage consists of a dam across 
the Ganges at Farakka with a rail-cum-road over it, a feeder canal 
linking the Ganges with the Bhagirathi, and a small barrage across the 
Bhagirathi, igstream of the outfall of the feeder canal into the 
Bhagirathi and to increase the fresh water stçply into the Hooghly as 
well as to reduce the silting of the Calcutta port. The question has 
also been raised before the Bengal Boundary Commission as to whether the 
Hooghly River should be kept under the exclusive control of the state 
of West Bengal. Although this scheme is nearly 100 years old, Pakistan 
is raising several objections to the present construction and expects to 
gain positive results from her protests.
India has been continuously exploring ways and means to restore 
normal relations with Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, has refused 
several Indian offers to sign a non-aggression pact. It has rudely 
rejected all such offers and, according to Indian government records, 
has committed 620 cease-fire violations of the Tashkent agreement reached 
on January 10, 1966, following the military skirmishes in the Eann of 
Kutch and on the India-West Pakistan boundary.
India’s primary concern should be to wean Pakistan away from 
Chinese influence and establish friendship in the region. As Nehru said, 
"A weak Pakistan is a perpetual threat to us."^? It seems that India
17V. G. Kieman, "India and Pakistan; Twenty Years After," 
Mainstream, V, No. 19 (January 7, 1967), 28.
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and Pakistan for a time, at least, will have to learn to live with each
other as less than friendly neighbors, although geography and history
*1Ôdeem them to live side by side like Siamese twins.
India and Nepal
Nepal has traditionally been closer to India than to any other 
country in the world. Several factors are responsible for keeping their 
relations friendly. In addition to geographical factors, social, his­
torical, cultural, political, and communication links tie India and 
Nepal so closely together that their destinies have been intermingled 
from time immemorial. Nepal and India are not separated by a physical 
barrier. The main Himalayan watershed lies along the northern boundary 
of Nepal. Nepal is the only officially Hindu state in the world, and 
Hinduism is obviously its dominant religion. Gorkhali, the official 
language, is a descendant of Sanskrit and is written in Davanagari 
script, as is Hindi, which is universally understood in Nepal.
In view of geographical, ethnological, cultural, and historical 
ties and the fast changing spectrum of politics in the world, particu^ • 
larly in Asia, Nepal's significance to India has increased. Nepal's 
strategic location, literally sandwiched between democratic India and 
Communist China, has caused it to become part of the free world's first 
line of defense against Communist expansion. China's main interest is 
to check such expansion and strengthen its own defense. After the 
Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1954- and intrusion into Indian territory
K. Padamnabhan, "Dido-Pakistani Relations," Swar.lva, XII, 
No. 12 (November 11, 1967), 16.
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in 1962, India's security and stability became linked to that of Nepal. 
The defense of India and Nepal is so closely knit together that one can
19ignore the other only at its own peril. If China overran Nepal, it 
would be catastrophic for the northern, western and eastern states of 
India; therefore, for strategic and political reasons, India and Nepal 
should maintain a mutually beneficial close relationship.
Relations between India and Nepal based on the 1925 Treaty of 
Sagauli have been cordial. After Indian independence, India and Nepal 
signed two additional treaties. The first signed on July 31, 1950, was 
a treaty of peace and friendship. A secret clause, which was made 
public in 1959, stated that any aggression against Nepal would be con­
sidered as aggression against India and would be dealt with accordingly. 
The second of the two latter treaties, signed in October, 1950, dealt 
with trade and guaranteed free transit through India for goods destined 
for Nepal, as well as for goods moving from Nepal to India.
India played a significant role in 1950-51 in curbing the 
Nepalese revolt against the Rana regime and in negotiating the terms of 
peace. It recognized the king of Nepal as the head of state, and thus 
King Tribhuvan and his successor felt obliged to India for their rise 
in power. Nepal's king also found in India his dream of progressive 
democracy and admired Indian respect for human dignity. From the very
beginning of Indian independence the New Delhi government was committed
20to the policy of supporting the cause of nationalism in Nepal.
^̂ The Eastern Economist, XXXVIII, No. 16 (April 20, 1962), 1007.
N. Mehrish, "India and Nepal," in India and Her Neighbors, 
ed., by Harman Singh (Jullundhar City; Book International, 1967), p. 35.
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Relations remained cordial until 1959, but a misunderstanding and 
Chinese intervention caused relations between India and Nepal to 
become strained in the period from 1959-1963. In 1960 King Mahendra 
dismissed his cabinet, banned all political activities, and assumed 
direct control of the government without consulting Indian authorities. 
Moreover, strong opposition was organized within India by the dismissed 
politicians who supported armed raids across the border into Nepal.
King Mahendra protested to the Indian government, and simultaneously 
cultivated Nepal’s relations with China.
It was in the interest of Chinese expansionism that the states 
bordering India, particularly Nepal, should turn against India. On 
January 24, 1967, Chou En-lai told a gathering in Katmandu that Nepal 
and China were blood brothers and nothing could poison this relation­
ship. On October 5, 1961, a Sino-Nepalese boundary treaty was signed, 
with a corollary treaty for constructing a highway from Katmandu to 
Lhasa. India feels that this highway project is a potential threat to 
its security. Further Chinese tactics included the granting of a loan 
to Nepal for economic development and the distribution of tons of cheap 
literature portraying China’s siç)erior achievements and India’s rela­
tively poor performance. Communist propaganda has increased steadily 
in Nepal. It is significant to note that the Nepalese Communists are 
overly anti-Indian and have attempted to foster Communist China’s
P1George L. Harris and Others, Ü. S. Army Area Handbook for 
Nepal (with Sikkim and Bhutan) (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1965), p. 193.
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22expansion south of the Himalayas. Nepal's strict neutrality during 
the Chinese invasion of India proved that China had already done 
considerable harm to the Indian position there.
About the beginning of 1963, Nepal's relations with India began 
to show significant improvement, and many ranking officials exchanged 
visits. India helped Nepal in a number of economic projects including 
the building of roads (the Tribhuvan Raj Path east-west highway), irri­
gation projects, power lines, educational establishments, domestic water 
schemes, agricultural assistance, veterinary services, and airport 
facilities. By March, 1967, India had spent about Rs. 500,000,000 in 
the kingdom and pledged another Rs. 400,000,000 for development in the 
nert five years. Using this aid Nepal has conçleted 99 aid projects.
Nepal now buys almost all of such basic products as cloth, salt, and
23kerosene from India. Moreover, more than 90 per cent of Nepal's 
foreign trade is controlled by the Indian business community. The 
Indian government aid is intended to build a shield to keep the Chinese 
north of the Himalayas. Happily the traditional policy of friendship 
between India and Nepal has been reaffirmed and is growing stronger daily.
India and Sikkim 
India is currently paying great attention to the welfare of the 
protectorate of Sikkim. Progress in development is greater in Sikkim
P. Karan and W. M. Jenkins, Jr., The Himalayan Kingdoms; 
Bhutmi. Sikkim, and Nepal (Princeton, New Jersey; D. Van Nostrand, Inc., 
1963), p. 118.
^^Girilal Jain, India Meets China in Nepal (Bombay; Asia 
Publishing House, 1959), p. 87.
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than in the neighboring protectorate of Bhutan. India sponsored the 
first seven year development plan (1954-61) of Sikkim with an outright 
grant of Rs. 32,500,154 ($4,333,020). Sikkim's five year plan of 
1961-66 which followed involved an expenditure of Rs. #1,300,000 
($10,840,000) by the Government of India. This Indian assistance 
increased the revenue of Sikkim ten-fold. In economic development 
Sikkim has gone far ahead of her neighbors as a result of Indian assis­
tance over the last 15 years. Sikkim's per capita income is now more
than twice that of India, about Rs. 700.00 (about $93*00) compared to
0/
India's Rs. 320.00 (about $42.00) per year. Sikkim's development 
plans are an experiment in democratic partnership between the two 
countries. Roads are being built to protect Sikkim from the Chinese 
threat.
The close political relationships between India and Sikkim date 
from March 28, I86I, when a treaty was signed in which Sikkim became a 
protectorate of British India. This treaty was of great political sig­
nificance since it gave full control of the kingdom to British India 
and consequently to the Indian Union in succession. Relations between 
India and Sikkim were reaffirmed on December 5, 1950, in a new treaty, 
the main provisions of which follow:
Sikkim shall continue to be a protectorate of India, and, subject 
to the provisions of this Treaty, shall enjoy autonomy in regard 
to its internal affairs.
The Government of India will be responsible for the defense and 
the territorial integrity of Sikkim. It shall have the right
0/'•■"Sikkim's Ruler on Need to Review Treaty with India," Asian 
Recorder. XIII, No. 25 (June 24-28, 1967), 7755.
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to take such measures as it considers necessary for the defense 
of Sikkim or the security of India, whether preparatory or 
otherwise, and whether within or outside Sikkim. In particular, 
the Government of India shall have the right to station troops 
anywhere within Sikkim.
The external relations of Sikkim, whether political, economic, 
or financial, shall be conducted and regulated solely by 
the Government of India j and the Government of Sikkim shall 
have no dealings with any foreign power. ^
This treaty does not contain any provision for further revision in the
near future.
There seems to be relatively little desire in Sikkim for 
independent status, and even the Maharaj Kumar (present king) is not 
eager for a parliamentary government. Moreover, there can be no pos­
sibility of full independence for Sikkim, since the tiny principality 
is not capable of standing on its own feet politically, economically, 
or militarily.
India and Bhutan
Bhutan's location between the rich Assam-Bengal plain of 
India and the Communist-occiqiied Tibetan plateau gives the kingdom con­
siderable geopolitical significance.India is helping Bhutan in its 
economic development partly for strategic reasons but also because 
Bhutan is backward and needs developmental facilities. Providing for 
approximately AjOOO Tibetan refugees has put a real strain on the 
economy of the little kingdom. The Bhutanese budget is prepared and
Sikkim (New Delhi: Government of India Publication, Govern­
ment Printing Press, 1966), p. 3»
2fi
p. p. Karan, "Geopolitical Structure of Bhutan," India 
Quarterly. XIX, No. 3 (July, 1963), 203.
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largely supported by the Indian government. The annual civil and 
military expenses of the kingdom ere about $8,000,000 of which only one- 
eighth is raised by Bhutan, The five-year plan (1961-66) calling for an 
outlay of Rs, 180,000,000 ($24-,000,000) was financed by India, Besides 
the development grant, Indian economic aid has totalled nearly $3,740,000 
annually in recent years, . Virtually all Bhutanese imports come from 
India.
India is actively helping Bhutan to develop a modem 
transportation and communications network. It is connecting the two 
countries with four north-south highways, one at the Bengal border and 
three along the Assam border. This Indian highway building program is 
designed to link Bhutan firmly with India and to improve communications 
within Bhutan itself. Air service has been introduced from Bashirara 
in West Bengal to Paro in Bhutan,
India's political association with Bhutan is more intimate than 
that with Nepal, In 1910, under the Treaty of Punakha, Bhutan accepted 
the guidance of the British government in foreign affairs, A new treaty 
was signed between the Government of India and Bhutan in 1949 which 
states that.
The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference 
in the internal administration of Bhutan, On its part the 
Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the 
Government of India in regard to its foreign relations.
Bhutanese citizens cannot leave the country without permission from the
Reserve Bank of India. This provision virtually gives India full control
^^Dev Murarka, "Isolated Bhutan," Eastern World, XV (May, 1961),
13.
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over Bhutan's international relations. India as a matter of general 
policy has discouraged Bhutan from developing any direct relations with 
foreign countries which might bring it into power politics and deter 
its guided progress towards social, economic, and political stability.
In 1963 Communist China asked to negotiate a boundary dispute directly 
with the Maharaja of Bhutan, but the Maharaja ignored the request and 
informed the Indian government which promptly advised the Maharaja not 
to negotiate directly. India also protested to Peking these diplomatic 
initiatives of the Chinese government.
Finally, although there is no defense agreement between India 
and Bhutan, the Indian government has declared time and again that an 
attack on Bhutan would be an attack on India. The Maharaja has also 
emphasized that India has every right to conduct Bhutan's foreign rela-
28tions eind to undertake its defense in case of external aggression. He 
declared in 1967 that the friendship between India and Bhutan should 
continue for generations to come. Such friendship is obviously in the 
interest of both countries.
The friendship of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan is very important 
for the security of India and for the survival of these kingdoms as 
separate political entities. Indian attitudes are also changing toward 
helping these kingdoms, and more and more aid is being extended to them. 
It is clearly desirable, therefore, for these kingdoms to follow their 
present policy of alignment with India, The alignment is also highly
^̂ Ibid.. p. U.
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useful to India in its larger plans for defending its northern 
perimeter.
India and Burma
Relations between India and Burma have remained friendly since 
the two nations gained independence shortly after World War II. The 
only serious conflict which has arisen between them concerned the mass 
emigration of thousands of Indians from Burma after 1962 consequent 
upon Burma's nationalization of the shops. The laws of nationalization 
were so designed that no foreigner could work in Burma, remove his accumu­
lated capital, or even stay in the country. In July, 1964, about 2,000 
Indians per week were leaving Burma. Since 1947, the Indian population 
in Burma has failed from 1,000,000 to 500,00.^9 some Indians were 
citizens of Burma and, besides, it was hard to throw all the Indians 
out of Burma. Burma, however, has actively cooperated with India in 
sealing its border against the illegal entry of rebellious groups such 
as the Mizo and Naga tribesmen. The boundary agreements signed on 
March 10, 1968, provide for boundary demarcation. During the past year 
or two relations between India and Burma have been better than ever 
before, and prospects for continued friendly relations look hopeful,
India and Ceylon
In spite of their respective differences about certain problems 
of emigration, India and Ceylon have had the closest of relations since 
the independence of both countries. Historic and cultural ties between
^^Richard L. Park, "India's Foreign Policy, 1964-68," Current 
History. LIV, No. 320 (April, 1968), 205.
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the two countries have been strong for at least the last 2,500 years.
India has exerted a profound influence on Ceylon in matters of religion, 
as both Buddhism and Hinduism spread there from India. Similarly, as 
regards language and literature, the Sinhalese language belongs to the 
Indo-European group and is related to Gujarati, Marathi, Bengali, and 
Hindustani. The Tamil language came to Ceylon from Madras or Tamilnadu, 
and Ceylonese art and architecture, as for instance the Buddhist temple 
styles, have their Indian equivalent. Buddhism has perhaps been the 
most important factor in the development of close bonds between the two 
peoples. The Panch Sheel adopted by Jawaharlal Nehru is reminiscent of 
the Buddha's five principles. Ceylon's geographical proximity to India 
has always had a powerful influence on its history.
The attitude of independent Ceylon's administrators towards
India has changed from time to time depending upon circumstances and
current issues. During the period from 194-8 to 1956, Ceylon adopted a
posture of political aloofness towards India. The desire to overlook
differences and promote neighborliness was a characteristic feature of
the policy of both countries during the period of the two Bandaranaike
administrations (1956-65) and more especially during that of Solomon
30Bandaranaike (1956-59). Several cultural, economic, religious, athletic, 
and scholastic exchanges were organized. Both countries thought alike 
and cooperated on Asian as well as world problems at the Colombo and 
Bandung conferences of the Afro-Asian nations and during the Suez crisis, 
the Congo emergency, and the conquest of Goa. Both India and Ceylon
30S. Ü. Kodikara, Indo-Ceylon Relations Since Independence 
(Colombo; The Ceylon Institute of World Affairs, 1965), p. 50.
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were sponsors of the Belgrade conference of non-aligned nations in 
September, 1961. Mr. Bandaranaike always considered India a friendly 
power and did not envisage her in any sense as a political threat.
Mrs. Bandaranaike, who succeeded her husband as Ceylonese
Prime Minister after his assassination, also took an active interest in
political affairs and played the role of peacemaker in the Sino-Indian
conflict of 1962. She wrote to Nehru that India should not prejudice
its territorial, integrity or self-respect by submitting to negotiations
31under pressure of armed force. At the same time, Ceylon refused to 
name China as the aggressor or to publicly support India. It is sig­
nificant to note that by 1962 Ceylon and China had developed good trade 
relations, and that the Prime Minister did not want to rupture those 
relations by branding China as an aggressor. Most of the Ceylonese 
political parties except the Communist Party, however, supported India 
during the 1962 crisis. Along with numerous Tamils, many Sinhalese 
volunteered to fight for India. Likewise, most of the Ceylonese news­
papers supported India's case.
There have been some blots on the record of good relations 
between India and Ceylon, such as Ceylonese objections to the presence 
of the large number of Tamils in Ceylon, the dispute over the Kachcha 
Thivu island, the unilateral extension of India's territorial waters 
and fishing limits, and the Radio Ceylon controversy. Of 1,187,059 
Indian residents in Ceylon approximately 26,829 are Indian citizens, 
13A)236 are registered citizens of Ceylon, anà 1,029,994 are stateless 
persons. About 130,778 Indian nationals had left Ceylon either
^^The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), November 5, 1962, p. 1.
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volimtarily or because of non-renewal of their visas up to the end of
April, 1967. Although the emigration of unskilled workers from India
to Ceylon was completely banned in Axjgust, 1939, quite a few Indians,
particularly from the districts of Madura, Trichinopoly, Tanjore, Salem,
Coimbatore, Tennevilli, and Ramnad of Madras Presidency have managed
32to enter Ceylon illegally. The Indo-Ceylonese Agreement of October, 
1964, largely resolved this issue. At the time there were nearly
975 ,000  stateless Indians in Ceylon, of whom 525,000 were to be granted 
Indian citizenship and 300,000 were to be granted Ceylonese citizenship 
during the next 15 years, leaving the future citizenship of 150,000 
other Indian immigrants subject to a separate future agreement. Under 
the 1964 arrangement, many families have been separated, and new 
questions have been raised concerning possible large scale repatriation 
to India.
A rather serious disagreement arose over the extension of the 
territorial water limits by India on September 30, 1967. Ceylon 
resented India's unilateral decision to extend the limit of its terri­
torial waters to 12 miles, because this extension would affect the 
Ceylonese claim to the island of Kachcha Thivu. India at the same time 
claimed jurisdiction over a contiguous zone of 100 nautical miles from 
the outer limit of its territorial waters for the purpose of protecting 
its fisheries and other resources. Ceylon resented this move and 
extended its fishing rights to 100 miles beyond its territorial waters. 
Radio Ceylon, which is very popular for its music and commercial
32P. R. Ramchandra Rao, India and Her Neighbors; India and 
Ceylon (Bombay; Oriental Longnans Ltd., 1954), p. 33.
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advertising, has restricted Indian advertising and, as a result, 
commercial revenue has declined. The Government of Ceylon itself 
imposed additional restrictions on Indian advertising in March, 1958. 
Despite some disagreements, however, Ceylon and India have generally had 
a close rapport with each other, culturally, economically, and politi­
cally, and these cordial and even intimate relations will surely endure.
Relations with Other Countries 
India since gaining its sovereignty in 194-7 has adhered to the 
principle of non-alignment and so has remained independent and free of 
the major power blocs, while at the same time cooperating with all other 
countries in ways that seem essential to preserve peace and freedom in 
the world. India has tried hard to maintain friendly relations with 
all the major powers, particularly wd.th the United States, since its 
democratic ideology is similar to that of India.
'India and the United States
Relations between the United States and India have remained
friendly since independence, although there have been occasions when
friction has developed between them. Cordiality reached a low point
in 1951; just before Chester Bowles was sent as Ambassador to India,
after which relations inproved somewhat.
During 1951-52, the United States sponsored a resolution on
33Kashmir in the United Nations which was strongly opposed by India.
Even stronger Indian resentment toward American policy occurred during
33Norman D. Palmer, "South Asia and United States Policy, " 
op. cit., p. 17.
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the spring of 1954 when the Tfeited States granted military assistance 
to Pakistan and sponsored the membership of Pakistan in the SEATO and 
CENTO military alliances. Indians realized that Pakistan could very 
well use the American arms delivered under terms of these pacts against 
India. Official and unofficial American views on Kashmir, because of 
the Muslim majority there, have always been more sympathetic to Pakistan 
than to India. The votes and speeches of the American representatives 
in the Security Council on the Kashmir issue clearly demonstrate this 
attitude.
During 1955-61, because of the developing Sino-Indian crisis, 
relations between India and the United States improved, and under the 
Kennedy administration which followed became very cordial. The only 
exception during this period was when the Ihited States supported Por­
tugal and condemned India in the Goa affair of 1961. The United States 
press and public became more critical of India's policy of non-alignment, 
non-violence, and peaceful co-existence after the Goan crisis.
Lido-American relations inçroved again after the Chinese 
invasion of 1962, when the United States came quickly to India's aid 
with arms delivered pronçtly without any pre-conditions. The United 
States also at this time recognized the McMahon Line as the boundary 
between India and China. Indians were deeply in^ressed by this honest 
support. Naturally the American aid to India was criticized by Pakistan. 
Many Americans believe that mere economic aid to India is insufficient, 
and that the area must become militarily strong to forestall subversion 
and potential aggression.
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I'lisunderstanding about some American-sponsored projects in 
India brought resentment among the Indian people. Many Indian people 
disapproved the establishment of a Voice of America radio station on 
Indian soil. They contended that the broadcasts of this station might 
create friction between the blocs and thus bring the cold war directly 
onto Indian soil. They also feared that the Americans would simply 
use the station for propaganda purposes.
India tried to get financial aid from the United States for 
construction of a fourth steel plant (Bokaro), but after a frustrating 
delay â  grant of $350,000,000 for this project was provided by the 
Soviet Union on May 1, 19&4« On the whole, however, American aid has 
had a profoundly beneficial effect on the Indian economy. There are 
approximately 200 economic assistance agreements between the United
O/
States government and the Indian government or Indian private firms.
At least 600; private United States firms and institutions are engaged
in India's economic and academic development programs. During the
fiscal year ending Juhej 1968, the total value of United States eco:-
nomic aid to India was around $690,000,000 including $615,000,000 in
loans ultimately repayable to the United States. These! loans and aid
excluded the grain supplied under Public Law 480. Altogether the United
States had provided India with about $8,000,000,000 in aid, in both
grants and loans, over the past twenty years, including millions of tons 
35of food grains. Nevertheless, the per capita economic aid to Pakistan
34-itindo-U. S. Cooperation," India's Development and Economic Aid 
(New Delhi; Embassy of the United States of America, 1966), p. 7.
^^Richard L. Park, "India's Foreign Policy, 1964-68," op. cit..
p. 244»
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is substantially greater than that furnished to India. As Thomas E.
Dow, Jr., puts it, "Our general aid to India over the entire 20 yeras 
of independence has cost us less than has four months of the Vietnam 
war, and has been much less than our per capita aid to other smaller 
Asian nations.
Currently, relations between India and the United States are
cordial. Cultural and educational contacts have increased tremendously
in recent years. There are nearly 72,000 Indian citizens in the United
States, including large numbers of students and professional people.
The Agency for International Development, Peace Corps, teacher exchange,
farmer exchange, technical assistance, and other government and private
programs are bringing better understanding between the two countries
and are producing worthwhile results. Mr. Chester Bowles wrote on
April 26, 1967, in the American Reporter that the United States believed
that a free and independent India, politically strong and economically
viable, with a vigorous and independent foreign policy, has a major role 
37to play in Asia. Thus with the friendly cooperation of both the 
countries, India can maintain its democratic ideals, and the internal 
and external Communist threat can be avoided.
India and the Soviet Union 
Ihdo-Soviet relations have improved markedly since 1953, 
although there have been some differences of opinion on international
^̂ Thomas E. Dow, Jr., op. cit., p. 2̂ 2.
37"The Moving Fingers," Eastern Economist, XLVIII, No. 18 
(May 5, 1967), 881.
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matters. The main points of difference have been the Soviet suppression 
of Hungarian nationalism in 1956, the unilateral resumption of nuclear 
testing in the atmosphere by the Soviet Union in 1961, and Soviet oppo­
sition to the contribution of India to the United Nations peacemaking 
force in the Congo., Although the people and the press of India suppor­
ted Czechoslovakia, the Government of India remained silent in the face of 
the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia of August, 1968. On the other 
hand, the Soviet Union strongly supported India on Kashmir and Goa, and 
changed its position from a pro-Chinese stand to a line of neutrality 
concerning Chinese-Indian disagreements in 1959. Somewhat surprisingly, 
Moscow did not criticize India when the latter received armaments from 
the United States during the 1962 Indo-Chinese conflict. In August,
1962, India entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union for the 
manufacture of supersonic aircraft engines, thus beginning a partial 
reliance on the Soviet Union for arms. Russia also helped India to 
build a MIG-21 factory and two giant steel plants at Bhilai in Madhya 
Pradesh and Bokaro in Bihar. It built oil refineries for India and 
assisted with petroleum exploration. Another project was the equipping 
of a large mechanized farm at Suratgarh (Rajasthan), said to be the only 
one of its kind in Asia. Recently the Soviet government agreed to estab­
lish eight more farms of the same kind in different parts of India. 
Economic aid extended to India by the Soviet Union totalled $1,022,000,000 
by the end of 1965. The Soviet Union has provided India with more eco­
nomic aid than it has furnished to any other non-Communist country. Other 
Communist countries have provided an additional $230,000,000.^^ The
38Leo Tansky, ÏÏ. S. and U. S. S. R. M d  to India. Turkey, and 
U.A.R. (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 106.
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.Soviet aid was largely confined to assistance in the industrialization 
of India. For cultivation of cultural relations, the Soviet Union 
has established centers for the study of Indian languages in Tashkent, 
Moscow, and Leningrad. Recently two Russian schools were named for 
Mahatama Gandhi and Lai Bahadur Shastri.
Following Nehru's death, Lai Bahadur Shastri and Mrs. Indira 
Ghandi continued to pursue Nehru" - non-alignment policy in reference to 
the Soviet Union and the United States. India's stand on Vietnam he,s 
followed a similar line to that of the Soviet Union, although it has 
not supplied war material to the Hanoi government. On the other hand, 
it has sent social workers to South Vietnam. The United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union worked hard to end the fighting 
between India and Pakistan in 1965- A major factor in Soviet caleula-
39tions was concern that the Chinese might intervene on Pakistan's side, 
which in a way China, did through its ultimatum to India. While trying 
to encourage a peaceful settlement, the Soviet Union continued regular 
military aid to India during the Indo-Pakistani conflict. When 
Premier Kosygin brought Ayub and Shastri to a conference table in 
Tashkent in 1966, it was the first time that the Soviet Union had 
mediated a dispute between two non-Communist nations.
Recently there has been strong criticism by the Indian press 
and public of the Soviet Union's decision to supply arms to Pakistan.
The United States and the Soviet Union are both unhappy about India's 
unwillingness to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. India feels
^^Arthur Stein, "India and the USSR: The Post Nehru Period," 
Asian Survey. VII, No. 2 (March, 1967), 171.
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that her security is endangered by the recent atomic and hydrogen bomb 
tests conducted by the People's Republic of China. India will probably 
refuse to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as long as China 
is not a party to the agreement.
India and the United Kingdom 
India is a founding member of the postwar Commonwealth, but in 
all sections in India there is great resentment towards continuing mem­
bership in this organization. Britain has always supported Pakistan on 
the Kashmir issue against India, and openly supported Portugal üi the 
case of Goa. Persistent British influence on the Indian administrative 
structure, Britain's legalistic stand on the South African racial 
question, the British effort to join the European Common Market, and 
the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 which restricted the tradi­
tional right of Commonwealth citizens to emigrate to Britain are 
further causes of resentment in India. The Indian governments seems 
to be unwilling to leave the Commonwealth, however, because through the 
Commonwealth it retains friendship and remains in communication with 
other Commonwealth countries.
The People of Indian Origin Abroad 
Many Indians emigrated to other countries in the nineteenth and 
the early part of the twentieth centures. The heaviest concentrations 
of Indians are in Ceylon, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, the Fiji Islands, 
Mauritius, Malagasy, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, the Republic of South 
Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana, Surinam, Canada, and the 




Persons of Indian 
Origin & Citizens 
of India
Name of Country
Persons of Indian 
Origin & Citizens 
of India
Aden 16,000 to 17,000 France 310*
Afghanistan 21,800 Germany (Federal Republic) 5,500
Algeria 196 Ghana 1,309
Argentina 214. Greece 16*
Australia U,378 Guyana 338,000 r
Austria 109 Hungary 44
Bahrain 5,000 Indonesia 25,000
Belginm 303* Iran 1,145
Bolivia 2* Ireland 384
Brazil 50* Iraq 1,500
Bulgaria 5* Italy 350
Burma 275,139 Japan 975
Cambodia 370 Jordan 21
Canada 28,534. Kuwait 12,000
Ceylon 1,187,059 Laos 620
Chile 66 Lebanon 306
China 99 Liberia 100*
Colombia 2 + ten families Libya 299*
Congo 2,016 Malagasy 17,710
Cuba 28 Malawi 10,800
Czechoslovakia 104. Malaysia 808,000Denmark 102 Malta 106
Ethiopia 4., 025 Mauritius 500,000Finland 40 Mexico 26
Fiji Islands 228,200 Morocco 500
ÎO
* These figures are in respect of Citizens of India only.
TABLE 18— (Continued)
Persons of Indian Persons of Indian
Name of Country Origin & Citizens Name of Country Origin & Citizens
of India of India
Nepal 3,000,000 Switzerland 305*
Netherland 156 Syria 85
New Zeeland 5,000 Tanzania 88,000
Norway 29 Thailand 15,000
Nigeria 2,051 Trinidad and Tobago 342,154
Panama 362 Jamaica 30,000
Phillippines 1,885 Turkey 62*
Poland 95 U.A.R. 452*
Portuguese East Africa 2,200 Uganda 80,000
Peru 7 U.K. 160,000
Rumania 3 U.S.A. 19,682
Saudi Arabia 2,000 U.S.S.R. 627
Senegal 568 Venezuela 12*
Sierre-Leone 200-250* Vietnam (North) One Family
Spain 2,307 Vietnam (South) 1,895
Sudan 2,555 Yugoslavia 102
Somalia 1,960* Yemen 12*
Surinam 93,000 Republic of Zambia 7,000
Sweden 255
K
^hese figures are in respect of Citizens of India only.
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Indians abroad continue to look to the Government of India for 
protection of their civil rights and liberties in these foreign countries. 
Even after the third and fourth generations, the emigrants live like 
Indians, their behavior and philosophical outlook are Indian, and they 
are faithful to India. The overseas Indians have developed an India- 
away-from-home attitude wherever they have settled. During the 1962 
Chinese invasion and the 1965 Ihdia-Pakistan conflict, overseas Indians 
contributed economic aid and moral support to India. They often revisit 
their homeland, and the newly established republics where many of them 
reside exchange political and cultural ideas with the Government of 
India. Some of these countries treat Indians as stateless citizens, 
however, and discriminatory treatment abounds. Ceylon, Burma, Malaysia, 
and Singapore are some of the countries where,discrimination exists, but 
the Indian government is negotiating special arrangements for settling 
the stateless persons problem.
The most acute problems concerning overseas Indians have arisen 
in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and the Republic of South Africa. In Keyna 
there are nearly 180,000 Indians anxious for Africanization. Kenya 
has introduced a new immigration bill, providing for the abolition of 
the erstwhile passes and work permits for non-citizens.̂ '̂  Nearly
130,000 Indians now have to apply for work permits. India has closed 
the door to these Indian citizens, but nearly 50,000 are expected to 
leave Kenya within the next five years. Many of them have been trying 
to relocate in Britain.
•̂ "̂Back to Motherland," Commerce. CX7, No. 294-3 (October 7, 
1967), 792.
288
India has had a bitter quarrel with the Republic of South Africa 
where racial discrimination is at its height. Racial discrimination 
against Indians exists in South Africa in every walk of life and in the 
worst possible form. The Group Area Act passed in 1950, which imposed 
segregation and a series of other restrictions on the negro: majority 
and various foreign minorities has been fully implemented. By this Act 
no one could live, acquire property, or conduct his own business in any 
area except one designated for his own racial group. The Indian citizens 
of South Africa have been denied some of the most important rights of 
citizenship. The wives of these citizens have been denied entry into 
South Africa, and the South African government has persistently ignored 
numerous resolutions passed by the United Nations urging it to abandon 
its discriminatory policies against different racial groups. India and 
Pakistan simultaneously protested against this discrimination. South 
Africa withdrew itself from the Commonwealth in 1961 rather than yield 
on its apart hied policy.
In conclusion, India's relationships with her neighbors and 
with the major power blocs are very iniportant to her own survival as a 
democratic nation and to the general political stability of southeast 
Asia. Confronting two hostile neighbors with contrasting ideologies, 
India has had to rely to some extent upon both the Communist and non- 
Communist power blocs in order to maintain its own prestige, ideology, 
and national image. The power blocs directly affect India's economic 
prospects, since the United States and the Soviet Union are siçplying
^^The Times of India Directory (Year Book) (Bombay; Times of 
India Press, 1967), 115.
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considerable economic aid for her development projects. Both of these 
superpowers have actively interfered in the case of international 
disputes between India and her neighbors. For example, the United 
States warned India and Pakistan to accept a cease-fire immediately 
when both were fighting an undeclared war in 1965- It was the Soviet 
Union which brought the two belligerents to a conference table in Tash­
kent in 1966. Military aid furnished by the United States and the Soviet 
Union to India to assist her in resisting Communist Chinese expansion is 
indispensable to Indian security. A policy of non-alignment is a dif­




This study of the political geography of India necessitated 
tracing the various political, economic, cultural, and geographical 
patterns since independence. It discussed several important aspects of 
the political geography of the Indian nation, such as the effects of the 
physical and cultural environment and the unequal distribution of 
resources on the changing internal map of India, as well as on voting 
behavior, external boundary problems, and international relations. 
Effects of environmental conditions on the internal stability, the 
economic and political viability, the survival of India as a democratic 
nation, and the maintenance of peace in the region have been appraised.
The four major physical divisions which have affected India's 
internal and external political relationships through its history are:
(1) the Himalayas, (2) the Gangetic Plain, (3) the southern plateau, 
and (4) the western and eastern coastal plains. The Himalayan ranges 
isolate India from central Asia. They are a linguistic and cultural 
divide as well as a catchment area for the perennial rivers of the north. 
The mountains, while not penetrable in earlier times, facilitated the 
stability and peace of south Asia since antiquity. Recent developments 
in air power and missile systems, however, have threatened the peace
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and posed questions as to the future efficacy of the Himalayas as a 
natural barrier. The Chinese invasion of 1962 demonstrated what 
modem military equipment can do in difficult terrain and refuted the 
false sense of security, a kind of Maginot Line mentality of the Indian 
people.
In contrast to the Himalayas, which have mainly served a 
separating function, the Gangetic Plain is a center of power with a 
concentration of population, and a capacity for assimilation which 
favors the unity of the nation. Altered political patterns in the 
northern plain brought instability in governmental machinery after the 
1967 elections.
The southern plateau has among its advantages well developed 
resources and the fertile black lava soil of the Deccan which supports 
a strong commercial agriculture. The higher revenue and foreign 
exchange earned through the sale of minerals and commercial crops has 
developed in the plateau a sense of opposition towards the ruling Con­
gress Party. State political leaders in the region would like to have 
access to foreign exchange earned for the development of their own 
state. The inability of the national government to supply the quantity 
and type of food grains desired has motivated changing the local 
allegiance to the opposition parties.
The coastal plains are also characterized by commercial 
agriculture, and the sale of products like cashew nuts, spices, and 
coir brings in foreign exchange earnings that are relatively higher than 
those earned by other states of India. Each of the states wants more 
attention given to its internal development and hence has tended to
292
oppose the ruling Congress Party which has had to look out for the 
appropriate developmental needs of the whole nation.
A variety of climatic influences have affected the strategic 
situation of India, its internal unity or disunity, its economic via­
bility, and its regional diversity. Many of the nation’s political 
problems can be related to the eccentricities of seasonal winds and 
rainfall rhythms. These phenomenon have created floods, droughts, re­
gional shortages of food, and conflicts concerning the distribution of 
river and canal waters. Less directly, climatic conditions have 
influenced the problems relating to the selection of dam sites, the 
preservation of forests, and conditions of soil erosion.
The unequal distribution of agricultural and mineral resources 
in India has affected the economic viability and political stability of 
the nation as a whole and of its various regions. This unequal distri­
bution of resources has created a regional disparity and rivalry among 
the states and has contributed to fragmentation and regionalism. The 
uneven distribution of agricultural resources in relation to population 
has resulted in some states being deficient in food, i.e., West Bengal 
and Kerala, whereas other states, like Andhra Pradesh and the Punjab, 
have a surplus of food. Similarly, the unequal distribution of minerals 
has posed problems of equitable distribution of industrial establish­
ments in various states. This problem was partially met by the central 
government's efforts to establish industrial plants in various states 
in response to locally available resources. The central government has 
tried to provide reasonably equal opportunity for manufacturai develop­
ment of every state.
293
Because of the urusual concentration of heavy industry in the 
Chota Nagpur plateau, that area has developed labor unrest which con­
tributes to political instability in the region. For example, the 
state governments in Bihar and West Bengal in this region became 
unstable, the ministries were toppled several times, and eventually 
West Bengal turned to a Communist coalition government and Bihar to a 
Congress coalition. Orissa changed its allegiance to a coalition 
government formed by the Swatantra and Jan Sangh Parties.
Since India is deficient in certain minerals and fuels, 
significant sums must be expended in importing these items from foreign 
countries to meet the demand at home. To continue this practice, India 
must maintain good relations with various foreign countries and power 
blocs, especially with ideologically similar countries like the United 
States and the nations of Western Europe.
Widespread poverty, regional economic disparities, and political 
instability can be attributed at least in part to India's immense popu­
lation and the uneven distribution of this population. India has, 
however, finally become aware of over-population as a national problem 
and has started massive family planning programs. "About 5,000,000
births have been prevented in India so far, according to a conservative
1estimate of the Family Planning Department of India." In spite of 
family planning, however, the population has been growing at the alarm­
ing rate of about 13,000,000 per year. The uneven distribution of pop­
ulation has generated several problems for the central administration,
1
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as well as for the various state governments. Some of the most densely 
populated states, such as Kerala and West Bengal, have changed their 
allegiance to Communist governments, hoping somehow to eliminate exist­
ing food scarcities, low wages, unemployment, inadequate housing, and 
generally poor living conditions. The densely settled northern plain 
has become politically unstable since March, 1967, due to regional food 
shortages, the widespread unemployment of educated young people, and 
large numbers of landless laborers. The failure of economic develop­
ment to keep pace with population pressure results in underenployment 
and mounting unemployment, which in turn create frustrations that are 
dangerous to the democratic process.
The lack of unity and political stability in India are 
reflected by the changing political map. The internal map of India has 
changed considerably since independence, and new patterns have emerged. 
After years of resistance by the central administration, linguistic 
states have become the rule.
The economic picture that India presented at the time of 
independence was one of extremes, with princes and privileged classes 
on the one hand and poverty-stricken peasants and suffering masses on 
the other hand. The initial challenges to the stability of the nation 
posed by the mass migration of displaced persons to India from Pakistan 
and by the problems of integrating 562 princely states and nine British 
provinces into a stable nation state"were successfully met.
The reorganization of states on a linguistic basis has 
introduced several disintegrating forces into Indian politics. It has 
developed greater linguistic consciousness and a stronger sense of
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regionalism, which in turn have hindered economic cooperation between 
the states. It has created new forms of social unrest and encouraged 
fissiparous tendencies in the newly united country. It is the writer's 
opinion that independent India should have been organized on the basis 
of geo-economic regions rather than on languages. At present the lin­
guistic agitation is subsiding, but regionalism is getting stronger.
The failure to find a generally agreeable solution to the 
Kashmir problem has presented another obstacle to stability and peace 
in India. In the writer's opinion, the Kashmir conflict is siinply the 
result of other conflicts between India and Pakistan. Even if the 
Kashmir problem had been solved, many of these basic conflicts would 
have remained. There is obviously an ideological difference between 
the two nations. After more than 20 years of separation, however, the 
two parts of Kashmir have developed reasonably peaceful and workable 
political, economic, and cultural links with the respective occupying 
countries. Maintaining the status quo seems at present to be the only 
solution to the problem of maintaining peace and stability in the 
region.
Besides Kashmir, Assam and the North-East Frontier Agency 
have developed into unstable and troublesome areas since independence. 
More and more autonomy within India has been granted to these areas. 
Finally, at least, proper attention is being paid to the economic 
development of the region. ]h the writer's view, however, these areas 
need even more attention from the central government in order to assure 
continued economic development, to provide for peace and stability in the
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region, and to assure the cultural assimilation of the people within 
the Indian nation.
The presence of foreign enclaves within her territory and along 
her coast presented different and sensitive problems to independent - India. 
The French enclaves were integrated by diplomatic intercourse between 
India and France. India also tried to persuade Portugal by diplomacy, 
and through non-violent protests, to vacate its enclaves but with no 
results. India then used force to eliminate Portuguese control of 
these enclaves. This action led to criticism by the western powers.
The offshore islands posed a somewhat different type of 
problem for India. Indian security concepts demanded that they be 
developed for reasons of national defense and security as well as for 
the betterment of the inhabitants. Some of these islands were occupied 
by Japan during World War II, and a threat was posed by a Pro-Communist 
Indonesia in the early sixties. The islands have, now been integrated 
more closely with the mainland than previously, and development pro­
grams are under way.
After four general elections in which representatives to the 
Lok Sdbha and the Vidhan Sabhas have been chosen, a distinct change has 
taken place in the internal political pattern. Although the transfer 
of power from Nehru to two successive prime ministers has been managed 
smoothly and with a sense of responsibility and dignity, the last 
general elections demonstrated that united opposition .strength can 
challenge the ruling Congress Party. Shifting political control from 
the ruling Congress Party to the united opposition, however, does not 
seem to be a favorable omen for the future stability of the nation.
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During its years in power, the Congress Party gave India a much more 
stable political order than prevailed in many other parts of Asia.
With two or three exceptions, the new state coalition governments have 
collapsed, causing political instability and economic distress. Oppo­
sition groups, especially the leftist groups, have tried to influence 
the central government to change its foreign policy towards the Com­
munist nations. The Congress Party's majority control at the national 
level resulted in such demands being rejected by the parliament.
Future viable political patterns which may evolve are ; a 
rightist coalition of the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh, a coalition of 
the Congress Party with either the Jan Sangh or the Swatantra, or a 
Congress Party in the; majority with split opposition from rightist and 
leftist parties. In the long run, the changing patterns of political 
parties may crystallize into two or three national parties and one or 
two local parties. An additional four or five general elections may be 
needed before any stable and viable pattern can develop in state 
governments throughout India.
The external relations of India are as inportant for its 
stability as a democratic nation as are the internal political and 
economic conditions. Serious disagreements with China and Pakistan have 
affected the peace, stability, and prestige of India as a democratic 
country. The long range outlook for peace was irrevocably changed when 
China invaded India in 1962. The aim of this Chinese invasion was to 
deprive India of its moral leadership in the world, especially among 
the Afro-Asian nations. Ideological, political, and strategic considera­
tions motivated China's aggressive action. China's expansionist policy
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has been a constant danger to India's safety and peace. The collusion 
of Pakistan and China in certain foreign policy situations has forced 
India to increase its defense budget and consequently hindered its 
economic progress.
The borders between India, China, and Pakistan are still 
unsettled, and India's stability can only be maintained through internal 
cohesion, and the support of the free world. The nations of the free 
world supported India wholeheartedly during the Chinese invasion in
1962. If India were to fall into hostile hands, unfriendly bases on 
Indian territory could be used to cut the sea and air routes essential 
for trade and lengthen the lines of defense against Communist aggres­
sion. If India were to be drawn into the Communist camp, the rest of 
southeast Asia, where hostile China's influence is less pronounced, 
could easily be incorporated into the power sphere of that nation of 
more than seven hundred million people.
Since achieving independence in 1947, India has had to face 
an astonishing variety of cultural, economic, political, and strategic 
problems. It has, however, survived as a democratic nation. Further­
more, it has proved te be a relatively stable nation and a stabilizing 
influence for peace in the region. With a highly diverse population 
of more than five hundred million, India is finding its place as a 
democratic, and peace loving nation in Asia and in the world.
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APPENDIX I
THE AREAS OF CONFLICTS AFTER REORGANIZATION OF STATES ON A LINGUISTIC BASIS 
INCLUDING LATER CHANGES WITH THE CLAIMANT STATES
Disputed Present Claimed Language Grounds Given by Grounds for Rejection











Separate Marathi Historical, cultural,
State administrative and









Marathi To include the whole





and economic well being 
of both the area
Economic necessity, 
water and power develop­
ment, etc.











Gujarat Maliarastra Marathi Linguistic, cultural, 
economic, and 
historical grounds
The area will be merged 
into water of Uki Dam, 
hence for rehabilita­
tion and the smooth 
running of the project 
it was necessary to 











Grounds Given by 
Claimant
Grounds for Rejection 
of the Claim




Rajasthan Gujarat Rajasthani It was included in 
Bombay state at the 
time of reorganiza­
tion of states
7. Mohindragarh Baryana Rajasthan Hindi
8. Loharu Haryana Raj asthan Hindi



















link with Uttar 
Pradesh, language 
spoken in Ambala 
tehsll was Punjabi
On linguistic, cultural, 
historical, administra­
tive, and economic 
grounds, as well as 
geographic contiguity, 
the area was included 
in Rajasthan
The area will be bene­
fited with the irriga­
tion and power project 








No ample proof of 
Punjabi spoken - lin­
guistic, cultural,his­














Grounds Given by 
Claimant
Grounds for Rejection 
of the Claim





both in Karnal 
district







Total - 397 
villages









by Punjabi people and 
administrative con­
venience
Included in Punjabi 
area under Sacher 






and not ample proof 
given by the claimants
Geographical contiguity 
linguistic affinity and 
no proof for the claims











Haryana Punjab Hindi Linguistic affilia­
tion, administrative 
convenience and irri­
gation and power 
facilities
Punjab Haryana Punjabi Ling;uistic affinity
No proof was given that 
the area is Punjabi 
speaking. Historical 
and cultural affinity 
with Mssar
No ample evidence for 











Grounds Given by 
Claimant





Punjab Haryana Punjabi 
and Hindi
Linguistic affinity 
and included in Hindi 
speaking area in 1956
Geographic contiguity, 
linguistic homogeneity 





















tiguity for canal 
system and power 
complexity
Water and power com­
plexities, shrine 
Anandpur Saheb and 
Bhakra Dam Project
It was part of PEPSU 





and linguistic affinity. 
Topographically the 
area is part of Himachal 
Pradesh
Linguistic affinity, 
topography, dress, diet, yj 
customs, manners, vn
habits, traditions, 




has been part of 
Himachal Pradesh and 
transportation routes 











Grounds Given by 
Claimant



















Ethnically it was a 
part of Himachal 
Pradesh as Dogra 
people were living 
there
with Punjab and communi- 
cational link and trade 
routes with Jammu and 
Kashmir is through Pathan- 
kot Tehsil. It has a 
direct link with Himachal 
Pradesh. Due to stra­
tegic reasons it was 
included in Punjab. North­
east part was included in 
Himachal Pradesh due to 
geographical contiguity 
and cultural affinity.
Linguistic affinity with 
with Punjab and the 
majority of the popula­









Haryana ffindi and 
and Punjab Punjabi
Both states extended their claims to the 
territory for linguistic, cultural, and 
economic reasons. The territory is still 
being claimed by both states.
23.Kasaragod 
Taluk of 
S outh  K anara  
District
















Grounds Given by 
Claimant
Grounds for Rejection 
of the Claim













Madras Tamil and 
Malayalam
Geographical con­
tiguity and economic 
viability
Linguistic affinity
has recommended this 
area to Mysore on the 
grounds given by Mysore 
bat Kerala has protes­
ted strongly. The report 
has not been implemented 
as yet.
Linguistic affinity 
wishes of the people 
administrative and 
p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y
Headwater of river water 
(Periyar river), forest 
economy, rice producing 
areas, hydroelectric 
plants, rubber estates 
and for viability of 
Kerala
26. Sir on j sub- Meidhya 














and wishes of the 
people
Administrative conven­











Grounds Given by 
Claimant







Rajasthan Hindi Cultural affinity 
and historical bonds
Administrative conven­









Telegu Tungabhadra Rroject, 
economic link and 
administrative 
convenience
SRC gave to Andhra 
Pradesh but the dispute 
continued and the area 
was transferred to 

















and Hindi and linguistic affin­
ity (wrongly pleaded 
for linguistic 
affinity)
Tribal and Home of tribal people 
Hindi
commission and Andhra 
followed the verdict, 
although economically 






trial zones, coal bear­
ing areas, Bihar's 
biggest thermal power 
station, Separate state 
will upset the balance 










, . 9r, _ .
Language
Affiliation
Gi’ounds Given by 
Claimant









Bihar Orissa Oriya Linguistic affinity















The SRC gave the area to West Bengal but tlie parliament has transferred to 
Bitar on the grounds that the Rajmahal coal fields and water works for Tata 
















ity and linguistic 
affinity (wrongly 
interpreted)





gation projects and 
geographical contiguity
Mahajan report has 
given 264 villages, 











Grounds Given by 
Claimant





Maharastra Mysore Bilingual Cultural affinity, 
history, adminis­
trative convenience







Note; Belguam was not,transferred to Maharaiâ ra even though tha majority of the 
people î peak Maurathi language. The Mahajan Report was in favor of Mysore. 
M. C. Msihajan himself was against the formation of linguistic states, 
hence he was prejudiced against Maharastra. If whole claim is met, 93$ 
of îfysoi'e's forest wealth will be transferred to Maharastra. The report 
has not been in^lemented. Items 35 and 36 are not officially implemented.
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